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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1. Interest in the relationship between growth and equity has deep roots and a long history in 
economic thinking and development debates.   
2. Traditionally, thinking has been divided between those who favour focusing on efficiency and 
growth as the best way to overcome poverty and inequality and those who advocate explicit 
policies to assist the poor even if this might come at the expense of a slower overall growth rate.  
3. In recent years, however, thinking has evolved beyond such a presumed trade-off with calls for a 
better and more integrated understanding of the relationship between growth and distribution.   
4. Asia’s recent experience of rapid and sustained growth in recent decades has contributed to this 
re-thinking demonstrating that considerable poverty reduction is possible in the face of 
persistent, if not widening, inequalities.  
5. The outbreak of mass protests against authoritarian regimes in MENA – dubbed the ‘Arab 
Spring’ – has similarly shown how a narrow focus on growth and a failure to consider its wider 
ramifications can have far-reaching consequences. 
6. An overriding economic lesson of the decade before the Arab uprisings is arguably that it is not 
growth per se but the type and pattern of growth achieved that matters as well. 
7. This report considers MENA’s recent trajectory of growth and considers critically its prospects 
for achieving inclusive growth.  
8. It is structured into two parts: the first part reviews the evolution of thinking on the relationship 
between growth and equity and considers its prospects in the MENA region from a broad macro 
perspective. The second part itself consists of two parts: first, it focuses on inequality aspects of 
inclusive growth through a detailed case study of wage adjustments and disparities during 
economic crises in Egypt and Jordan; second it offers a detailed study of the role of Micro and 
Small Enterprises (MSEs) in Egypt and in MENA. 
9. Chapter 1 starts first by reviewing the evolution of thinking on growth and distribution in 
economic theory and development policy showing how pro-poor growth strategies have given 
way to concerns about inequality in recent years  
10. It then examines the concept of inclusive growth and its analytical aspects considering whether 
and to what extent it differs from pro-poor growth both analytically and in practice. This 
demonstrates the absence of a universally agreed notion of inclusive growth. 
11. Chapter 2 deals with a wide range of indicators pertaining to economic growth and distribution 
in MENA and analysing, where possible, the experience of these countries over time and in a 
comparative context with other developing regions.   
12. It shows that overall the MENA region has fared relatively better recently both in historical 
terms and compared to other regions.  Most MENA countries enjoyed respectable average 
annual real GDP growth rates of 4%-5% during the period 2000-10.  
13. The same period also witnessed many other encouraging achievements: life expectancy rose, 
educational and health indicators improved, the number and proportion of slum dwellers 
declined and more people enjoyed civic amenities such as access to improved drinking water 
and sanitation.  
14. The demographic experience of the region, however, has been an important challenge exhibiting 
some of the highest national unemployment rates and youth unemployment rates and the 
lowest female and participation in the workforce. In this respect, there is much that the 
countries in the region need to do to enhance their prospects for achieving inclusive growth.  
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15. This Chapter also offers a detailed analysis of poverty and inequality in the region. While the 
absolute level of poverty for each country measured on the basis of the international poverty 
lines may be contentious, the location and the movement of poverty relative to the international 
poverty curve in each country sheds light on the nature of poverty reduction in the country 
concerned.   
16. We argue that the international poverty lines of $2 and $2.75 a day are unlikely to give accurate 
measures of poverty in any of the MENA countries, but it is plausible to maintain that the 
national poverty lines for the MENA countries are likely to fall between the two international 
poverty lines – closer to the lower line for countries such as Egypt and Morocco, and to the 
upper line in the case of the other countries.    
17. As far as inequality is concerned, our data point out to a number of findings. Firstly, the Middle 
East is varied, and so are the income distributions patterns it displays. Secondly, the data tend to 
place the region’s income distribution levels between those for Africa and Asia. Therefore it is 
not true that the Middle East has exceptionally low levels of income inequality. In fact it has both 
high and low inequality levels, and it tends to have moderately high levels of inequality overall 
(some countries like Egypt are on the lower end of the scale of inequality, with an income 
distribution closer to Asian pattern; others, such as Iran, have fairly high inequality, closer to 
African levels). Thirdly, a key finding is that despite huge structural changes in these economies, 
income distribution has not changed by much.  Over the last few years, there are indications of a 
worsening tendency, but the trend is not noticeable when compared to worsening income 
distribution in fast growing Asian countries.  
18. Chapter 3 comes back to the notion of inclusive growth and its measurement. We offer a 
methodology for constructing a single combined score for measuring inclusive growth for 
comparison purposes. This is based on 13 selected indicators pertaining to broader categories 
of: growth, health and demographics, labour force and employment, gender, education, 
sanitation, inequality and governance.  
19. A comparison is offered for standardised inclusive growth scores thus estimated (with a 
minimum = 0 and maximum = 100) for the two periods of 2000-02 and 2008-10.   
20. Our data show that within the Middle East region, Iran and especially Syria follow a deteriorating 
trajectory in this period (with a decline of 13.1% and 19.4%, respectively).  This is in contrast 
with all other countries where a strong trend of improvement is observed: Yemen by as much as 
almost 30%; Lebanon by 25% and Turkey and Israel by about 15%.   
21. Further sensitivity analysis is conducted to establish the relative importance of each of the 
thirteen indicators included in the IG index for a select sample of five North African countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia).  
22. Results show that employment indicators (both employment-to-population ratio and female 
workforce as a % of the total labour force) have the largest impact in all these five countries. This 
is especially true of Algeria (particularly in 2000-02) as well as in Tunisia. Ironically perhaps, the 
inclusion of the inequality indicator (Gini) improves the situation in Egypt. By contrast, almost all 
of these five countries do well in respect of sanitation and education indicators whose 
elimination lowers their IG index below 100%. Last but not least, Morocco shows a more varied 
pattern since its IG index shows sensitivity to the structure of employment as well.  
23. These results are interesting and to a large extent reinforce our descriptive discussion of a wide 
range of indicators offered in Chapter 2.  
24. Chapter 4 focuses on the labour market as an important arena where inequality and social 
impact of economic adjustments and crisis are witnessed, but also where reforms and policy 
interventions can be carried to achieve inclusive targets.    
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25. It examines public-private, gender and education dynamics of wage inequality in Egypt and 
Jordan during a period of economic liberalization and crises. It draws from four comparable 
labour market surveys in Egypt: the 1988 Labour Sample Survey followed by three rounds of the 
Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 1998, 2006 and 2012), and for Jordan, one also highly 
comparable round of the Jordan Labour Market Panel survey (JLMPS 2010).  
26. The results of analysing descriptive data in these surveys point to two distinct phases in Egypt: 
an initial one of wage erosion and narrowing pay differentials, and a subsequent phase of 
recovery of real wages and decompression of the wage structure up until 2006. The onset of the 
financial and post-revolution crisis in Egypt seem to have coincided with a moderation in real 
wage rises, whereby the traditionally lower paid segments saw bigger rises. This resulted in 
compression of wage structure (i.e. reduced inequality), again, but still everyone’s wages are low 
enough that there is a rise of the share of workers below the low earnings line, who can be 
described as the working poor, to a startling 46% of all working Egyptians.  
27. Estimates from a joint model of sector allocation and wage determination based on data after 
the onset of the crisis period in both countries, point to a moderated rise in real pay, and a 
stable wage structure but very wide gender-based pay gaps in the Egyptian private sector by 
international standards.  High returns to university education for women helped maintain a 
compressed gender wage differential in Jordan in comparison to Egypt.  
28. The Chapter concludes by drawing implications for inclusive labour market reforms as MENA 
countries recover from the crisis. Such policies centre on moving away from using the public 
sector as a lead wage-setter and employer of last resort and towards enhancing measures that 
increase the equality of opportunity for modern and relevant training and education 
programmes systems to upgrade the quality of the labour force in the private sector. 
29. Chapter 5 utilises the 2003-2011 MSE surveys in Egypt to evaluate the characteristics of that 
sector in comparison to other surveys in Egypt and similar ones in MENA. It provides a situation 
analysis of the role, scope, challenges and opportunities related to MSEs in Egypt as presented 
by recent enterprise data.   
30. It also examines changes over the 2003-2006 period which witnessed both global recession and 
domestic political upheavals leading to economic crisis. Three main conclusions and broad sets 
of policy recommendations are drawn from the comparative analysis in this chapter. 
31. First, the structure of MSEs is relatively small and mainly concentrated in the range of 2-4 
employees, and the majority of enterprises are concentrated in trade activities followed by 
services and manufacturing activities, so new policies should give more emphasis to 
manufacturing activities to increase their numbers, productivity and employability.  
32. In general, the MSEs productivity, quality of products, competitiveness and ability to innovate is 
rather below the performance of other developing countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Taiwan, Vietnam. Thus any development of the MSEs should involve a serious stress 
on various technical assistance packages for the different types of economic activities, especially 
those that are more competitive and have potentials for growth and expansion.  
33. Second, results indicate that informality still dominates the MSE sector in Egypt. Inherently, 
there is a disincentive to expand beyond a certain limit and most government regulations fail to 
reach them. As they grow, they become visible to taxes and other regulations and so far all the 
institutional steps, procedures and programs that were undertaken to improve the business 
climate surrounding MSEs were not sufficient enough to convince them to work on a formal 
basis. Yet, formal enterprises have better opportunities for interacting in the market and 
expanding their clients' base, with the formal private and public sectors through subcontracting, 
and thus raising their capacities to introduce better production technologies and raise their 
productivity and efficiency. Thus more conducive steps should be introduced to help MSEs 
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become more formal and enjoy the privileges of widening the scope of their markets. Offering 
fiscal incentives such as tax exemptions in the first three years of starting up the business could 
be one step; presenting business bonus for innovation (registering patents or trademarks) and 
tax exemptions for all activities that involve research and development would be another step; 
granting certain fiscal incentives for exporting is also helpful.  
34. Third, the main source of capital for MSEs comes from own savings of the entrepreneurs or 
inheritance.  Formal loans play a very modest role in financing MSEs, therefore the government 
should look into the procedures adopted by the banks and try to improve and facilitate them. Up 
and until now, the outreach capacity of the formal lending institutions is quite limited in its 
ability to support MSEs with its needs for funding. This result indicates that the present financial 
packages are not sufficient to meet the entrepreneur’s need, and are not capable to reach them. 
Strengthening the capacities of the existing NGOs operating in economic support to MSEs is 
direly needed. In addition, new NGOs should be encouraged to operate in this field. Any 
intervention in this respect should target the areas of weakness such as the female owned 
enterprises, and the micro enterprises (less than 5 workers) and rural-located MSEs.  
35. Overall and in addition to boosting the small enterprises through technical assistance, providing 
finance, offering better work places, and opening up windows of transactions with the larger 
enterprises and the public sector and government purchases would act as enabling factors. 
Specifically, new policies should also provide fiscal incentives to large and medium sized 
enterprises for establishing strong business links and extending the supply chain with the MSEs, 
by setting standards to their products, which could be used as intermediate inputs to larger 
enterprises.  
36. In Chapter 6 we see that like with enterprise data, results based on the latest house-hold level 
micro and small enterprises data in Egypt reveal that the structure of MSEs is relatively small and 
mainly concentrated in the range of 2-4 employees and this proportion has been drastically 
increasing over time, particularly as a coping mechanism in recent recessionary times. The 
majority of enterprises are concentrated in trade and the main source of capital for MSEs comes 
from own savings of the entrepreneurs or inheritance sources such as loans , as well as informal 
sources like family loans and ROSCAs.   
37. More in-depth analysis of wealth status of households based on transition matrices for the 
change in wealth status across quintiles for 2006-2012 shows a definite trend towards 
compression with the proportion who moved up from the bottom quintiles and the proportion 
who moved down from the top quintile much higher than in 1998-2006.  
38. Regression analysis based on cross-sectional and panel data with MSEs indicate that they are 
more likely to prosper the larger in size (more than 10 workers and relatively high levels of 
capital), and this indicates that any policy aiming to sustain and develop MSEs should help them 
increase their capital through providing continuous and secure access to finance and technical 
assistance.  The positive changes in the enterprise (size, formality and capital) or the 
entrepreneur’s characteristics (age and education) affect the household’s wealth status 
positively. Training in areas such as domestic and international marketing, technical aspects of 
the production process, legal, financial and administrative procedures is required to enable the 
enterprise to improve their products, add new lines and innovate.  
39. The results show that formal loans play a very modest role in financing MSEs, therefore the 
government should look into the procedures adopted by the banks and try to improve and 
facilitate them. They also single out one rather promising form of informal financing for 
household enterprises in Egypt: ROSCAs, which account for a significant proportion of sources of 
finance for both small and larger enterprises that exceeds both bank loans and household 
savings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the relationship between growth and equity has deep roots and a long history in 
economic thinking and development debates.  Traditionally, thinking has been divided between 
those who favour focusing on efficiency and growth as the best way to overcome poverty and 
inequality and those who advocate explicit policies to assist the poor even if this might come at the 
expense of a slower overall growth rate (Bourguignon, 2000: 2). In recent years, however, thinking 
has evolved beyond such a presumed trade-off with calls for a better and more integrated 
understanding of the relationship between growth and distribution.   
Asia’s recent experience of rapid and sustained growth has contributed to this re-thinking by 
demonstrating that considerable poverty reduction is possible in the face of persistent, and 
widening, inequalities. This has in turn led to a sharper differentiation between policies dedicated to 
fighting poverty and those aiming to improve equality, and more generally, to greater interest in 
making growth more ‘inclusive’ to benefit the widest social and economic groupings.  
Recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) too have raised similar 
issues relating to the nature and type of growth experienced in the region. The outbreak of mass 
protests against authoritarian regimes – widely dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’ – has shown how a narrow 
focus on growth and a failure to consider its wider ramifications can have far-reaching 
consequences. These uprisings in the main occurred against a somewhat paradoxical background of 
a period of relatively improved economic performance in the region.  During 2000-10, for instance, 
MENA’s real GDP growth averaged around 4%-5% a year (Hakimian, 2011) including Tunisia, Libya, 
Yemen and Egypt, where autocratic regimes have been swept away by mass uprisings since early 
2010.  Yet, the region continued to suffer from social and economic disparities with persistently high 
unemployment, particularly amongst the youth. A trickle-down mechanism to spread the benefits of 
growth was either absent or not sufficiently robust to prevent social and political unrest and strife. 
An overriding economic lesson of the decade before the Arab uprisings is thus it is not growth per se 
but the type and pattern of growth achieved that matters as well. 
This report is an in-depth study of inclusive growth in MENA with a focus on employment 
and inequality dimensions. It comes in two main parts: the first part reviews the evolution of 
thinking on the relationship between growth and equity and considers its prospects in the MENA 
region from a broad macro perspective. This section also develops and offers a methodology for 
constructing a single combined score for measuring inclusive growth in these and a number of other 
Less Developed Countries for comparison purposes. 
The second part itself consists of three chapters: first, it focuses on inequality aspects of 
inclusive growth through a detailed case study of wage adjustments and disparities during economic 
crises in Egypt and Jordan; second it offers a study of the role of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) 
in Egypt and in MENA. Finally, the last part uses the panel component of three waves in the ELMPS 
surveys in Egypt to study factors that help enterprises perish or survive. Using transition matrices it 
examines whether they manage to develop their enterprises and thus raise their families’ income; 
and if the small and successful business enterprises are capable of raising the household’s socio-
economic status measured by an asset-based wealth index.  Policy implications to bolster the 
contribution of MSE’s to employment creation and poverty alleviation can be highly relevant to 
other MENA countries. 
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PART 1: LITERATURE, ANALYSIS AND MEASUREMENT OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH   
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1. Literature Review 
1.1 From Growth and Equity to Poverty Reduction and Back?  
Concerns about growth and inequality go back a long way in economic thinking and policy debates.  
Early post-war thinking on the subject was influenced by Kuznets’ seminal work in 1955 which 
posited an ‘Inverted-U Hypothesis’ between growth and income distribution (Kuznets, 1955). 
Accordingly, growth was initially expected to have a detrimental effect on inequality but this was 
eventually to be reversed during the course of long-term economic growth.  
This influential view was to a large extent rooted in development thinking at the time which 
saw structural transformation and growth making differential impacts on different sectors and 
regions. Accordingly, given that some sectors and regions were likely to benefit first, inequality was 
expected to worsen initially.  However, with the benefits of growth and transformation spreading to 
more sectors and regions, the rising trend of inequality would be expected to be reversed and 
equality would improve.  More specifically, this process was driven by shifts in surplus labour from 
the poorer and less productive traditional (or subsistence) sector to the more productive (or 
capitalist) sector. As the weight of the sector with greater inequality (modern sector) rises and 
simultaneously the gap between the two sectors widens, overall inequality would deteriorate at first 
(McKinley, 2009:12). With inequality eventually stabilising, the impact of growth on equality would 
thus show up as an inverted-U shape.  
While Kuznets’ empirical work was based on the historical experience of three developed 
countries only (the US, England and Germany), his influence was nevertheless pervasive enough to 
elevate his contribution to something of an ‘iron law’ in the course of growth and development. This 
was despite the fact that subsequent empirical investigations failed to give a conclusive support in 
favour of the inverted-U hypothesis.  While Barro found empirical support for it in two successive 
studies (2000 and 2008), other studies were more critical casting a shadow of doubt on the empirical 
validity of this hypothesis. For instance, some studies have pointed out to differences in Asia where 
rapid periods of growth (such as in the case of Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 1990s) 
were not accompanied with deteriorating income inequality (Ali, 2007a: 8).  Similarly, based on a 
comprehensive study of the Gini index with some 682 observations for 108 countries, Deininger and 
Squire (1996) failed to find empirical support for Kuznets’ inverted-U curve.  
Empirical ambiguities aside, the wider policy implications of such a simple, and yet powerful, 
hypothesis were perhaps more important.  At one level, the Kuznets curve seemed to imply that a 
degree of deterioration in inequality was inevitable at least in early stages of growth and structural 
transformation. On the other hand, this pessimistic and short term outlook was countered by 
optimism in the long run since growth would eventually pave the way for an improvement in income 
distribution.  What delineated the two phases was a ‘trickle down’ mechanism or process which 
would ultimately kick in, spreading out the benefits of growth.  This influential view – placing 
efficiency and growth before distribution – became dominant during the 1960s as well as during the 
structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s (Bourguignon, 2000: 3).   
The 1970s, however, saw a major rethinking of the subject. This was led by another seminal 
work in 1974 – Redistribution with Growth – which sought to reposition equity at the heart of the 
development agenda (Chenery et al, 1974). Questioning the primacy of growth over distribution, the 
authors argued that, given the weight of the rich in GNP, a strategy of maximising growth was bound 
to be inherently pro-rich.  It was therefore no surprise that the policies adopted to maximise growth 
entailed in the main a range of market- and business-friendly policies (such as lower income and 
corporate taxes, wage-restraint policies and low inflation policies), which have since become the 
norm though they have at the same time been adorned as ‘pro-poor’ in their impact (McKinley, 
2009: 15).  From this perspective, however, what was needed was not so much a redistribution of 
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assets in favour of the poor as the reallocation of public investment to bring about a more just 
distribution of resources over time (McKinley, 2009: 16). 
While the influence of this book was largely limited and its main message drowned in the 
global economic crisis that followed the first oil shock in the mid-1970s, debates had indeed moved 
on and poverty was gradually moving centre stage of the development agenda. This paved the way 
for a more explicit formulation of the case for fighting poverty through ‘pro-poor’ policies. This in 
turn required a more holistic and strategic framework to address the inter-relationships between 
growth, inequality and poverty – beyond the simple growth-distribution trade-off – and the 
attraction of ‘Pro-Poor Growth’ (PPG) policies was in the fact that they seemed ‘to satisfy both 
growth enthusiasts and equity advocates by bringing both objectives into a common analytical 
framework and value system’ (McKinley, 2009: 3). 
At a very general level, it was relatively easy to agree over the broad steer for pro-poor 
policies as those policies that are ‘good for the poor’.  Agreement over the definition of the poor 
was, however, more challenging given two alternative approaches. If poverty was identified in 
absolute terms (such as a simple headcount of those below an international poverty benchmark 
such as $1.25 or $2 a day), then PPG policies could be measured simply by their impact on the poor 
irrespective of what happened to the income of the rest of the population (those above the 
benchmark). In this case, both the extent of poverty (the proportion of the people below the poverty 
line) and its depth (how far most poor people were below that line) depended merely on the rate of 
growth of income for the poor alone. For instance, for two countries starting with the same 
benchmarked poverty ratio, the one enjoying a higher rate of income growth for its poor would be 
more successful in reducing the incidence of poverty (its extent and/or its depth) compared to the 
other where its poor experience a lower income growth rate.  
A different situation arises, however, if poverty is to be defined in relative terms, such as in 
relation to a national poverty line (for instance as a proportion of national mean or median income). 
In this case, for growth to be ‘pro-poor’ the growth of income for the poor has to exceed the rate of 
growth for the income of the population as a whole (DFID, 2004). A corollary of this is, therefore that 
for growth to be pro-poor, income inequality as a whole must fall regardless of how the income of 
those below the absolute poverty line fares.  
The distinction between absolute and relative notions and measurements of poverty can lead 
to two anomalies.  First, it is easy to conceive of the fight against poverty succeeding in absolute 
terms while income distribution as a whole deteriorates (the rich get richer faster than the incomes 
of the poor improve). Second, the converse is also possible: income distribution may improve while 
poverty actually deteriorates (for instance during a recession, if the poor suffer less compared to the 
average contraction in incomes). 
These two different approaches to the notion and measurement of poverty lay at the heart of 
the debate between Ravallion and Kakwani whose seminal works focused on relative and absolute 
poverty respectively (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000, and Kakwani et al, 2004; Ravallion and Chen, 2003, 
and Ravallion, 2004).  Kakwani, who was more concerned with the distributional consequences of 
the growth process, envisaged “pro-poor growth” as being the type of growth that would reduce 
poverty more than it would if all incomes grew at the same rate (Kakwani and Pernia, 2000).  
Ravallion, in contrast, focused on poverty itself, simply defining “pro-poor growth” as growth that 
reduces poverty. He also went as far as arguing that rapid growth is pro-poor because it is poverty-
reducing (Ravallion, 2004). This was seen, for instance, in the case of China which has managed to 
reduce extreme poverty through rapid growth.  
While interest in pro-poor growth strategies had its obvious attractions for those concerned 
with poverty eradication, targeting absolute poverty was both easier and more practical from a 
policy point of view.  This is, for instance, reflected in the Millennium Development Goal of halving 
income poverty by 2015 (DFID, 2004). In more recent years, however, PPG has given way to a 
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broader interest in growth that is more inclusive in character and not limited to just the conditions 
and welfare of the poor.  
An important impetus behind this gradual shift of opinion came from a stark reminder that 
achieving growth and a substantial reduction in poverty were indeed compatible with worsening 
income equality. This was exemplified, for instance, in Asia’s experience in the past two decades, 
where impressive growth rates were combined with a notable decline in poverty alongside rising 
income inequalities.  It has been estimated that every 1% of growth in Asia has been associated with 
an almost 2% reduction in poverty, yet at the same time, data also indicate that income inequality 
has increased over time (Ali, 2007a: 2). Rapid growth between 1990 and 2005, for instance, pushed 
the number of those below the $1-a-day poverty line down to 604 million from 945 million (almost 
halving the headcount ratio from 35% to 18%). Similarly, the number of those below the $2-a-day 
poverty benchmark shrank from 2,046 million to 1,740 million reducing the headcount ratio from 
75% to 52% of the total (Ali, 2007a: 2-3; see also Ali, 2007b on the extent of poverty incidence in 
Asia).   
Much of this decline was attributed to rapid growth in China and Vietnam (in South Asia, in 
fact, poverty incidence remains high).  Nevertheless, this experience shows that the pattern and 
pace of growth is indeed critical to poverty reduction, and moreover, reducing inequality and 
ensuring a more even and equal spread of the benefits of growth requires more than a narrow 
agenda to maximise growth.  This was quite clear in the Asian context, where according to various 
indicators growth had an uneven impact on different groups. For instance, the Gini coefficient 
deteriorated in almost all countries (with the exception of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, which 
were hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis). Similarly, household expenditure surveys have shown 
widening gaps with the growth in per capita expenditure of the top quintile far exceeding that of the 
bottom quintile. In China this ratio was as high as 2.5, in India 3 and in Bangladesh a staggering 25 
(Ali, 2007a: 5).  
By the mid-2000s, therefore, there was a growing and widespread concern that growth had 
to be made inclusive to ensure a more equitable spread of its benefits to the widest population 
possible. For instance, equity featured high on the agenda during the Indian national election in 
2004, as well as subsequently, when the new government built concrete strategies into India’s 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-12) to safeguard and promote the well-being of the poor and 
disadvantaged groups (Government of India, 2006; see also Klasen, 2010). Similarly, the World 
Bank’s World Development Report in 2006 was devoted to ‘Equity and Development’, addressing the 
intrinsic value of equity and focusing on its positive impact on long term development (see also 
Ianchovichina et al, 2009).   
Reflecting Asia’s centrality to concerns about equity, the Asian Development Bank took the 
lead role in articulating the need for inclusive growth, going as far as adopting it as one of its 
‘strategic pillars’. This was formalised in ADB’s Strategy 2020 which lists inclusive growth as the first 
of its three key development agenda (the other two being environmentally sustainable growth and 
regional integration; ADB, 2008).  Such commitment was also reflected in advice given by the 
Eminent Persons Group, which was set up to develop ADB’s strategy for inclusive growth. Reflecting 
on the potentially harmful impact of rising disparities on economic reforms or even on political 
stability, the Group favoured a solution based on “...the continuation of pro-growth economic 
strategies – but with a much sharper focus on ensuring that the economic opportunities created by 
growth are available to all – particularly the poor – to the maximum extent possible.” (ADB, 2007: 
13–14).  
This interest has led to wider debates and a flurry of new contributions and growing 
literature dealing with many aspects ranging from the conceptual and analytical complexities of 
inclusive growth to its measurement difficulties and applications to specific country experiences.   
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The next section discusses the meaning and significance of inclusive growth and examines its 
broader implications for growth and development before turning to an examination of its 
ramifications in North Africa in Section 4. 
 
1.2 What is Inclusive Growth?  
Although growth is widely considered a necessary element in a country’s ability to raise the standard 
of living of its population, it is recognised that growth alone cannot be relied upon to bring about a 
reduction in poverty or, for that matter, a desired improvement in the welfare of all concerned. As 
we have seen, the quality of such growth, its sustainability as well as the degree to which its benefits 
may extend to the widest sections of the society have increasingly become of interest. This has led 
to greater attention being given to inclusive growth as a way of addressing equity considerations 
underlying the growth process in recent years (see Tandon and Zhuang, 2007; Ali, 2007a and 2007b; 
Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010; Klasen, 2010; and Felipe, 2010; Ianchovichina et al, 2009, among 
others). 
Concern about equity has had two main intellectual drivers.  First, those who believe in an 
intrinsic value of equality view it as a matter of human rights and consider its violation as unethical 
or immoral. In this view, equity should form an integral part of the development agenda to ensure it 
is not sacrificed to concerns for higher growth and efficiency in practice. Second, greater equality is 
also deemed by some to have an instrumental value for long term and sustainable growth. From this 
perspective, inequality poses a risk to growth in a number of ways. For instance, ‘it leads to 
inefficient utilization of human and physical resources, lowers the quality of institutions and policies, 
erodes social cohesion, and increases social conflict.’ (Ali, 2007b: 10).  
Looked at from either perspective, inclusive growth now presents a favourite theme for 
growth and development in many regions and there is a wide call for growth to be made ‘broad-
based across sectors and inclusive of the large part of a country’s labour force.’ (ADB, 2011: 12). A 
number of specific reasons support this call. 
First, high growth and greater equity are seen as essential ingredients of the fight against 
poverty. Second, and as mentioned above, widening income disparities are seen as a threat to long 
term growth and prosperity, and last, but not least, inclusive growth is needed to address a more 
complex development agenda capable of transcending poverty eradication and embracing 
‘economic, social and political inequality’ (Ali, 2007a).  
Despite this interest, the main difficulty is that there is not a universally agreed definition of 
‘inclusive growth’. While growth is easier to define and measure, specifying what makes it ‘inclusive’ 
is much more contentious. There is some broad agreement that inclusive growth is growth for ‘the 
benefit of most and not just the poor’, but ambiguities and disagreements abound beyond this 
general notion and it seems that this approach too has encountered some of the conceptual and 
measurement challenges that the Pro-Poor-Growth debates confronted previously.  
Taking a somewhat narrow approach, inclusive growth can be characterised as ‘growth plus 
declining income disparities’ (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). In this formulation, inclusive growth 
comes close to the notion of PPG in relative terms with the difference perhaps that its notion of 
equality is more embracing and reaches beyond the poor.  This definition, it must be noted, excludes 
non-income considerations and, therefore, lends itself much more easily to measurement (Klasen, 
2010: 5).   
Contrasting this and at another extreme, inclusive growth is also sometimes loosely referred 
to as ‘growth that benefits everyone’. In this – perhaps its broadest sense – the concept seems to 
imply that growth should ‘benefit all stripes of society, including the poor, the near-poor, the middle 
income groups, and even the rich’ (Klasen, 2010: 2).  But this is equally problematic and highlights 
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the fact that it is not just who is to benefit from growth but the extent and distribution of such 
benefits are important as well and cannot be overlooked.  
If income distribution is to be improved and inequalities are indeed to be reduced (a 
presumed aspiration behind the search for inclusive growth), then the poor and the rich should not 
be expected to benefit proportionately from growth (by an equal percentage rise in their incomes). 
Narrowing disparities would indeed require a progressive distribution of the benefits from growth in 
favour of the poorer sections of the society. From this perspective then inclusive growth comes close 
to the relative version of PPG with the difference that the definition of the ‘poor’ needs to be 
widened to allow broader social groups (lower and middle income groups) to benefit from growth. 
We shall come back to this later on.  
Both the narrow and broad definitions referred to above face some complications. For 
instance, both are focused on income and emphasise outcomes only.  More recent formulations 
have sought to address these by taking into account non-income elements of the growth process as 
well as characterising inclusive growth as a process and not just an outcome (Klasen, 2010). 
For instance, some recent contributions have stressed the role of opportunities in generating 
inclusive growth.  This is the case with the ADB’s Eminent Persons Group which – as we saw earlier – 
refers to inclusive growth as ‘economic opportunities’ that are ‘available to all – particularly the poor 
– to the maximum possible extent’ (ADB, 2007: 13-14; emphasis added). Several other ADB 
contributions have similarly characterised inclusive growth as ‘growth coupled with equal 
opportunities’ (Ali and Zhuang, 2007; Ali and Son 2007) or even more specifically, ‘inclusive growth 
focuses on both creating opportunities and making the opportunities accessible to all’ (Ali and 
Zhuang, 2007: 10). Accordingly, this depicts inclusive growth as a process – rather than an outcome – 
whereby individuals are provided with improved opportunities to benefit from growth.  
There is, however, some ambiguity over the precise role of the state in the inclusive growth 
process. For instance, are market forces to be relied upon to spread the benefits of inclusive growth 
(through improved opportunities for all) or is state intervention justified to enable individuals to 
improve their outcomes? The former approach, which is arguably a ‘trickle down’ version of the 
inclusive growth approach, is seen in the World Bank’s 2006 Development Report on ‘Equity and 
Development’, which defines equity broadly as ‘equal opportunities to pursue a life of one’s 
choosing.’  In a similar light, Ianchovichina et al emphasise that inclusive growth is about ‘raising the 
pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy’ and not about ‘redistributing resources’ 
(2009: 3).  
For others, however, the provision of public and social goods as well as safety nets and social 
protection are important elements of the inclusive growth package.  Accordingly, Ali and Son (2007) 
refer to the provision of social opportunities (such as access to health and education) and how these 
may vary with income levels.  Similarly, the World Bank’s Commission on Growth and Development 
talked of inclusiveness as a concept encompassing ‘equity, equality of opportunity, and protection in 
market and employment’ (World Bank, 2008). 
Matching this desire to improve opportunities, attention has inevitably been drawn to 
understanding and recognising the roots of unequal opportunities.  Roemer (2006) ascribes 
differences in outcomes (such as income differentials for individuals) to two broad sets of factors: 
differences in individual efforts (which can be controlled by individuals themselves) and differences 
in their circumstances (which cannot be helped by them alone). The latter – differences in 
circumstances – may in turn be understood at two sub-levels: individual-level circumstances (e.g., 
gender, size of household, one’s parental education and income, rural/urban and regional location, 
ethnic and religious backgrounds, etc) and wider circumstances relating to institutional setting and 
social policies in force (such as gender or ethic discrimination, social exclusions, etc). As individuals 
cannot exert any direct influence over their circumstances, such differences are ‘not only ethically 
unacceptable’, they are indeed wasteful and should be ‘addressed through public policy 
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interventions’ (Ali, 2007a: 9; Velez et al, 2012, offer an applied framework for measuring equality of 
opportunity for children in Egypt).  
In this formulation, therefore, inclusive growth can improve individuals’ incentives to work 
harder and to look for new opportunities mainly through their own efforts. What is required to 
achieve inclusive growth is accordingly a double process: one of creating better opportunities and 
another of ‘ensuring equal access’ to these opportunities for all segments of the society (Ali, 2007a, 
10).  
Focus on process helps to broaden the scope of the debate to include social and institutional 
aspects of growth and development.  But it also throws up new challenges. One of these is how to 
deal with a trade-off between processes and outcomes. Is growth more - or less – inclusive when 
improved processes result in poorer economic outcomes? This can happen, for instance, when 
improvements in civil rights and greater mass participation in social and political affairs following a 
social movement or revolution may lead to a setback to economic outcomes caused by short-term 
instability and turmoil.  A converse scenario is equally possible: if better outcomes are secured in the 
absence of any improvements in process, does that make the experience of growth undesirable per 
se? This can happen, for instance, under an autocratic regime when it experiences a period of 
economic boom in the absence of any real reforms or improvements in governance.   
These two scenarios are not entirely hypothetical and resonate well with the recent Arab 
uprisings.  In countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, inevitable turmoil and instability 
associated with regime changes worsened the short term economic outlook just as popular 
expectations for better governance and a more representative political and civil order have 
substantially escalated. Conversely, ‘stable’ periods associated with the autocratic regimes of 
Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia were associated with higher GDP growth and better 
macroeconomic performance compared to the period since their downfall (at least so far). In the 
former case, we see growth but not inclusivity (with the old regimes); and in the latter case, the 
process is arguably more inclusive yet the economic outcome is far from assured.  
This issue could be better addressed if we had a commonly agreed indicator for measuring 
inclusive growth (see McKinley, 2010). But, the conceptual difficulties and challenges we discussed 
above are inevitably mirrored in measurement difficulties and problems, too. If the benefits of 
growth are envisaged in terms of outcomes only (for instance, in terms of better income and/or 
access to social goods and safety net), measurement is generally easier given that such outcomes 
are more readily quantifiable. However, when access to and benefits from growth are envisaged in 
terms of processes, measurement becomes harder and more complex. According to Klasen (2010) 
the absence of universally agreed notion of inclusive growth has led to a wide range of 
measurement indicators which vary from ‘unclear’ to ‘straightforward’ and ‘technically difficult’.  We 
shall come back to this issue in Section 5 below when we offer a methodology for computing a single 
combined score for the measurement of a country’s inclusive growth.  
To sum up this section, we can see that growing interest in inclusive growth has not been 
matched by success over a universal definition that can help both implement and monitor policies 
for inclusive growth. A variety of approaches have emerged with emphases on different aspects of 
the concept.  Narrower concepts stress outcomes (e.g., growth plus equity) and are easier to 
measure and monitor. Wider concepts are multi-dimensional and hence more ambitious in scope: 
they stress improved opportunities for achieving better outcomes; they differentiate between 
processes and outcomes in inclusive growth and they widen outcomes to include non-income 
aspects (social goods and safety nets). An implicit risk is that an overambitious notion of inclusive 
growth becomes both meaningless and impractical if it comes to implying ‘everything for everyone’.  
In the next section, we deal with some of the main economic and social indicators in North 
Africa over the past two decades. We will examine whether and to what extent the experience of 
growth in this period has been inclusive from a broad macro perspective. We will provide 
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comparisons with other regions and focus on the main economic outcomes and opportunities by 
examining a variety of different indicators relating to growth and transformation on one hand and 
access to social and public goods, on the other. 
 
 
2. Inclusive Growth in the MENA Context  
2.1 Growth and Structural Change 
The recent economic performance of the Middle East and North Africa indicates a much improved 
record compared to the 1980s, when ‘slow growth’ posed a threat ‘to social development’ in the 
Arab world. For instance, GDP per capita in the median Arab country in the period 1985-94 was as 
low as 1.1% per annum only (Elbadawi, 2005; see also Esfahani, 2009). In contrast, real GDP growth 
rate for the Arab countries (and the MENA region as a whole) rose markedly after the mid-1990s to 
reach around 4%-4.5% per annum and was sustained thereafter (Table 1).  In comparative terms too, 
this was an encouraging reversal of past trends. In the last decade preceding the outbreak of the 
Arab uprisings (2000-10), the region’s growth rate was almost double that of the world average 
(2.2%) and compared favourably with most other regions (it lagged only behind South Asia’s growth 
which exceeded 7%).   
 
Table 1: Real GDP and Real GDP Per Capita and Growth Rates 
 Real GDP growth 
(average annual %) 
Real GDP per capita growth  
(average annual %) 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2010 
2000- 
2010 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2010 
2000- 
2010 
            Arab World 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.4 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 
East Asia & Pacific 3.5 2.7 3.5 3.9 3.7 2.2 1.6 2.7 3.2 2.9 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.3 3.2 2.7 4.1 3.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.9 2.1 
MENA 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.3 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 
South Asia 5.0 5.4 6.5 7.7 7.1 2.9 3.5 4.9 6.2 5.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.2 3.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 -1.5 0.8 2.1 2.4 2.2 
World 2.3 3.4 2.8 2.3 2.5 0.8 2.0 1.5 1.1 1.3 
                    
Algeria 0.3 3.1 4.9 2.5 3.7 -1.9 1.6 3.4 1.0 2.2 
Bahrain 6.9 4.3 6.1 7.1 6.5 4.2 1.6 3.4 -5.4 0.1 
Egypt 3.4 5.2 3.5 6.2 4.9 1.6 3.4 1.6 4.3 3.0 
Iran  3.5 4.1 5.6 4.5 5.1 1.8 2.2 4.2 3.2 3.8 
Iraq   18.4 -2.0 4.4 1.2  14.9 -4.4 1.4 -1.5 
Jordan 7.3 3.2 6.4 5.9 6.1 1.5 0.5 3.9 3.6 3.7 
Kuwait 15.8 1.9 8.4 4.8 7.3  -1.6 5.1 0.8 3.9 
Lebanon 12.8 1.5 3.8 6.6 5.2 9.3 -0.1 2.2 5.7 3.9 
Libya   3.7 4.3 4.5 4.4  1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Morocco 1.1 4.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 -0.6 2.5 3.8 3.8 2.8 
Oman 5.9 3.4 3.5 6.6 4.9 2.2 3.1 2.1 3.7 2.8 
Qatar     8.5 19.9 13.5    1.6 1.4 1.5 
Saudi Arabia 2.9 2.6 3.8 2.7 3.2 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Syria  8.0 2.3 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.0 -0.1 2.0 2.8 2.4 
Tunisia 3.9 5.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 2.0 4.2 3.4 3.6 3.5 
Turkey 3.3 4.1 4.7 3.3 4.0 1.6 2.5 3.3 1.9 2.6 
UAE 3.8 5.6 5.4 3.2 4.3 -1.5 0.3 -0.6 -8.7 -4.6 
WB & Gaza 6.0 6.2 -1.2    -1.2 1.4 2.1 -4.6   -4.6 
Yemen 5.6 5.5 4.2 3.5 3.9 0.7 2.3     0.8 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012). 
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Taking into account the region’s continued high population growth rates, however, modifies 
the above overall growth picture.  Even so, an annual real GDP per capita growth rate of just over 2% 
still confirms an improving trend line as well as an overall performance that is at least comparable to 
other regions (it was only outpaced by South Asia’s 5.5% and East Asia and the Pacific’s 2.9% annual 
growth rates). 
The growth experience of individual countries within the region, too, confirms this broad 
pattern: an improved trend-line since the mid-1990s which is moderated considerably in per capita 
terms by persistent high population growth rates in many countries. This is specially clear in the GCC 
states where high GDP growth rates are significantly eroded by rapid population growth resulting in 
a variety of per capita outcomes ranging from contraction (UAE), to stagnation (Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain), to low growth (Qatar) and an above average growth rate (Oman and Kuwait). In the case of 
more diversified economies of the region, GDP per capita generally grew either at about regional 
average rates (Algeria, Syria and Libya) or above that (Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Turkey).   
What is further interesting is that the generally better record of economic performance 
during 2000-10 also holds true for the Arab countries that have been affected by the recent political 
upheavals and uprisings. For instance, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria all exhibited real growth rates 
of about 4.5% in the decade before their recent upheavals (averaging around 4.5%) and sometimes 
even better (Egypt’s growth rate for 2006-10 was 6.2% on average; Table 1, see also Hakimian, 
2011). It was thus not so much absence of growth that may shed light on why these uprisings 
occurred, but the pattern and type of growth that was experienced may be just as important and 
deserves closer examination.  
 
Table 2: Average Annual Sectoral Growth (%) 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
2001- 
2010 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
2001- 
2010 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
10 
2001- 
2010 
                Algeria 4.5 3.9 7.3 1.6 4.8 -0.5 4.0 4.1 1.6 3.0 1.0 2.2 5.1 5.4 5.2 
Bahrain                               
Egypt 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 6.9 5.1 3.0 7.5 5.3 1.6 5.7 4.3 6.1 5.2 
Iran 4.5 2.2 5.5 5.4 5.5 3.8 4.2 6.5 7.4 6.7 4.4 3.8 5.2 6.3 5.5 
Iraq   4.2 -3.6   -3.6   25.7 -15.9   -15.9   -14.7 10.9   10.9 
Jordan 3.6 -3.2 10.0 7.7 8.9 8.3 2.6 9.1 5.9 7.5 5.7 4.1 5.4 6.2 5.8 
Kuwait   1.6 14.9   14.9   0.3 3.1   3.1   3.8 10.7   10.7 
Lebanon 11.
9 
1.8 1.2 0.3 0.8 4.7 -0.8 3.5 5.1 4.3 4.0 1.7 3.0 7.5 5.3 
Libya                               
Morocco -
0.5 
10.6 7.7 9.3 8.5 2.1 3.7 4.1 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 5.1 4.3 4.7 
Oman 6 3 1.9 2.6   2.6 4.9 3.3 -0.1   -0.1 6.8 3.6 6.3   6.3 
Qatar                               
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.2 2.0 1.4 0.8 1.1 4.6 1.9 4.2 1.1 2.6 1.4 3.5 3.8 4.4 4.1 
Syria 6.9 6.4 9.1   9.1 9.5 6.8 -1.2   -1.2 4.4 1.6 3.6   3.6 
Tunisia -
1.1 
8.9 2.2 1.2 1.7 4.4 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.1 4.9 6.0 6.5 6.3 6.4 
Turkey 0 7 2.4 1.8 1.0 1.4 4.7 4.2 4.8 3.9 4.3 3.3 4.4 5.2 3.5 4.3 
UAE      -1.5 -5.5 -3.5     4.2 4.0 4.1     10.2 3.8 7.0 
WB & Gaza                               
Yemen 4.5 6.0 0.4   0.4 7.0 8.0 -0.4   -0.4 5.8 3.9 8.4   8.4 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012). 
 
To understand the nature of growth and structural changes in this period, we next look at 
the sectoral growth rates for various countries in the MENA region. Table 2 shows that in general the 
services sector has been the main source behind the recent growth phase in MENA. In nine countries 
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out of fifteen for which data is available, real value-added growth rate in the services sector 
exceeded those of agriculture and manufacturing (these were: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen). In four other countries, agricultural growth outpaced the 
other two sectors (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Syria). Manufacturing growth was superior in only 
three countries in the region: in one (Iran), it was the fastest growing sector and in two others (Egypt 
and Turkey), it matched growth in services. We shall come back to this issue later to examine the 
contribution of these sectors to employment and job creation. 
 
2.2 Demographic Trends and Characteristics  
Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of the demographic changes and dynamics in the MENA region 
compared to the rest of the world. It can be seen that the region as a whole has benefited from 
improvements in life expectancy combined with a sustained decline in infant mortality rates. Since 
1990, the under-5 mortality rate in the MENA region has more than halved (from 71 to 31 per 1,000) 
helped by significant falls in Egypt, Turkey, Morocco and, to some extent, Iran. Similarly and 
reflecting this, life expectancy at birth in the MENA region has now risen to just above the world 
average (72.2 years against 69.4) bringing it close to those of East Asia and Latin America (73-74 
years).  Improvements in the Arab world, however, have lagged behind MENA as a whole due to 
slow progress in Yemen and Iraq.   
 
Table 3: Demographic Trends in the MENA Region, 1990-2009 
 Life Expectancy at 
Birth, Total (years) 
Mortality rate,  
under-5 (per 1,000) 
Fertility Rate,  
Total (births per 
woman) 
 1990 2000 2009 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2009 
          Arab World 63.2 67.4 69.9 84.9 64.1 51.4 5.1 3.8 3.3 
East Asia & Pacific 69.0 71.0 73.0 53.4 37.2 23.0 2.5 1.9 1.8 
Latin America & Caribbean  68.2 71.6 73.9 54.4 34.5 23.3 3.2 2.6 2.3 
MENA 64.8 69.8 72.2 70.7 46.1 31.3 4.8 3.2 2.7 
South Asia 58.5 61.9 65.0 120.3 88.8 67.0 4.2 3.3 2.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.6 49.8 53.8 174.6 154.8 121.2 6.2 5.6 5.0 
World 65.4 67.2 69.4 89.9 74.7 57.9 3.2 2.7 2.5 
                    
Algeria 67.1 70.0 72.6 67.6 48.9 36.0 4.7 2.6 2.3 
Bahrain 72.5 73.8 74.9 17.0 12.2 10.2 3.7 2.7 2.6 
Egypt 62.0 69.1 72.7 93.5 46.5 21.8 4.4 3.3 2.8 
Iran 61.9 69.7 72.5 64.8 43.9 25.8 4.8 2.2 1.7 
Iraq 67.5 70.7 68.1 46.1 42.8 38.6 6.0 5.3 4.8 
Jordan 70.4 72.1 73.2 38.3 29.4 21.7 5.8 3.9 3.8 
Kuwait 72.7 73.8 74.5 15.4 12.6 11.1 2.6 2.6 2.3 
Lebanon 68.7 70.6 72.2 38.3 29.3 22.1 3.1 2.4 1.8 
Libya 68.1 72.5 74.5 44.5 27.2 16.9 4.8 3.1 2.6 
Morocco 64.1 68.7 71.6 85.9 55.3 35.5 4.0 2.7 2.3 
Oman 70.6 74.1 73.0 47.2 21.5 9.3 7.2 3.6 2.4 
Qatar 74.1 76.3 77.9 20.8 12.7 8.2 4.2 3.1 2.3 
Saudi Arabia 68.8 71.5 73.6 44.6 25.8 17.5 5.8 4.0 2.9 
Syria 71.1 74.0 75.6 38.2 23.0 16.0 5.3 3.6 3.0 
Tunisia 70.3 72.6 74.5 49.3 28.4 16.1 3.6 2.1 2.1 
Turkey 63.1 69.4 73.4 79.8 42.7 17.6 3.0 2.4 2.1 
UAE 72.1 74.6 76.4 21.5 12.4 7.1 4.4 2.6 1.8 
WB & Gaza 68.0 70.9 72.5 44.7 30.6 22.3 6.5 5.4 4.5 
Yemen 56.1 59.7 64.6 128.0 99.5 77.0 8.7 6.5 5.3 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012). 
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Table 3 also shows that after a significant delay, the region’s demographic transition has at 
last taken effect, marked by a slow reduction in fertility rates. Although significantly lower than in 
1990 (5 births per woman), the region’s fertility rates in 2009 still stand above that of other regions 
and comes second after Sub-Saharan Africa (around 3 births per woman compared to Africa’s 5 
births per woman). Within the MENA countries, there is wide variation: Iran, the UAE and Lebanon 
have the lowest fertility rates (below 2 births per woman and on par with East Asia) in contrast to 
Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza and Iraq, which have the highest (between 4.5 and 5.3 children per 
woman). 
 
Table 4: Median Age and Age dependency Ratios, 1990-2010 
 Age Dependency Ratio (% Working Population) Median Age 
 (over 65) (under 15)  
 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 
          Arab World 6.3 6.7 6.6 80.0 65.7 54.3 - - - 
East Asia & Pacific 9.1 10.7 12.0 45.4 39.5 30.2 26.3 30.8 35.5 
Lat America & Caribbean  8.3 9.2 10.6 61.4 51.0 42.7 22.0 24.5 27.6 
MENA  6.7 7.2 7.0 80.9 61.8 46.9 - - - 
South Asia 6.6 6.9 7.5 68.4 59.9 49.6 20.3 22.0 24.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.7 5.7 5.9 87.4 82.7 78.0 17.3 17.9 18.6 
World 10.2 11.0 11.6 53.7 48.1 40.9 24.4 26.7 29.2 
                    
Algeria 6.7 6.7 6.7 80.9 55.5 39.6 18.1 21.7 26.2 
Bahrain 3.4 3.6 2.6 50.0 40.5 25.7 25.4 27.4 30.1 
Egypt 6.8 7.4 7.9 74.2 60.5 49.7 19.4 21.4 24.4 
Iran 6.7 7.4 7.3 89.8 57.8 31.9 17.1 20.8 27.1 
Iraq 7.7 7.1 6.1 92.9 82.4 80.6 16.6 18.0 18.3 
Jordan 7.1 5.8 6.7 93.6 70.0 64.0 16.4 19.4 20.7 
Kuwait 2.4 4.4 3.5 56.7 37.9 37.7 22.4 28.3 28.2 
Lebanon 8.9 10.8 10.7 61.4 48.6 36.5 21.7 25.6 29.1 
Libya 4.8 5.3 6.6 80.6 50.4 46.6 17.7 21.9 25.9 
Morocco 6.8 7.6 8.3 70.4 54.4 42.1 19.7 22.6 26.3 
Oman 4.3 4.1 3.6 87.4 60.4 38.6 17.6 21.0 25.3 
Qatar 1.7 2.3 1.2 40.2 36.1 15.8 28.8 30.3 31.6 
Saudi Arabia 4.8 5.8 4.4 78.2 66.6 45.5 19.4 20.9 25.9 
Syria 6.8 6.5 6.7 93.5 71.2 62.4 16.4 19.1 21.1 
Tunisia 8.0 10.0 10.0 66.5 47.2 33.7 20.8 24.7 28.9 
Turkey 6.3 8.0 8.8 60.7 47.9 39.0 21.7 24.5 28.3 
UAE 
Emirates 
1.7 1.4 0.5 45.8 34.9 20.6 26.5 28.1 30.1 
WB & Gaza 4.3 4.6 5.0 96.4 94.1 77.6 15.9 16.2 18.1 
Yemen 4.9 5.3 4.8 118.4 100.3 83.1 13.9 15.5 17.4 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012) and UN Population database (2010).  
 
The fast pace of population growth in the region in the past few decades is also reflected in a 
number of other ways and characteristics. Table 4 shows that the age structure of the region 
continues to be heavily skewed in favour of those under 15 years of age. While those above 65 
account for a stable portion of the working population (6%-7%), the young (under 15) make up for 
more than half of the working population as a whole. Thus, overall dependency ratios have been 
gradually declining (the combined share of those below 15 and above 65 was around 53-60% in 2009 
against 86% twenty years earlier). Whilst this implies a favourable change in the structure of the 
population in favour of producers as opposed to consumers overall, as we shall see below the rise in 
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the number of those within the working population group has posed serious challenges to the 
dynamics of the labour force and employment in the region and this is likely to continue for a while.  
The young age structure of the region is also clear from the region’s strikingly low median 
age where in some countries the median age is among the lowest in the world and generally 
comparable to that for the Sub-Saharan Africa: Iraq (18.3), Syria (21.1); West Bank and Gaza (18.1) 
and Yemen (as low as 17.4).   
 
2.3 Labour Force and Employment  
Table 5 highlights the twin features of the MENA region’s labour markets: very high labour force 
growth rates combined with limited employment and job opportunities.  
As seen above, high population growth over the past few decades has created a 
demographic momentum that continues to swell the size of the workforce in the region.  Although 
gradually moderating over the last two decades, annual labour force growth in the Arab world and 
the MENA region as a whole has been consistently the highest in the world (exceeding all regions 
including the Sub-Saharan Africa). Within MENA, small GCC states have experienced the fastest 
labour force growth rates boosted by incoming migration: the size of the workforce in the UAE, 
Qatar and Bahrain, for instance, grew at double digit rates between 2006 and 2009.  But most others 
too have seen a considerable and sustained additional growth in the size of their workforce: Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt and Algeria are among the notable ones.    
 
Table 5: Labour Force Growth and Employment-to-Population Ratios, 1990-2009 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012). 
 Labour Force Growth,  
Average Annual (%) 
Employment-to-Population Ratios  
(% of population aged 15+) 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
2001- 
2009 
Arab World 3.6  3.1  3.4 2.6 28.1 28.1 27.2 27.7 27.4 
East Asia & Pacific  1.4  1.3  1.1 0.8 63.7 58.1 53.8 51.7 52.9 
Latin America & Caribbean  3.0  2.7  2.6 1.4 48.2 46.2 44.5 45.1 44.8 
MENA 3.6  3.5  1.8 2.4 28.0 28.2 28.0 28.5 28.2 
South Asia 2.2  2.2  2.3 1.5 46.1 44.0 42.6 42.1 42.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.2  3.1  3.0 2.3 48.8 48.7 48.8 49.4 49.1 
World 1.6  1.7  1.7 1.1 51.5 47.9 45.7 45.1 45.5 
                 
Algeria 5.4  4.5  3.6 2.2 23.7 22.9 27.6 36.3 31.5 
Bahrain 3.5  3.2  3.2 13.0 32.3 32.6 32.6 30.7 31.8 
Egypt 2.2  2.4  2.5 2.1 23.9 27.3 26.7 25.3 26.1 
Iran 2.8  4.9  4.8 1.7 31.4 30.9 32.4 32.3 32.4 
Iraq 3.6  3.6  2.6 2.3 20.8 19.7 16.2 18.0 17.0 
Jordan 9.3  3.1  3.3 1.5 18.3 21.1 19.5 19.3 19.4 
Kuwait 1.5  5.5  3.4 2.3 33.6 34.1 32.4 29.9 31.3 
Lebanon 5.8  2.1  2.8 1.6 24.3 23.4 23.7 23.2 23.5 
Libya 5.2  4.8  3.3 1.8 25.8 26.9 28.6 28.9 28.7 
Morocco 3.3  2.6  2.4 1.3 39.8 39.5 35.6 34.9 35.3 
Oman 7.7  0.5  2.8 3.2 27.4 28.2 27.8 28.5 28.1 
Qatar 1.0  3.1  13.4 19.1 49.0 42.6 48.9 61.7 54.6 
Saudi Arabia 3.7  2.7  6.3 2.6 22.1 22.1 23.1 20.3 21.8 
Syria 5.8  2.8  3.3 2.4 39.7 36.8 32.3 34.3 33.2 
Tunisia 3.4  2.5  2.0 1.3 27.8 25.6 23.7 22.7 23.2 
Turkey 1.2  0.4  1.3 1.1 44.3 40.8 33.4 30.4 32.1 
UAE 7.9  6.4  9.9 13.1 44.1 43.3 44.3 40.9 42.8 
WB & Gaza 4.6  4.5  5.9 4.3 19.3 20.9 15.9 17.2 16.4 
Yemen 6.9  4.0 4.7 3.4 45.4 45.5 45.8 46.5 46.1 
20 
 
 
Clearly, such supply-side demographic developments pose a serious challenge to the 
region’s ability to provide employment and jobs to the ever rising number of those entering the 
labour market every year.  
What is also notable is that Table 5 also shows that the regions’ fastest labour force growth 
goes hand in hand with some of the lowest employment-to-population ratios compared to other 
regions. Again the Arab world and the MENA region as a whole exhibit some of the lowest ratios 
indicating the combined effects of both a large pool of job-seekers and limited employment 
opportunities. We can see that for the region as a whole only about 28% of the population over 15 
years is employed and this ratio has been remarkably constant over the past twenty years (even 
slightly declining in the Arab countries). This compares poorly with the rest of the world, where 
similar ratios range between 42.4% (South Asia) and nearly 53% (East Asia).  Again, there is 
considerable variation within MENA itself. For some of the countries the employment-to-population 
ratios are strikingly lower: Iraq (17%), Jordan (19.4%), Saudi Arabia (21.8%), Tunisia (23.2%) and the 
West Bank and Gaza (16.4%).  These numbers clearly confirm the size of the employment challenge 
that the region as a whole and various countries within it face.  
 
Table 6: Labour Force Statistics (Period Averages) 
 Labour Participation Rate  
(% of population aged 15+) 
Labour Force, Female  
(% of total labour force) 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
2001- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
2001- 
2009 
           Arab World 51.1 51.5 51.4 52.0 51.7 23.0 23.8 24.2 24.5 24.3 
East Asia & Pacific 74.9 74.2 72.7 71.4 72.1 43.6 43.6 43.6 43.7 43.7 
L America & Caribbean  62.3 62.9 63.9 65.3 64.5 35.6 37.2 38.8 40.2 39.4 
MENA  50.5 50.9 51.1 51.6 51.3 22.4 23.9 24.5 25.0 24.7 
South Asia 60.5 59.5 58.8 58.8 58.8 28.1 28.0 27.9 28.7 28.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.4 69.7 70.2 70.5 70.3 42.2 42.7 43.2 43.3 43.2 
World 66.2 65.6 65.0 64.8 64.9 39.5 39.6 39.7 40.0 39.8 
                     
Algeria 51.0 54.2 56.5 58.1 57.2 24.6 27.0 29.6 31.2 30.3 
Bahrain 65.4 65.3 65.0 64.1 64.6 18.1 19.9 21.2 18.6 20.1 
Egypt 50.1 49.2 48.3 48.1 48.2 25.8 24.7 24.0 23.7 23.9 
Iran 51.4 51.2 52.3 52.1 52.2 23.3 27.1 28.3 29.6 28.9 
Iraq 41.7 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.5 14.1 15.1 16.1 16.5 16.3 
Jordan 47.6 49.6 49.0 49.4 49.2 17.9 20.1 21.3 22.4 21.8 
Kuwait 66.7 70.2 70.2 68.7 69.5 24.2 23.2 24.5 24.4 24.5 
Lebanon 44.0 44.6 45.1 45.5 45.3 22.3 22.7 23.8 25.0 24.3 
Libya 47.7 49.7 51.7 52.4 52.0 16.7 20.5 22.6 22.7 22.7 
Morocco 53.0 53.8 52.0 52.3 52.1 24.6 26.2 25.1 26.0 25.5 
Oman 58.1 58.8 57.0 55.9 56.5 12.3 14.6 18.3 18.1 18.2 
Qatar 79.7 76.2 79.5 83.6 81.4 14.7 14.8 16.0 13.3 14.8 
Saudi Arabia 53.6 53.9 54.6 54.7 54.6 11.0 13.3 14.9 15.8 15.3 
Syria 51.5 51.3 49.3 50.3 49.8 20.5 21.1 19.6 20.5 20.0 
Tunisia 48.2 48.3 47.8 48.0 47.9 22.6 24.3 25.6 26.6 26.0 
Turkey 55.3 52.7 49.1 47.4 48.3 28.5 27.9 27.1 26.1 26.7 
UAE 73.8 75.2 76.3 77.4 76.8 10.9 12.0 13.4 14.4 13.8 
WB & Gaza 38.9 39.1 39.7 42.6 41.0 14.1 13.6 14.9 18.0 16.3 
Yemen 45.4 45.5 45.8 46.5 46.1 18.6 18.8 19.8 20.9 20.3 
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
 
Table 6 shows that the prognosis for the region’s employment problem could indeed be 
even more challenging in the years to come. This indicates that the current population bulge within 
the working age groups comes against some of the lowest overall labour force participation rates 
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(LFPR) in the world. The region’s LFRP is around 51%-52% compared to 60%-70% in other regions. As 
more of the population become active, this can only add to pressures on jobs and employment in 
the future.  
 
 
Table 7: Employment by Economic Sector (Period Averages - % Total) 
 Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
 
Indeed, the region’s low LFPR is in the main due to very low female labour force 
participation rates – again the lowest by world standards. In general, female workers make up only 
about a quarter of the workforce in the MENA region, whereas the norm elsewhere is over 40% 
(Table 6). In some of the Arab countries, females account for an even lower share of the total 
workforce: in Qatar (14.8%), Saudi Arabia and Iraq the proportion of females in the labour force is 
only 15%-16% and in Oman and Bahrain 18%-20%. Thus a rise in the economic activity of women in 
the coming decades can only boost labour supplies intensifying competition over scarce jobs. This 
means that supply-side forces will be in operation for years to come compounding the region’s 
employment challenge already strained by demand-side factors and its limited ability to boost 
demand for new jobs. 
To analyse the changing nature of jobs, the next two tables disaggregate employment data 
by sector and status. Table 7 shows that, as expected, for most countries in the region, the services 
sector is the largest provider of jobs and has been growing in importance over time. This is true of 
the more populous countries such as Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Algeria, where around 40%-50% 
of jobs are concentrated in the services. In some of the GCC states (Saudi Arabia and UAE) as well as 
in Jordan, this sector accounts for as high as three-quarter of all jobs. The share of industrial sector 
in some of the largest countries of the region (Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria 
and Jordan) reaches 20%-30% of all employment. 
Table 8 shows that with the exception of Morocco and Turkey, family workers account for a 
very low share of overall employment in the MENA region and the bulk of employment is made up 
  Agriculture Industry Services 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
             Algeria   21.0       24.8       54.1   
Bahrain 2.4   1.5   28.5   28   68.6   67.8   
Egypt 34.8 30.1 29.7 31.5 22.3 22.4 20.6 22.4 42.9 47.3 49.6 46.0 
Iran   23 24.7 22.4   30.7 30.3 32.0   44.3 44.8 45.6 
Iraq     17.0 22.7     17.8 19.2     65.1 56.8 
Jordan   4.9 3.9 3.0   21.8 21.7 19.5   72.8 74.2 77.4 
Kuwait 2.1   1.4   22.9   19.5   73.9   78.9   
Lebanon                         
Libya                         
Morocco 11.4 5.6 36.9 42.1 32.8 34.0 22.1 21.0 55.5 59.8 41.0 36.7 
Oman 9.3 6.85     7.5 9.5     81.6 83.5     
Qatar   3.7 2.5 2.65   33.1 39.6 46.7   62.9 57.4 50.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
  6.2 5.35 4.5   20.5 21.0 19.4   73.3 73.5 76.1 
Syria 27.8 26.2 29.6 19.1 28.4 29.2 26.5 29.1 43.9 44.5 43.8 51.8 
Tunisia                         
Turkey 44.3 40.3 34.0 24.4 21.9 23.5 23.3 26.1 33.8 36.2 42.8 49.6 
UAE 8.0 7.9 4.9 4.2 33.6 33.4 39.8 24.3 58.2 58.6 54.4 71.0 
WB & 
Gaza 
  13.2 14.5 15.0   34.7 25.9 24.5   51.5 58.5 59.5 
Yemen 53.1 55.2     11.1 10.9     32.9 33.3     
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of self-employed and wage and salaried workers. Self-employment is relatively high in Egypt, Iran, 
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Yemen and Morocco, although its share has been broadly constant or falling 
in the last two decades.  In some of the smaller GCC states (UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) almost all 
employment is taken up by those in the wage and salaried workers category (their share in total 
employment is as high as 96%-99%). Elsewhere, too, high ratios probably reflect the predominance 
of the public sector and its importance in providing the bulk of jobs. For most other countries 
(including Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt) the ratio is around 50%-60%.  
 
Table 8: Employment Status (% Total Employed) 
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
 
Table 9 shows that MENA’s unemployment rate has been consistently in double digits in the 
past twenty years and continues to exceed the rate for other regions (around 12% during the period 
2000-2009 against 4%-8% elsewhere). Within the region itself, the GCC states are again the 
exception to the rule with much lower unemployment rates (averaging 1.5%-5.5% during 2001-09). 
Elsewhere, the pattern is very different: the highest rates are seen in the West Bank and Gaza, Iraq 
and Algeria (19% or above), with Iran, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen in the lower teens (10%-15%).  
Official unemployment data most probably underestimate real unemployment in many 
MENA countries and even if they could be taken at face value, a significant portion of those 
‘employed’ fall into the ‘vulnerable employment’ category (those either self-employed or working as 
contributing family workers). This category of employment lacks the formality that goes with wage 
and salaried jobs and consists of many informal occupations. For the MENA region as a whole, over 
one-third of all those employed can be considered as being ‘vulnerable’ (lack formal jobs). Given the 
precarious nature of some of these jobs, they can pose an additional threat to unemployment 
figures. Within the region, the share is even higher for some countries such as Iran, Morocco, 
Turkey, Syria (40%-50%). As we have already seen (in Table 8 above), only in the small GCC sates is 
the share of vulnerable employment almost negligible (UAE, Qatar and Kuwait) thanks to the 
predominance of the wage and salaried workers.   
 Contributing Family Workers Self-Employed Wage and Salaried Workers 
 1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1991- 
1995 
1996- 
2000 
2001- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
             Algeria     7.8       36.8       55.9   
Bahrain                         
Egypt 13.7 10.1 11.8 13.6 43.6 37.3 40.8 39.9 56.4 62.1 59.2 60.2 
Iran   5.5 12.9 9.7   45.2 36.2 47.5   51.7 50.3 52.3 
Iraq                         
Jordan     0.9 0.5     10.4 10.7     82.0 83.9 
Kuwait             2.7       97.3   
Lebanon     3.3 4.4     36.9 37.3     62.1 62.1 
Libya                         
Morocco 19.2 21.5 25.8 25.1 51.5 48.5 55.2 55.3 48.5 47.4 42.4 44.1 
Oman         13 12.1     85.8 87.2     
Qatar           1.2 1.1     98.7 98.8   
Saudi 
Arabia 
                        
Syria     16.5 8.9     50.8 46.3     49.2 53.7 
Tunisia 0.9 7.6 7.9   29.2 31.1 33.4   70.2 68.3 66.5   
Turkey 29.3 25.4 19.8 13.4 59.5 54.9 49.5 40.5 40.5 45.1 50.5 59.5 
UAE     0 0     3.1 4.2     96.9 95.8 
WB & Gaza   9.5 10.4 10.2   36.6 40.8 37.3   63.4 59.2 62.7 
Yemen   0.3         58.4     41.6     
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Table 9: Unemployment 
 Unemployment Rate, Total  
(% of total labour force) 
Unemployment with Tertiary Education 
(% of total unemployment) 
Vulnerable Employment  
(% of total unemployment) 
 1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2009 
2001-
2009 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2009 
2001-
2009 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2009 
2001-
2009 
                Arab World     14.9 10.9 12.2                     
East Asia & Pacific 2.8 3.6 4.7 4.7 4.7                     
Latin America & Caribbean  7.2 8.6 8.9 7.3 8.2     11.8 12.3 11.9   32.7   30.3 30.3 
MENA 12.6   13.0 10.5 11.7                 36.7 36.7 
South Asia 3.3 3.4 4.6   4.6 26.1 28.0 31.1   31.1           
Sub-Saharan Africa                               
World 5.3 5.4 6.4   6.4                     
                               
Algeria 23.8 27.6 22.5 12.5 18.7 10.8   10.0   10.0     31.6   31.6 
Bahrain 6.3   5.5   5.5   18.0 19.6 33.6 24.2           
Egypt 10.4 8.5 10.4 9.4 9.9           27.0 23.7 23.8 26.1 24.4 
Iran 11.1 9.1 11.7 10.6 11.3     19.6   19.6   41.1 43.2 42.4 42.6 
Iraq     24.3 17.5 22.6                     
Jordan 17.15 13.7 14.95 12.9 14.1               3.0 3.9 3.4 
Kuwait 0.7 0.7 1.4   1.4 6.3 2.7 9.9 9.6 9.9     2.1   2.1 
Lebanon   8.5 7.9 9.0 8.5               31.8 27.8 29.8 
Libya                               
Morocco 18.0 16.3 11.6 9.8 10.8 11.9 17.9 20.2   20.2 47.5 47.0 51.6 51.4 51.5 
Oman             4.4                 
Qatar   2.3 2.7 0.5 2.0   21.5         0.7 0.4   0.4 
Saudi Arabia   4.5 4.9 5.6 5.4   16.8 19.3 35.0 29.8           
Syria 7.2 8.4 11.2 8.4 10.5     9.8   9.8     42.4 37.8 40.1 
Tunisia   15.9 14.6 14.2 14.5 1.7 4.9 9.2   9.2 20.9         
Turkey 8.4 6.9 10.1 11.4 10.7 5.4 8.4 11.0 12.4 11.4   48.6 44.4 34.8 40.1 
UAE 1.8 2.3 3.1 4.0 3.6 20.3   21.6   21.6     1.6 1.2 1.4 
WB & Gaza   16.9 27.5 23.9 25.4   18.5 17.2 22.4 18.7   31.1 36.6 32.5 34.8 
Yemen 8.3 11.5 16.2 15.4 15.7             31.3       
                
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
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Table 9 also shows that one important feature of MENA’s unemployment is that those with 
tertiary education feature prominently among the ranks of the unemployed. Although data is 
patchy, in several countries they account for as high as one-fifth of total unemployment (as in the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran and Bahrain). Elsewhere (Algeria, Kuwait, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) 
their share is still around 10%.  
Another well-known and marked feature of unemployment in the region is very high youth 
unemployment rates. Despite the region’s improved growth experience in the last decade, it appears 
that MENA’s Achilles heel has been its inability to translate such growth into productive jobs 
especially for its young population (see Dhillon, 2009, and Radwan, 2006 on MENA youth 
unemployment).  As we have already seen, MENA’s population is generally very young. The working-
age youth (those between 15 and 29 years of age) account for about one-quarter to one-third of the 
total population across countries in the region. Unfortunately, the youth bulge in the region suffers 
unemployment rates that are well above the national average rates, which is high by world 
standards, as we saw earlier. Figure 1 shows that the youth unemployment rate in 2010 was at least 
twice as high as the overall national average rates in most Arab countries for which recent data is 
available. In Iraq and the West Bank official youth unemployment rate exceeded 40%, followed by 
Saudi Arabia (30%), Tunisia (29.4%), Jordan (28%) and Egypt (25%). Elsewhere at least one of out of 
five youth was unemployed (Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Morocco). Given the absolute size of the 
youth bulge, it is not surprising that the youth make up a significant bulk in total unemployment 
figures. According to ILO figures (KILM, 2009), these range from one-third in Turkey (2009), to two-
fifth in Morocco (2009), to half in Saudi Arabia and Iran (2008) and as high almost two-thirds (63%) 
in Egypt (2007). Figure 1 also shows that in Arab countries, somewhere between two and four out of 
ten people aged 15 to 25 years are unemployed.  
 
Figure 1: Total Unemployment and Youth Unemployment Rates* (%)  
Selected Arab Countries (2010) 
 
 
Notes:  *  Youth unemployment refers to those aged 15-24 years;  
 (a)-2008; (b)-2007; (c)-2009 
Source:  ILO (2011). 
 
Figure 2 confirms the serious nature of youth unemployment in MENA indicating that these 
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Kuwait topping the list, where youth unemployment is 15 times higher than the national 
unemployment rate, followed by Saudi Arabia (10 times) and Bahrain and Qatar (5 times). 
Elsewhere, this ratio varies between 2.2 and 3.6 (Yemen and Lebanon, respectively.   
 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of Youth Unemployment Rate to Adult Unemployment Rate in MENA  
(1999-2009) 
 
 Source: KILM (2011).   
 
 
Table 10: Employment Elasticities 
 Total Male Female 
 1992-
1996 
1996-
2000 
2000-
2004 
2004- 
2008 
1992-
1996 
1996-
2000 
2000-
2004 
2004- 
2008 
1992-
1996 
1996- 
2000 
2000- 
2004 
2004- 
2008 
Algeria 0.87 1.01 1.29 1.53 1.45 1.69 1.63 2.18 0.68 0.76 1.15 1.24 
Bahrain 0.68 0.66 0.44 0.34 1.02 1.25 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.52 0.42 0.30 
Egypt 0.67 0.48 0.82 0.57 0.66 0.66 1.30 0.87 0.67 0.44 0.69 0.49 
Iran 0.84 1.44 0.59 0.56 2.14 1.88 0.74 0.83 0.46 1.30 0.54 0.46 
Jordan 1.99 0.36 0.69 0.58 2.58 0.68 1.15 0.80 1.90 0.31 0.61 0.54 
Kuwait 0.02 2.93 0.41 0.46 0.05 3.16 0.51 0.65 0.02 2.87 0.38 0.40 
Lebanon 0.69 0.92 0.52 0.37 0.81 1.31 0.68 0.46 0.65 0.80 0.47 0.34 
Libya -0.82 2.00 0.49 0.38 -1.51 3.49 0.66 0.62 -0.68 1.62 0.44 0.32 
Morocco 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.40 0.89 1.00 0.50 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.43 
Oman 1.21 0.63 0.50 0.42 1.02 2.07 1.25 0.86 1.24 0.41 0.36 0.33 
Qatar 0.37 0.28 1.26 1.03 1.56 0.46 0.54 0.85 0.20 0.25 1.37 1.05 
Saudi Arabia 1.99 1.74 1.00 0.68 2.85 3.10 1.48 1.25 1.89 1.55 0.93 0.58 
Syria 0.69 2.99 0.65 1.03 0.62 4.96 0.76 1.41 0.70 2.65 0.63 0.94 
Tunisia 0.79 0.40 0.55 0.42 1.30 0.61 0.89 0.46 0.64 0.34 0.43 0.40 
Turkey 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.20 0.24 -0.31 -0.16 0.11 0.51 0.34 0.14 0.23 
UAE 1.38 1.33 0.88 0.51 1.93 1.60 1.22 0.76 1.31 1.29 0.83 0.47 
Yemen 1.09 0.60 1.12 1.05 1.51 0.87 1.93 1.34 0.98 0.52 0.88 0.96 
Source: KILM (2009). 
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Our discussion of MENA economies’ ability to generate jobs has so far concentrated on three 
common indicators: unemployment rates, labour force participation rates and employment-to-
population ratios. While these are useful indicators, we can also gain further insight into the 
dynamics of employment creation and its relationship to economic growth by examining 
employment elasticities (Kapsos, 2005; see Saget, 2000 for a discussion of the relationship between 
growth and employment in general). This concept indicates the employment intensity of growth or 
net new job creation for each 1% growth in GDP and can help us analyse the extent to which growth 
may be attributed to gains either in labour productivity or in increases in labour supplies.  An early 
study for the period 1991-2003 found that MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa had the highest of all 
regions’ overall employment elasticities indicating that growth was in the main driven by rising 
labour supplies in these two regions rather than by gains in productivity (Kapsos, 2005: 19).   
ILO computations for individual MENA countries in more recent years are summarised in 
Table 10 for the period 1992-2008 broken down into four-yearly sub-periods and disaggregated by 
gender (KILM, 2009).  It can be seen that overall employment elasticities have been declining in most 
MENA countries (albeit after a rise in the middle period in some cases). A second point worth noting 
is that female employment elasticities are generally higher than those for males in each of the sub-
periods reported. As we saw before (Table 6), women’s participation rates in the labour force in the 
region tends to be limited and therefore higher female elasticities could simply indicate the scope 
for catching up with the males in this regard.  
 
2.4 Poverty  
Judged by international standards, MENA’s poverty rates appear to be notoriously low and, if 
focused on narrowly, pro-poor growth strategies risk missing out on large numbers of low income 
people who fall above fixed international poverty thresholds (on MENA poverty and inequality , see 
Bibi and Nabli, 2009; Adams and Page, 2003; and Bargawi and McKinley, 2011). Figure 3 shows that 
in the Arab region those living on less than $1.25 a day (in 2005 PPP US$) add up to only 4% of the 
total population. This is in line with the much richer Latin American headcount ratio (5%) and a mere 
fraction of that for other developing regions such as South Asia (40%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (50%). 
Although raising the benchmark to $2 a day and $2.75 a day does make a significant and 
disproportionate difference in the Arab countries (more so than anywhere else), the overall poverty 
picture still seems comparatively favourable in the region, if judged by fixed international poverty 
lines (19% live below $2 a day and 40% below $2.75 a day).  
Although patchy, limited data available for a number of MENA countries seems to support 
this overall picture. Against a background of generally low poverty headcount ratios, Table 11 shows 
Yemen to be an exception with the highest poverty ratios in the region and a deteriorating trend: in 
1998, 13% of the Yemenis lived below $1.25/day. By 2005 this had risen to 17.5%. Similarly, the 
headcount ratio for those below $2/day was in excess of one-third of the total and rising to about 
one-half in the same period. In Tunisia and Morocco, where poverty ratios were slightly above the 
regional norms in the mid-1990s, the trend has been sharply downwards (falling from around 6.5% 
to 2.5% for the lower benchmark of $1.25 a day). Elsewhere, poverty ratios seem to be very low and 
generally falling (Jordan) or very low and stable (Egypt, Iran and Turkey).   
Again, raising the benchmark to $2/day does make a considerable difference but in most 
cases these headcount ratios appear as either stable (Egypt, Iran, and turkey) or falling noticeably 
(Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).  In general, even at this higher threshold, the MENA countries for 
which data is available match poverty incidence favourably at well below that of East Asia (40%) and 
just over that for Latin America (12%; see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Regional Poverty Headcount Ratios at $1.25, $2 and $2.75 a Day  
(in 2005 PPP Dollars, % of Population)  
 
Source: UNDP (2012: 22). 
 
 
Table 11: Poverty Headcount Ratios at $1.25 and $2 a Day in Selected MENA Countries  
  Population (%)  
below $1.25 a day  
Population (%)  
below $2 a day 
 Survey Period Earliest Survey Latest Survey Earliest Survey Latest Survey 
      Algeria 1995 6.8  23.6  
Egypt 2000-2005 1.8 2.0 19.3 18.4 
Iran 1998-2005 1.3 1.5 8.3 8.0 
Iraq 2007 4.0  25.3  
Jordan 1997-2006 1.5 0.4 11.5 3.5 
Morocco 1998-2007 6.8 2.5 24.4 14.0 
Syria 2004  1.7  16.8 
Tunisia 1995-2000 6.5 2.6 20.4 12.8 
Turkey 2002-05 2.0 2.7 9.6 9.0 
Yemen 1998-2005 12.9 17.5 36.3 46.6 
Source: KILM (2011). 
 
Although it appears that MENA poverty headcount ratios are highly sensitive to the choice of 
the benchmark applied, there are good reasons to believe that the underlying issue may be whether 
fixed international poverty lines can be appropriate guides for estimating the real incidence of 
poverty in the region.  A number of authors have questioned the methodology of the international 
poverty estimates in the MENA context. For instance, the application of universal PPPs may not be 
representative of relative price levels faced by very poor consumers, leading to distorted 
comparisons of poverty or deprivation across countries in the MENA region (Sabry, 2010, for 
instance argues that household expenditure surveys indicate a much worse poverty situation in 
Egypt). Based on an alternative methodology which takes into account per capita consumption 
expenditures, UNDP re-estimates new poverty lines dismissing that the $1.25/day benchmark as 
being far too low and favouring the $2.00/day line as ‘a more appropriate benchmark’ for global 
poverty measurement (2011: 24). 
4 
17 
2 5 
40 
50 
19 
40 
6 
12 
74 74 
40 
57 
12 
20 
87 
84 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Arab
Countries
East Asia &
Pacific
Europe &
Central Asia
Latin
America &
Caribbean
South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
$1.25
$2
$2.75
28 
 
In the case of the MENA countries the appropriateness of the international poverty line of 
$1.25 a day used by the World Bank has been questioned by many.  To avoid some of these 
controversies, in this section we compare the poverty trends in the MENA countries with 
international norms as depicted by the international poverty curve in Figure 4. 
The poverty curve is based on the relationship between headcount poverty and mean 
income (or mean consumption in case of countries discussed in this section) normalized by poverty 
line (y/z, where y is mean income or consumption and z is the poverty line).  The analytics of the 
relationship are discussed in Karshenas and Pyatt (2012) where it is shown that this relationship 
remains invariant to the choice of the poverty line and the metric which is chosen to represent 
average well-being in different countries, as long as the same distribution scales are used.  Similarly, 
the poverty curve in Figure 4 remains invariant to the choice of poverty line, be it the $1.25 or $2.0 
dollar a day international poverty lines, or any national poverty line which may be deemed 
appropriate.  Each observation in Figure 4 depicts headcount poverty in a particular country for a 
given poverty line.  The poverty lines used in this Figure are the 2 and 1.25 dollar a day poverty lines, 
and the metric used for average well-being is per capita consumption based on survey results plus 
observations based on national accounts consistent survey means (see, Karshenas, 2012, and 
Karshenas and Pyatt, 2012). 
 
Figure 4:  International Poverty Curve 
 
Source:  Karshenas and Pyatt (2012). 
 
The poverty curve fitted to this data can be imagined to depict the case of a hypothetical 
country starting with very high levels of poverty and following the downward trend along its 
development path, assuming that at each stage its income distribution is equal to the average for 
countries at a similar level of development. The slope of this curve can show the sensitivity of 
headcount poverty to increases in per capita income/consumption at each level of development. 
The vertical distance between this poverty curve and the actual observations, therefore, can be 
viewed as the deviations of headcount poverty in a particular country at a particular time from this 
average country.   The slope of the poverty curve is particularly steep in cases where per capita 
income or consumption is less than two and a half time the poverty line.  In this upper range of the 
poverty curve, which relates to the poor countries with what may be called generalized poverty, the 
fit of the curve to actual country experiences is also very close.  On the other hand, along the lower 
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ranges the poverty curve becomes almost flat, with the variations resulting from distributional 
differences across the observations explaining a much higher proportion of the change in poverty 
than the changes in per capita income.   
 
Figure 5:  International Poverty Curve (generalized poverty) 
 
Source:  Karshenas and Pyatt (2012). 
 
Figure 6:  International Poverty Curve (the lower tail) 
 
Source:  Karshenas and Pyatt (2012). 
 
The two cases are shown separately in Figures 5 for the case of generalized poverty, and Figure 6 
for what may be called the ‘normal’ poverty situation.  In the case of the poor countries under 
generalized poverty, where average incomes are close to or below the poverty line growth will 
clearly be necessary to lift the mass of the population above the poverty line.  Under such 
circumstances which have not been uncommon in some of the poorest countries under the 
international poverty line of 1 dollar a day defined by the World Bank, growth appears to be a 
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precondition for reducing poverty.  Average incomes are simply too low to allow significant changes 
in headcount poverty by a redistribution of income.  In extreme circumstances where average 
incomes are below the poverty line (y/z<1) a redistribution of income can even increase headcount 
poverty. In the case of middle income countries with ‘normal’ levels of poverty shown in Figure 6, 
however the major part of variations in poverty seem to be explained by variations in income 
distribution rather than income growth.  In these cases growth appears to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient form poverty reduction.  Growth is not sufficient, because a country at point ‘A’ in Figure 6 
can more than double its per capita income and nevertheless reach point ‘C’, with even higher 
poverty levels.   It is not necessary, because country ‘A’ can half its poverty levels to reach the 
situation such as country ‘B’ without the need for any growth in average incomes.  The fact that 
variations in income distribution at lower poverty levels explain such a large part of the variations in 
poverty is not inconsistent with the overall Gini coefficient remaining stable.  Changes in poverty are 
sensitive to variations in income distribution at lower tail of the distribution which can be much 
more volatile than the overall Gini coefficient.   
It may be argued that the distinction between generalized and normal poverty is really a matter 
of the choice of the poverty line and with a high enough poverty line all countries can be 
characterized by generalized poverty, or vice versa.  It is however sobering to consider that the 
international one dollar a day poverty line defined by the World Bank relates to the average of the 
official poverty lines in the poorest countries in the World and hence generalized poverty is more 
real than may appear.  In the case of the middle to high income developing countries, which 
characterize most MENA countries with the exception of Yemen, average income and consumption 
levels are likely to be well over double the poverty line and one would be mainly dealing with 
‘normal’ poverty rather than generalized poverty. 
The issue of the international poverty lines in the context of MENA countries has created plenty 
of controversies.  Clearly the $1.25 a day international poverty line is not very relevant to most 
MENA countries, with possible exception of Yemen.  The low poverty measures often reported using 
this poverty line are by no means a sign of equal income distribution in the MENA region as some 
times argued.  It is rather due to the high average incomes in the region and hence the 
inappropriateness of the dollar a day poverty line.  To identify the poor for the sake of national 
policy making it is essential to use appropriate national poverty lines.  However for the sake of 
comparability and due to lack time series data we use the $2 a day poverty line to compare the 
trends in poverty in MENA countries.  National poverty lines in most MENA countries are unlikely to 
be higher the $2 a day international poverty line, but in case of higher income countries such as 
Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan and Iran, even higher poverty lines may be appropriate.  For this reason we 
report trends in headcount poverty for the MENA countries for both the $2 a day and $2.75 a day 
poverty lines. 
Figures 7 to 13 the trends in poverty in MENA countries against the backdrop of the 
international poverty curve for both the $2 and $2.75 a day poverty lines.  While the absolute level 
of poverty for each country measured on the basis of the international poverty lines may be 
contentious, the location and the movement of poverty relative to the international poverty curve in 
each country sheds light on the nature of poverty reduction in the country concerned.  The 
comparison of poverty levels between the two poverty lines for each country indicates that 
relatively small changes in poverty line can lead to substantial increases in headcount poverty.  This 
phenomenon has been discussed in the literature highlighting the vulnerability of large groups of 
population, which though may not counted as poor, have standards of living close to the poverty line 
and can fall into poverty as a result of relatively small economic fluctuations.  Strictly speaking, 
inclusive growth in necessary for the absorption of this low income group into the economic 
development process in order to prevent the development of a situation akin to generalized poverty 
observable to the prevailing conditions in the least developed countries.  The poor on the other 
hand require additional targeted policies, both to alleviate their condition of poverty and to be 
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enabled to take advantage of the possibilities presented by the development process in order to lift 
themselves out of the their poverty.  This also highlights the importance of a clearly defined national 
poverty line in order to identify the poor for specific anti-poverty policies.   
 
Source:  Karshenas and Pyatt (2012). 
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Figure 9:  Poverty Treds in Jordan, 1997-2010
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Figure 10:  Poverty Treds in Morocco, 1984-2007
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Figure 7:  Poverty Treds in Egypt, 1990-2008
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Figure 8:  Poverty Treds in Iran, 1986-2005
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Figure 11:  Poverty Treds in Tunisia, 1985-2005
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Figure 12:  Poverty Treds in Turkey, 1987-2008
$2.75 a day
$2 a day
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
mean consumption / poverty line
H
ea
d-
co
un
t R
at
io
 %
Figure 13:  Poverty Treds in Yemen, 1998-2005
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Amongst the MENA countries Egypt has poverty levels which clearly are below the international 
norms, and it also seems to have the steepest decline in headcount poverty relative to the 
international poverty curve over the 1990-2008 period (Figure 7).  The former phenomenon is 
consistent with Egypt’s relatively low levels of Gini coefficient, but the latter does not seem 
consistent with the stability of Egypt’s Gini coefficient over this period.  If this evidence can be 
trusted, then it appears that in Egypt despite the constancy of the overall Gini coefficient, the 
income of the poorest deciles has been growing faster than average.  Another anomaly in the case of 
Egypt is that at least in the case of the $2 a day poverty line it appears to have the most pro-poor 
income distribution in the world, as it is the limiting country with the lowest poverty for its level of 
average consumption.  This may give credence to those who have been questioning the accuracy of 
Egyptian data indicating the missing poorest families in the household surveys. 
The case of Iran in Figure 8 is consistent with its having the largest Gini coefficient in the MENA 
region, being the only country that is consistently above the poverty curve.  There is some indication 
that over time Iranian income distribution has become more pro-poor, as poverty has tended to 
gradually gravitate towards the international poverty curve over time. 
 
2.5 Inequality 
In this section, we examine the empirical evidence on regional inequality, and show that there is at 
best a tendency for stagnation – if not worsening – income distribution in MENA.  Analysis here is 
based on Gini coefficients of per capita expenditure, because virtually all MENA surveys cover 
consumption or expenditure, and hardly any collect data on income distribution. Therefore, almost 
all the data analysed here are from the World Bank database on Development Indicators for April 
2012 and from Povcal.net. Most are based on country surveys of household expenditures. The main 
exception is Iran: the series of Gini of per capita consumption in Salehi-Isfahani (2007) is preferred, 
because it relies on detailed unit record data from annual household surveys, and because of its 
accuracy and comprehensiveness. MENA countries here are compared to countries whose inequality 
measurements also derive from consumption surveys. Hence, the dataset is restricted to a selection 
of Asian and African countries (Latin American countries are excluded). This section proceeds in 
three parts: first we look at regional patterns of income distribution, then we consider the patterns 
displayed by income deciles, before zooming in on country level development. 
 
2.5.1 Regional Patterns 
Figure 14 plots income distribution for countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, placing the 
region in an international context. Two major patterns are immediately visible. Firstly, MENA 
countries are not the worst in the world,1 but they are certainly not the best. In other words, they 
are in the middle, and they are far from exhibiting low levels of income inequality.  This means that 
they are better than most African countries included in the graph. Examples of Gini indexes for 
2005/6 are the coefficients of 47.7, 43.7, and 39.2 corresponding to Kenya, Uganda and Senegal 
respectively. On the other hand, the region displays more inequality than most of its Asian counter-
parts: in 2004-2005, India, Pakistan and Indonesia had Gini coefficients of 36.8, 31.2, and 39.4. In 
2005-2006, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey had Gini coefficients of 32, 37.7, and 43.3, respectively.  
MENA’s intra-regional ranking is also confirmed when we look at regional means and 
medians. The overall regional means for Asia, Africa and MENA are 35.1, 44.9, and 41.1 (39.2 using 
the World Bank Iran data). The medians show a similar ranking, at 34.3, 43.9, and 42.9 respectively. 
Furthermore, it is quite clear from Figure 14 that those regional rankings have not changed over 
                                                          
1
  Most notably, they are below Latin American levels. In 2006, the Gini coefficients for Colombia, Chile and 
Argentina stood at 58.5, 52 and 48.  
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time, with MENA remaining firmly in the middle between the lower Asian inequality Ginis and the 
higher African Ginis.  
The second striking common trend according to our data is that MENA countries have not 
displayed a significant improvement for the last two to three decades. It is true that the majority of 
Gini coefficients in the region have fallen significantly since the early surveys of the 1950s and 1960s, 
when they commonly scored over 50. However, in the last three decades, they have not displayed a 
clear or significant trend over time. Figure 15 shows that the regional range has just narrowed from 
45-32 to 44-32. Indeed the average for the whole region merely slipped back slightly from 39.9 in the 
late 1980s to 39.2 in the mid -2000s. Even when countries saw significant changes at one point, 
these tended to be reversed, leaving overall levels mostly unchanged, or displaying changes of 5% or 
less in the Gini levels.  
 
Figure 14: Gini Coefficients of per capita Consumption Expenditure, 
MENA, Africa and Asia 
 
Source: WDI (2012).  
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In terms of intra-regional ranking, Figure 15 shows that regional rankings have not changed 
much. Means for Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey are above the regional average, while Algeria, Jordan, 
Egypt and Yemen are below the average.  The highest levels are displayed by Iran, while the lowest 
levels are displayed by Egypt. Looking at country averages, Morocco is very close to the regional 
average. This makes the patterns and trends displayed by the Iran and Egypt particularly useful 
points of references within which the rest of the analysis can be framed. 
The overall message of no significant change tallies with the conclusion of Bibi and Nabli 
(2009). Having surveyed the literature, and tested the statistical significance of changes in a couple 
of cases, the authors conclude that the overall regional inequality is ‘stable’, or in most cases, failing 
to display statistically significant changes.  Ali (2009) would disagree, claiming that inequality has 
been increasing in the Arab region since the 1990s, because Gini coefficients rose from 36.2% for 
1995 to 38.8 for 2004.  
 
Figure 15: Gini Coefficient of per capita Expenditure 
in MENA Countries 
 
Source: WDI (2012).  
 
 
2.5.2 Distribution by Income Groups 
Of course, Gini coefficients are only one measure of income distribution. However, the above 
patterns concerning the position of the Middle East vis-a-vis other regions, as well as the patterns of 
intra-regional rankings tend to be repeated when we consider data for income distribution by 
income groups. Beginning with income deciles, Figure 16a and Figure 16b clearly show that the 
richest 10% in MENA recently ranged between 30% and 35%, higher than the more equal Asian 
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MENA tended to vary between 2%-3%, and whereas Asian values typically stood between 3% and 
4.5%, with the shares of African deciles ranging between 1% and 3%. Again, values for MENA are 
very much in the middle. The figures also point to a trend of static distribution of total consumption. 
 
 
Source: WDI (2012).  
 
Regional rankings are also preserved when data for the lowest and highest income quintiles 
are considered. Figure 17 shows the striking similarities between the income distributions of the 
region. The average share of the bottom in 2000 stood at 2.6% to 2.8%, with only Egypt distinctly 
higher at well over 3% most of the time, and Iran distinctly lower at below 2%. The range for the top 
deciles averaged 30% in 2000s, with Iran and Turkey at the top with 34%, and a low of under 28% for 
Egypt. 
Table 12 confirms the typical absence of clear or strong trends over time. The table shows 
that the poorest 20% of the population accounted for 5.5% to 9% of the distribution through most of 
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the richest 20%), while Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey showed an improvement. Patterns in Jordan and 
Egypt were less clear. 
The table also shows that the ratios of the top quintiles to the bottom quintiles range from a 
low of over 4 in Egypt to a high of over 8 in Tunisia. The ratios for deciles are larger at 6.7 and 13.4, 
respectively. Finally, according to the latest surveys, the bottom 60% of the population accounted 
for a low of 30.8% of total consumption in Tunisia and over 38.6% in Iraq and Egypt. 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of Income by Deciles (most recent data) 
 
Source: WDI (2012). 
 
 
2.5.3 Country Level Trends 
Figure 18 plots the first of individual country trends, namely data for Iran from the World Bank and 
Salehi-Isfahani (2007). The two sets indicate inconsistent trends: there is a clear improvement if we 
use the World Bank data, since despite stagnation in the 1990s, the Gini would have fell by 10 
percentage points to a moderately high level of 38 in 2005. The gains are not significant in the data 
tabulated by Salehi-Isfahani (2007), since the Gini merely inches down from 0.45 in 1984 to 0.435 
twenty years later. Yet the trend is far from stagnant: there were improvements in inequality 
following the Revolution, a worsening after the war, which the reforms of the 1990s reversed. This 
was followed by a small increase between 1999 and 2002, which was reversed in recent years. In 
other words, overall inequality has not worsened. It also did not improve, although there were clear 
gains in the terms of poverty reduction. Salehi-Isfahani suggests that it may well be that increased 
insecurity – especially in urban areas, polarisation, and concerns about oil wealth distribution, have 
led to a perception of rising inequality.  
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Table 12: Shares of Income Quintiles 
Country Year Bottom 20% Top 20 Ratio 
Top/bottom 
Share of 
bottom 60% 
Algeria 1995 7.0 42.6 6.1 34.8 
  1988 6.5 47.2 7.2 32.2 
Egypt    2008.3 9.2 40.3 4.4 38.6 
  2004.5 9.0 41.5 4.6 37.7 
  1999.8 9.0 42.1 4.7 37.3 
  1995.8 9.5 39.9 4.2 38.9 
  1990.5 8.7 41.1 4.7 37.5 
Iraq 2006.8 8.7 39.9 4.6 38.1 
Jordan 2010 7.7 43.6 5.7 35.0 
  2008 8.1 42.3 5.2 36.0 
  2006 7.3 45.5 6.2 33.5 
  2002.5 6.7 46.1 6.9 32.5 
  1997 7.6 44.4 5.9 34.5 
  1992 6.0 50.0 8.3 29.7 
  1986.5 7.3 43.8 6.0 34.2 
Morocco 2007 6.5 47.9 7.3 31.5 
  2000.8 6.5 47.7 7.4 31.2 
  1998.5 6.5 46.5 7.1 32.0 
  1990.5 6.6 46.3 7.0 32.0 
  1984.5 6.6 46.2 7.0 33.0 
Syria 2004 7.7 43.9 5.7 34.6 
Tunisia 2005 5.9 47.9 8.1 30.8 
  2000 6.0 47.3 7.9 31.1 
  1995 5.7 47.9 8.5 30.3 
  1990 5.9 46.3 7.9 31.5 
  1985 5.5 49.6 8.9 29.4 
West Bank and Gaza 2009 7.4 43.4 5.8 34.8 
  2007 6.5 45.6 7.0 32.6 
Yemen   2005 7.2 45.3 6.3 33.8 
  1998 7.4 41.2 5.6 36.3 
Iran 2005 6.4 45.2 7.0 32.9 
  1998 5.2 49.9 9.7 28.7 
  1990 5.2 49.4 9.5 29.2 
  1986 4.6 52.7 11.5 26.6 
Turkey 2008 5.7 45.1 7.9 32.5 
  2003 5.4 49.3 9.2 29.5 
  1994 5.8 47.7 8.2 30.8 
  1987 5.9 50.0 8.5 29.7 
Source: PovcalNet. 
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Source: WDI (2012) and Salehi-Isfahani (2007). 
 
 
Source: WDI (2012) and Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy (2006). 
 
Trends for Egypt shown in Figure 19 are also ambiguous. World Bank data show rather 
stagnant levels. However, according to Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy (2006), who use household survey 
data, Egypt’s per capita Gini fell by a fifth from over 44 to 34 in the 1990s, worsened again with 
economic recession, but improved to 32 by 2005 and to 30.8 by 2008, the lowest level in the region. 
Adams and Page (2003) also indicate a clear worsening in the 1990s. The overall improvement is in 
line with the fact that poverty has declined considerably over time, but still remains significant. Not 
all regions shared the reduction in poverty, particularly where per capita income failed to grow 
(Lokshin et al, 2010). Thus a pervasive problem of poverty remains, and it is yet to be addressed 
systematically (Berenger, 2009), and equity-enhancing policies (for instance, supporting agriculture) 
may still be needed (Kheir-El-Din and El-Laithy, 2006). Cherkaoui et al (2009) find that in 2005-2008 
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growth was not equitable. All these point to a non-inclusive pattern of growth and possibly an 
increased vulnerability of the poor in the 2000s, which would make a fall in inequality unlikely.  
 
 
Source: WDI (2012). 
 
 
Source: WDI (2012). 
 
Figure 20 depicts inequality trends in Tunisia, which shows a small but insignificant 
improvement since 1985, but not compared to 2000. The Tunisian Gini fell by around 2 percentage 
points in the 1980s, probably due to the reduction in the inequality of food expenditure (Zouari-
Bouattor and Jallouli, 2001). It then worsened by over one percentage point in the late 1990s during 
the adjustment years. The pattern is repeated in the 2000s, with the effects of the pro-poor growth 
seem to be weakening. Likewise, in Lahouel (2008), redistribution effects of growth are important 
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for poverty reduction in the second half of the 1980s, while by the end of 1990s, poverty reducing 
effects of growth are reduced by rising inequality particularly in urban areas.   Research and data on 
the last decade are very scarce, so the picture for the 2000 is uncertain. But on the whole, despite its 
image as a progressive society, Gini coefficients place Tunisia as having one of the most unequal 
distributions of consumption in MENA. In particular, regional and rural/urban disparities have not 
narrowed.  
Figure 21 considers the country with the second highest inequality after Iran, namely Turkey. 
Turkey has had the strongest economic growth in the region, averaging 3.1% in 1970-2008. In the 
1990s, this growth was accompanied by a clear decline in inequality. With the recession of the 
1990s, this gain was partially reversed, leaving the mid-2000s Ginis hardly lower than in the 1980s. 
Turkey’s social profile improved (better access to health, improved educational attainment 
indicators), and its GDP has tripled in the 2000s, but progress has been uneven and pockets of 
poverty remain. 
 
 
 
Source: WDI (2012). 
Figure 22 outlines the trends of Morocco, the country closest to the regional averages. Here, 
the trend has been stubbornly static: the Gini coefficient hovered just over 39 in the 1990s, inching 
up to just nearly 41 in 2007.  To go with this unrelenting inequality, Morocco continues to have a 
substantive proportion of its people in absolute poverty, although this has declined as growth picked 
up in the 2000s. Other studies similarly point to the persistence of high overall Gini levels, not just in 
income (Abdelkhalek and Rockmore 2007). But as with Egypt, this was not a static picture, 
particularly in terms of rural/urban or inter-regional contrasts. Furthermore, according to Cherkaoui 
et al (2009), growth was not poverty reducing in 1985-2001, although the poorest did benefit, while 
in 2001-2007, there was continued reduction in poverty, and the poor did benefit, but not more 
than other groups.  
Figure 23 shows an overall trend of insignificant improvement of inequality in Jordan. 
However, the trend here is more dramatic: inequality shot up significantly during the economic crisis 
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of the late 1980s/early 1990s. It improved a little thereafter, but it rose again to 37-39 in 2003-2007, 
before easing at the end of the period at 35.43 in 2010. Adams and Page (2003) indicate a similar 
pattern for the 1990s, while Shahateet (2006) picks up a worsening between 1997 and 2002.  
 
 
Source: WDI (2012). 
 
  
Source: WDI (2012). 
Finally, Figure 24 plots the trends for the countries with the lowest inequality levels after 
Egypt. The first is Yemen, which saw an insignificant overall improvement. The Gini coefficient clearly 
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drops in the late 1990s, but by rising again around 2000, it is only less than 2 points lower in 2005. 
But Yemen has seen the clearest and worst story of mass impoverishment in the region: using the $2 
headcount, poverty shot up from 17.3% in 1992 to 50% in 2005 (Bibi and Nabli 2009). The second is 
Algeria. Here, we are limited by the fact that only two observations are available. These indicate a 
clear improvement between 1988 and 1995. Despite being an oil economy, Algeria’s income growth 
was hardly noticeable through most the 1980s and 1990s, only picking up in the mid-2000s. 
Finally, new data suggest Gini levels in Iraq and West Bank and Gaza at around 31 and 35-39 
respectively, placing the former towards the bottom of the regional inequality ranking and the latter 
in the middle. Only one estimate is available for Syria, namely a Gini of 35.8 in 2004. David and 
Marouani (2009) suggest a slightly higher Gini of 37.4 for 2004 based on survey data. They also show 
that while inequality did not increase significantly at the national level, in some regions it worsened 
significantly.  
To sum up, three MENA countries (Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen) show a slight, mostly 
insignificant improvement in inequality. Two other countries (Jordan, Morocco) indicate insignificant 
worsening, despite very different paths. Finally, two countries (Iran and Egypt) seem to indicate 
overall lack of change.   
 
2.5.4 Overall Trends and Data Issues 
Data in the previous section point out to a number of findings. First, the Middle East is varied, and so 
are the income distribution patterns it displays (for some countries no data are available, such as 
Libya).  
Second, the data tend to place the region’s income distribution levels between those for 
Africa and Asia. Therefore it is not true that the Middle East has exceptionally low levels of income 
inequality. In fact it has both high and low inequality levels, and it tends to have moderately high 
levels of inequality overall.  Some countries like Egypt are on the lower end of the scale of inequality, 
with an income distribution closer to Asian pattern. Others, such as Iran, have fairly high inequality, 
closer to African levels.  
Third, a key finding of the exercise is that despite huge structural changes in these 
economies, income distribution has not changed by much.  Over the last few years, there are 
indications of a worsening tendency, but the trend is not noticeable when compared to worsening 
income distribution in fast growing Asian countries. The relative stability of MENA pattern can be 
clearly seen is Figure 25, which also shows visible and significant changes for other developing 
countries. For example, inequality worsened clearly in Sri Lanka, beginning a Gini coefficient of over 
30 in 1985, and rising to over 40 after 2000. On the other hand, levels narrowed significantly for 
Senegal and Kenya, from 55 and over in the first half of the 1990s to 40 and 44 by 2005, respectively. 
Sri Lanka, like China, is an example of successful developing economies that have grown 
rapidly and lifted much of their population out of poverty. And while income inequality has 
worsened, they have made great improvements in social and human development. But MENA has 
been characterised by stagnating income distribution, suggesting that the region has not done 
enough for its poor people.  
The relative positions of MENA’s income distribution levels vis-a vis other regions flies in the 
face of claims by some MENA economists that MENA has displayed ‘relative equality’. Furthermore, 
since income distributions here are not exceptionally low, and are moderately high in some cases, 
there cannot be ‘cultural and religious factors’ at work in the region that are either specific or 
exclusive to the region. Further, given these special factors, inequality should have fallen or shown a 
tendency to fall more clearly, which is not the case. Therefore a more relevant question is why has 
inequality in MENA been so stagnant? 
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Source: WDI (2012). 
 
It is worth pointing out to a couple of features of regional data that contribute to these 
observed levels. First, an important factor contributing to the underestimation and/or stagnation of 
MENA’s levels of inequality are measurement errors and the nature of the data (see Nabli and Bibi 
2009). We have already pointed out to the contradictions between datasets concerning Iran and 
Egypt. More generally, a key reason for the region’s medium levels of inequality is the use of 
consumption surveys. By contrast, Latin America’s larger Ginis are based on income distribution, and 
these tend to show much larger differences than those displayed by consumption.  In fact, Bibi and 
Nabli (2009) remind us of Dininger and Squire’s study in 1996 finding that income-based Ginis tend 
to be larger than consumption Ginis by 6.6 percentage points.   
More recently, the Arab Development Challenges Report 2011 (see UNDP, 2011) has argued 
that it is very likely the ‘enigma of inequality’ is due to the fact that the highest deciles are excluded 
from surveys, which would explain the large differences between household expenditures in 
household surveys and those in national accounts. The differences between the two in the 2000s 
ranged between 61% in Egypt and 11% in Morocco.  The authors argue convincingly that it is very 
likely that this is due to the exclusion of the highest deciles, and that the Ginis are almost certainly 
seriously underestimated (at least in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan and Yemen). Therefore, it is 
entirely possible that while the elites were getting richer compared to the rest of the population, 
income distribution amongst the general population was found to be rather stagnant. Any 
corruption and embezzlement at the top deciles would have sharpened perceptions of economic 
injustice, contributing to the current explosions. 
Similarly, if one considers a typical MENA basket included in the surveys, these baskets 
include subsidies (e.g. on food or fuel) and exclude many large items (rent, private education, 
repairs). The effect of these two measurement issues is to narrow the differences between the 
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richest and poorest consumption baskets, thereby under-estimating both poverty and inequality. An 
in-depth study on this matter in the case of Egypt has been conducted by Sabry (2009), who shows, 
for example that: surveys do not reflect the absence of services such as school or sanitation in some 
areas; and the measured non-food budgets excludes many essential categories (medication, repairs 
to drains; water connections, etc.). In other words, the poor are not actually coping with the cost of 
living, and current estimates of their spending grossly under-estimate their deprivation. 
 
 
2.6 Access to Social Goods and Services  
2.6.1 Health 
As we saw above (Tables 3 and 4), in recent years the region’s demographic transition has been 
marked by improvements in life expectancy combined with a sustained fall in infant mortality rates. 
Table 13 provides other selected health indicators for which comparative data are available. It can 
be seen that in the last decade, maternal mortality ratios in MENA have fallen steeply reaching levels 
that are now comparable to those of East Asia and Latin America (to 74 per 100,000 live births in 
2009, down from 200 per 100,000 live births in 2000). The experience of the Arab world has lagged 
somewhat behind the region as a whole weighed down by the persistence of high maternal 
mortality rates in Libya and Yemen (100 and 200 per 100,000 live births, respectively, in 2009). 
 
Table 13: Selected Health Indicators (2000-09) 
 Maternal Mortality Ratio  
(per 100,000 live births) 
 
Incidence of Tuberculosis  
(per 100,000 people) 
 
 2000 2005 2009 2000 2005 2009 
       Arab World 360 290 230    
East Asia & Pacific 210 120 78 167 136 114 
Latin America & Caribbean  140 100 80 88 61 43 
MENA 200 120 74 56 50 38 
South Asia 620 410 220 215 215 192 
Sub-Saharan Africa 850 740 500 210 276 271 
World 400 320 210 144 141 128 
 
 
     
Algeria 220 140 97 66 87 90 
Bahrain 23 22 20 28 34 23 
Egypt 230 100 66 34 26 18 
Iran 120 48 21 36 32 17 
Iraq 89 78 63 64 64 64 
Jordan 110 79 63 16 8.4 5.4 
Kuwait 11 9 14 16 30 41 
Lebanon 52 38 25 32 17 17 
Libya 300 170 100 40 40 40 
Morocco 99 67 58 147 109 91 
Oman 110 51 32 30 15 13 
Qatar 15 11 7 45 54 38 
Saudi Arabia 44 27 24 17 20 18 
Syria 240 120 70 61 35 20 
Tunisia 130 84 56 29 24 25 
Turkey 67 39 20 58 46 28 
UAE 24 14 12 4.5 5.5 3.1 
WB & Gaza 
 
  8.7 9.4 4.9 
Yemen 610 380 200 137 116 49 
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
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Similarly, the incidence of tuberculosis has shown a sustained decline. Whilst generally low 
by world standards, by 2009 such cases were on average affecting 38 per 100,000 people in MENA 
(down from 56 per 100,000 a decade earlier and only a quarter of the average global rate at 128 per 
100,000). Within the region itself, incidence was highest in some North African countries: in 
Morocco and Algeria rates were around 90 per 100,000, while the GCC states exhibited some of the 
lowest rates.  
Table 14 provides data on health expenditures and the share of the public sector in such 
expenditures.  We can see that the share of total (public and private) health expenditure in MENA’s 
GDP over the last decade has been generally low at around 4%-5%, which is about half of the world 
average (which includes developed countries). This ratio falls between that for East Asia and Latin 
America on one hand (7%) and South Asia on the other (4%). Within the region, high relative shares 
are seen in Jordan and Lebanon (7%-8%) in contrast to small GCC states (Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) 
with much lower shares (2%-3%).  
 
Table 14: Expenditure on Health (2000-09) 
 Total Health 
Expenditure  
 
(% GDP) 
General Government 
Expenditure on 
Health  
(% Total Government 
Expenditure) 
General Government 
Expenditure on 
Health  
(% Total Expenditure 
on Health) 
 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
          Arab World 4.2 3.8 4. 7    57.2 60.8 60.9 
East Asia & Pacific 6.6 6.7 6.9    72.4 67.8 69.5 
Latin America & Caribbean  6.6 6.9 7.7 9.8   48.9 47.2 50.2 
MENA 4.7 4.4 5.1    54.2 58.3 57.8 
South Asia 4.3 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.5 28.1 24.4 30.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 6.6 6.5  10.00  40.0 39.3 45.3 
World 9.2 9.9 10.4    57.8 58.6 62.8 
 
 
     
   Algeria 3.5 3.4 4.2 8.9 9.9 9.2 73.3 75.8 77.9
Bahrain 3.9 3.7 5.0 10.0 10.0 11.4 67.5 69.0 77.3 
Egypt 5.4 5.2 4.7 7.3 6.7 5.7 40.5 40.6 37.4 
Iran 4.6 5.7 5.6 8.4 8.9 10.5 41.6 44.2 40.1 
Iraq 1.3 4.4 3.9 1.3 3.3 9.0 30.1 73.4 81.2 
Jordan 9.7 8.9 8.0 11.0 12.0 18.6 48.3 53.3 67.7 
Kuwait 2.6 2.4 2.6 5.5 7.1 6.9 73.8 77.9 80.4 
Lebanon 10.7 8.4 7.0 8.0 11.9 9.5 30.4 43.8 39.2 
Libya 3.3 2.5 3.9 6.0 5.5 5.5 57.2 61.8 68.8 
Morocco 4.2 5.1 5.2 4.0 4.8 6.6 29.4 28.7 38.0 
Oman 3.1 2.6 2.8 7.1 6.1 6.2 81.8 82.4 80.1 
Qatar 2.3 3.3 1.8 5.0 8.2 5.5 68.8 81.2 77.5 
Saudi Arabia 4.3 3.5 4.3 9.2 8.8 7.0 71.6 72.8 62.9 
Syria 4.9 4.1 3.4 6.5 6.8 5.6 40.4 50.5 46.0 
Tunisia 6.0 6.2 6.2 8.1 9.2 10.7 54.9 51.5 54.3 
Turkey 4.9 5.4 6.7 9.8 11.3 12.8 62.9 67.8 75.2 
UAE 3.2 2.7 3.7 7.6 8.6 8.8 76.6 66.9 74.4 
WB and Gaza                   
Yemen 4.5 4.9 5.2 8.3 4.8 4.3 53.8 33.9 24.2 
Source: Calculations from WDI (2012). 
 
A regional comparison of the relative importance of government spending on health (judged 
by its share in government budget) is not possible due to lack of data, but within the region, in 
46 
 
Turkey and Jordan public expenditure on health are highest as a share of total government 
expenditure (13% and 19% respectively).  
The relative importance of public sector provision of health services is seen much more 
clearly from the composition of the total health expenditures. The share of public sector in MENA’s 
total health spending (private and public) has been edging up to reach around 58%-60% in 2010 (in 
comparative terms, it is only below East Asia’s 70%). A closer look at the region, however, shows a 
dual pattern. In Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco private health spending exceeds public spending. In 
most other cases, the public sector takes the lion’s share in health spending. This reaches as high as 
three-quarters to four-fifth of all health spending in Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey, UAE, Qatar and 
Bahrain.  The trend appears to be upwards for most, although in Yemen public spending has been 
giving way rapidly to private health spending in recent years (falling to 24% from 54% in 2000).  
 
2.6.2 Education 
Table 15 shows that gender parity in both secondary and tertiary education in MENA has been 
improving significantly in the past decade. In secondary education, the rise in the female to male 
enrolment ratios has been particularly marked in Turkey: reaching 91.5% in 2009, up from 73% in 
2000. Many other countries in the region too have attained similar ratios in excess of 90%. The only 
exceptions are Yemen and Iraq with dismal ratios of 41% and 62%, respectively, in 2000 – the latest 
year for which data is available.   
 
Table 15: Education Indicators, 2000 and 2009 
 Ratio of Female to Male Enrolment (%) Private Secondary Enrolment  
(% of Total Secondary)  Secondary Tertiary 
 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2010 
       Arab World 88.7 91.4 80.1 96.3     
East Asia & Pacific 95.6 104.7 84.4 104.0   15.8 
Latin America & Caribbean  106.8 108.1 118.5 126.0 17.2 18.1 
MENA  90.1 92.7 82.6 100.7     
South Asia 74.2 88.4 64.2 
 
49.1   
Sub-Saharan Africa 81.0 79.2 65.2 63.3     
World 91.6 96.6 99.1 108.2     
  
    
    
Algeria 
 
101.8 
 
144.2   0.1 
Bahrain 108.8 
   
14.3 19.9 
Egypt 92.2 
   
    
Iran 93.8 94.4 86.3 107.0     
Iraq 62.1 
 
54.3 
 
    
Jordan 104.4 
 
115.1 112.3 16.5   
Kuwait 103.8 
   
27.5 30.8 
Lebanon 
 
111.1 104.6 118.9   58.7 
Morocco 79.3 
 
72.3 87.1 5.0   
Oman 99.2 99.0 
 
135.2 0.9 7.5 
Qatar 115.0 129.4 
 
541.7   38.4 
Saudi Arabia 
 
89.8 126.6 123.7     
Syria 91.9 100.7 
  
4.9 3.8 
Tunisia 103.4 105.8 
 
150.5 7.6 4.1 
Turkey 72.9 91.5 66.9 79.3     
UAE 
Emirates 
105.7 
 
370.7 
 
31.8 54.3 
West Bank and Gaza 104.4 106.9 89.8 130.2 4.6 5.1 
Yemen 40.9 
 
27.3 
 
    
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012).  
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The rising trend of female participation in education has been even more marked in the 
tertiary sector. Although following a worldwide trend, the ratio of female to male enrolment in this 
sector has jumped significantly by almost a quarter in less than ten years to reach parity in MENA 
(up from 83% to 100.7%) and near parity in the Arab countries (up from 80% to 96.3%) in the same 
period. Even more significantly perhaps, in many MENA countries female students are now 
comfortably outnumbering male students in tertiary education. The only exceptions are Turkey and 
Morocco, but at the other extreme, in Qatar there are more than five females for each male tertiary 
sector student (Table 15).  
 
Table 16: Public Expenditure on Education (period averages) 
 
 
Public Expenditure on 
Education 
(% of GDP) 
Public Expenditure on 
Education 
(% of Total Government 
Expenditure) 
 
Public Expenditure per  
Pupil  
(% of GDP per capita) 
 
 1998- 
2001 
2002- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1998- 
2001 
2002- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
1998- 
2001 
2002- 
2005 
2006- 
2009 
Algeria     4.3     20.3       
Bahrain     3.1     12.0       
Egypt   4.8 3.8   15.9 12.2   18.1   
Iran 4.4 4.8 5.0 19.1 20.0 19.7 14.0 17.2 19.7 
Iraq                   
Jordan 4.9     20.6           
Kuwait 6.6 5.8 3.8   13.7 12.9 25.6 24.8   
Lebanon 2.3 2.6 2.3 10.2 12.0 8.7 6.9   7.8 
Libya 2.7                 
Morocco 5.5 5.7 5.5 25.1 27.1 25.9 25.7 24.6 24.1 
Oman 3.8 4.0 4.1 20.3 23.1 31.1 16.8 15.1 16.0 
Qatar 3.6 2.1 2.4     8.2 16.5 10.0 15.9 
Saudi Arabia 7.3 6.7 6.1 24.5 24.0 20.1   20.9 22.4 
Syria     5.1     17.6       
Tunisia 6.2 6.4 6.4 17.8 19.9 22.2 21.4 22.5 23.5 
Turkey 2.8 3.0 2.9       12.3 12.7 12.2 
UAE 1.4 1.2 0.8 22.5 25.4 25.4 6.9 6.6 8.3 
WB & Gaza                   
Yemen 9.7   5.2 32.8   16.0 44.3     
Source: UNESCO (2012). 
 
While an encouraging trend, the rising trend for female participation in tertiary education, 
however, should be seen against a background of generally limited opportunities for women in 
social and economic spheres. As we saw earlier, women’s labour force participation rates in the 
MENA region (particularly in the Arab world) are among the lowest in the world: female workers 
make up only about a quarter of the workforce in the region, whereas the norm elsewhere is over 
40% (Table 6). Women also have fewer opportunities for studying abroad and are generally also 
over-represented among the unemployed. As we have argued before, should improvements in 
education and skills for female workers boost their LFPRs in due course, this can only increase the 
supply of women in the labour market and exacerbate the region’s unemployment challenge.  
Although data is patchy, the same table also indicates an expanding role of the private 
sector in secondary education. This trend is particularly marked in the small GCC states (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman and the UAE) where the role of private sector has been expanding.  
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Table 16 shows that public expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP in the MENA 
countries has been generally steady around 3%-6% between 1998 and 2009. Saudi Arabia and 
Tunisia top the list with their share exceeding 6%, whereas Turkey and Lebanon come at the bottom 
end with a share of less than 3%. The importance of public provision is also seen from the fact that 
educational expenditure in the MENA countries amounts to about one-fifth of the total government 
budget with the exception of Egypt, Lebanon and Yemen, where the budgetary share of expenditure 
is as low as 8%-12%. Normalising for the number of the pupils, public expenditure on education per 
pupil in Iran has been rising to about 20% of per capita GDP with similar ratios for Morocco, Tunisia 
and Saudi Arabia (around 22%-24%), but much lower ratios are seen in Lebanon (8%), Turkey (12%) 
and the UAE (8%). 
 
2.6.3 Urban Amenities 
With large numbers of population and jobs concentrated in urban centres, access to civic amenities 
and hygiene standards are important aspects of living standards for millions of urban inhabitants 
during the process of transformation and structural change.  Table 17 shows that urbanisation in 
MENA countries has continued apace: in most countries urban populations now exceed the numbers 
residing in rural areas with the urban proportion continually rising in the last two decades. The 
exceptions are Yemen where only 32% of the total population live in towns followed by Egypt where 
the ratio is 43%. In general, the proportion of town inhabitants exceeds two-thirds of the total 
elsewhere.  
  
Table 17: Urban Population Living in Slums 
 Population in Urban Areas  
(% Total Population) 
Population Living in Slums  
(% Urban Population) 
Population Living in Slums  
(‘000s) 
 
 1990 2000 2005 2009 1990 2000 2005 2007 1990 2000 2005 2007 
             Algeria 52.1 59.8 63.3 66.5 11.8    1,507    
Bahrain 88.1 88.4 88.4 88.6         
Egypt 43.5 42.6 42.6 42.8 50.2 28.1 17.1 17.1 12,029 7,978 5,312 5,505 
Iran 56.3 64.2 66.9 69.5 51.9  30.3  17,094  14,581  
Iraq 69.7 67.8 66.9 66.4 16.9 16.9 52.8 52.8 2,182 2,873 9,889 10,199 
Jordan 72.2 78.3 78.3 78.5   15.8    686  
Kuwait 98 98.2 98.3 98.4         
Lebanon 83.1 86 86.6 87.2 50  53.1    1,844  
Libya 75.7 76.4 77 77.9 35.2    1,242    
Morocco 48.4 53.3 55 56.7 37.4 24.2 13.1 13.1 4,490 3,713 2,196 2,276 
Oman 66.1 71.6 71.5 71.7 60.5    671    
Qatar 92.2 94.9 95.4 95.8         
Saudi Arabia 76.6 79.8 81.42 83.6 19.8  18    3,442  
Syria 48.9 51.6 53.2 54.9 10.4  10.5    1,055  
Tunisia 57.9 63.4 65.3 67.3 9    425    
Turkey 59.2 64.7 67.3 69.6 23.4 17.9 15.5 14.1 7,947 7,911 7,610 7,202 
UAE 79.1 77.8 77.7 78         
WB & Gaza 67.9 71.5 71.6 72.1         
Yemen 20.9 26.3 28.9 31.8 67.5  67.2  1,787  4,102  
Source: Calculated from WDI (2012) and MDG Goals Indicators (2012).  
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Table 18: Water and Sanitation 
 Population Using Improved 
Drinking-Water Sources (%) 
Population Using Improved 
Sanitation Facilities (%) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Algeria 94 93 89 85 83 88 90 92 94 95 
Egypt 90 93 96 98 99 72 79 86 93 94 
Iran 91 92 93     83 83 83     
Iraq 81 80 80 80 79   67 69 71 73 
Jordan 97 96 96 96 96   97 98 98 98 
Kuwait 99 99 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Lebanon 100 100 100 100 100   98 98 98   
Libya 54 54 54     97 97 97 97 97 
Morocco 74 76 78 80 81 53 59 64 68 69 
Oman 80 81 83 86 88 85 87 87     
Qatar 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Saudi Arabia 89 90                 
Syria 85 86 87 89 89 83 84 89 93 96 
Tunisia 81 86 90 94 94 74 78 81 85 85 
Turkey 85 89 93 97 99 84 85 87 89 90 
UAE 100 100 100 100 100 97 97 97 97 97 
Yemen   67 65 63 62 18 28 37 46 52 
Source: WHO (2012).  
 
Along with the rise in urbanisation, there has been a marked decline in the number and 
proportion of those living in urban slums. With the exception of Iraq, where urban refugees and 
displacements caused by external conflict and war have pushed considerable numbers into urban 
slums (reaching 10 million people or over half of the total population by 2007), significant absolute 
and proportionate reductions have been recorded elsewhere (specially in Egypt, Morocco and Iran 
where the downward trend has been most marked).  
Despite this encouraging trend, of course, in absolute terms still significant numbers of 
Middle Easterners reside in slums: in Iran the total reached 14.5 million in 2005 and in Turkey it has 
hovered around 7-8 million since 1990. 
 
To summarise this section, we have seen that overall the MENA region has fared relatively 
better recently both in historical terms and compared to other regions.  Most MENA countries 
enjoyed respectable average annual real GDP growth rates of 4%-5% during the period 2000-10. 
Moreover, the same decade witnessed many other encouraging achievements: life expectancy rose, 
educational and health indicators improved, the number and proportion of slum dwellers declined 
and more people enjoyed civic amenities such as access to improved drinking water and sanitation. 
Judged by international poverty benchmarks, even poverty and inequality data seem to offer a 
favourable picture of the region’s experience in these years. The demographic experience of the 
region, however, was its main challenge with some of the highest national unemployment rates and 
youth unemployment rates and the lowest female and participation in the workforce, there is much 
that the countries in the region need to do to enhance their prospects for achieving inclusive 
growth.  
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3. Measuring Inclusive Growth in MENA  
This section draws from the various development indicators discussed above to arrive at an 
estimation of a combined single measure of inclusive growth for MENA countries focusing on North 
Africa for illustrative purposes. This will then be used to compare their performance both over time 
and in relation to a selection of other peer countries. 
As mentioned above, the choice of a single measure or indicator for inclusive growth is still 
in early stages. For instance, McKinley (2010) has proposed using a weighted scoring system that 
embraces a number of key growth statistics and a broad set of development indicators. But even if 
focusing on economic outcomes alone, there remains the problem of agreeing what elements to 
include and what weights to adopt when constructing a universal ‘inclusive growth’ index.   
The UNDP’s annual ranking of countries based on their estimated Human Development 
Indicators (HDI) can be taken as a readymade – albeit limited – measure of such an indicator. 
Introduced in 1990, the HDI provides an alternative to conventional measures of national 
development, such as the level of income and the rate of economic growth. HDIs offer a broader 
definition of well-being and provide a composite measure based on three basic dimensions of 
human development: income, life expectancy and education. These are given equal weightings and 
the resulting combined score is used for ranking countries according to their performance annually.  
Since 2010, UNDP has also offered an inequality-adjusted score (IHDI) to capture the effect of 
inequality on these scores and hence on country rankings. These two measures would in fact be the 
same if there were no inequality and in that sense the ‘IHDI is the actual level of human 
development (taking into account inequality), while the HDI can be viewed as an index of the 
potential human development that could be achieved if there is no inequality’ (UNDP, 2012a).  
Table 19 gives the HDI and IHDI rankings for the five North African countries out of 187 
countries in total for the former and 134 countries for the latter in 2011. Also given are the rankings 
for the sub-components of income, health, education, inequality and gender.  We have also 
provided the normalised rankings for HDI and IHDI to take into account the variable number of 
countries for which these rankings are possible.  
 
 
Table 19: Human Development Rankings by Various Components, 
North African Countries, 2011 
 Income Health Education Inequality Gender Overall  
HDI 
Inequality-Adjusted 
HDI  
Rank Normalised 
rank 
(max=100; 
min=0) 
Rank Normalised 
rank 
(max=100; 
min=0) 
Algeria 91 93 107 - 71 96    48.9  - - 
Egypt 107 92 129 78 - 113    39.8  80              40.6  
Libya 64 65 69 - 51 64    66.1  - - 
Morocco 115 108 147 95 104 130    30.6  91              32.3  
Tunisia 96 70 110 81 45 94    50.0  66              51.1  
          
 
Total countries 
 
187 
 
188 
 
188 
 
134 
 
146 
 
187 100 
 
134 
 
100 
Source:  Ranks data from UNDP (2012b). Normalised ranks are author’s calculations 
based on the equation (2) explained in the text below. 
 
A number of interesting issues emerge here. First, for these five countries rankings based on 
income alone are generally a good proxy for their overall HDI rankings since it appears as if the 
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inclusion of the other two indicators (health and education) only makes a marginal difference to 
their overall HDI rankings. The only exception is Morocco where a severe underperformance in 
education leads to a significant divergence between its income rankings and overall HDI.  
Second, normalised HDI rankings indicate that Egypt and Morocco are in the bottom median 
of all country rankings (approximately 40% and 31% respectively), whereas Tunisia and Algeria rank 
at the median level (around 50%). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Libya’s HDI comes on top, 
situated in the top one-third of all country rankings (66%).   
Third, gender rankings help Tunisia – with a rank of 45 out of 134 countries (significantly 
above its overall HDI or any other indicators). Normalised gender rankings (not reproduced in the 
table) indicate stable rankings for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (data for Egypt is missing).  
Fourth and last, normalised Inequality-adjusted HDIs in the same table indicate a slight rise 
in the rankings of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, the three countries for which such data is available. 
This shows that taking into account inequality in the region in fact makes a modest positive effect on 
their overall rankings. 
While useful, UNDP’s HDIs only encompass a limited number of indicators we covered in 
Section 4 above. To get a more holistic indication of the nature of inclusive growth, in the rest of this 
section we attempt to widen the range of economic and social indicators to re-estimate the relative 
performance of each of the North African countries in relation to others and over time. This is done 
by taking into account the country rankings obtained for a range of indicators specified below and 
constructing a normalised score (between 0 and 100) for each country. To smooth out annual 
fluctuations in individual ranks, we use three year averages first for the first three years (2000-02) 
and then the last three years of the decade (2008-10). This is repeated for all indicators (see a list 
below) with the exception of the inequality indicator for which, due to data limitations, we use an 
average of the Gini values available for the periods 2000-04 and 2005-10, respectively. Obviously, 
the period is of special interest given its proximity to the events leading to the Arab uprisings in 
many countries of the region.  
The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as a geometric mean for that 
country of the standardised values for different indicators (defined below) according to the following 
formula: 
 
IGi  = √           
      (1) 
where:  
(i = 1,… m:  country i  included in the dataset);  
(j = 1,… n:  indicator j  included in the dataset); and  
sj is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of indicator j for country i. 
Standardised scores are obtained using the following formula (for each indicator for each country): 
 
sji = 100 . (
     
    
)i     (2) 
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order) and mj is  the total 
number of countries for which data for indicator sj is available. This takes into account the variable 
number of countries for which data is available for specific indicators. In general, due to data 
limitations, the number of the countries declines for variables such as inequality and the structure of 
employment (percentage of the wage and salaried in total employment) – a factor that is arguably 
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biased against less developed countries (see detailed data and methodology in Appendix Tables 3.1 
and 2).  
 
Table 20: Indicators Used for Computation of Inclusive Growth Index 
Broad Categories Specific Indicators (  )  No of countries in 
the Dataset (mj)  
Growth 1. Real GDP Growth 
2. Real per capita GDP Growth 
194 
194 
Health and 
Demographics 
3. Public Health Expenditure (% GDP) 
4. Mortality Rate Under-5  (per 1,000) 
5. Life Expectancy at Birth  
6. Tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 
187 
193 
196 
202 
Labour Force and 
Employment 
7. Wage & Salaried (% of total employment)  
8. Employment-to-Population Ratios (% of 
15+) 
92 
 
173 
Gender 9. Female Labour Force (% of total 
workforce) 
 
184 
Education 10. Ratio of Female to Male Secondary 
Enrolment (%) 
 
163 
Sanitation 11. Population Using Improved Sanitation 
Facilities (%) 
 
178 
Inequality 12. Gini Index 99 
Governance 13. Corruption Perception Index 179 
 
 
Standardised scores obtained from equation (2) take a maximum value of 100 (for the 
highest ranked) and 0 (for the lowest ranked) for each country for each indicator.  A list of a total of 
thirteen indicators used is given in Table 20 grouped under their broad categories (growth, health 
and demographics, etc). All indicators are given equal weights (1/n) when computing the overall 
inclusive growth index (IGi) in equation 1. All data are taken from the World Bank (WDI, 2012) with 
the exception of Governance, for which we use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by 
Transparency International (2012).  
Table 21 provides a summary of estimated values for the ‘Inclusive growth Index’ (IGi as in 
equation 1 above) for the five North African countries for the periods 2000-02 and 2008-10 and 
compares them with similar data computed for a select number of Middle Eastern countries and 
other LDC peers.  A number of interesting patterns emerge. 
First, all five North African countries underperform internationally considering that they 
appear in the bottom median of all countries (lowest score is 0 and highest 100). In comparative 
terms though, Tunisia does best followed by Egypt. Algeria appears at the bottom of the pecking 
order followed by Morocco and Libya (in that order for 2008-10). 
Second, the trend over the decade seems to have improved for all these five countries 
though to varying extents. Libya and Algeria do best (in that order) followed by Egypt. Morocco and 
especially Tunisia and show a more modest improvement.  Our results – based on a wider set of 
development indicators seem to diverge from the HDIs and do not seem to provide a ready 
explanation for the political turmoil and uprisings encountered in the region (especially Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya). Whilst important, thus, the economic origins of the ‘Arab Spring’ must be 
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understood alongside its political roots to shed light on complex processes that saw power swept 
from under the feet of the region’s authoritarian regimes (AfDB, 2012: 25).  
More insight can be obtained by further interrogating the data for other Middle East and 
developing countries.  First within the Middle East region, Iran and especially Syria follow a 
deteriorating trajectory in this period (with a decline of 13.1% and 19.4%, respectively).  This is in 
contrast with all other countries where a strong trend of improvement is observed: Yemen by as 
much as almost 30%; Lebanon by 25% and Turkey and Israel by about 15%.   
Among other LDCs a number of interesting results emerge. Of BRICS, China, Brazil and India 
indicate an improvement. This is in sharp contrast to Russia and South Africa, where a significant 
deterioration is observed (20%-30%).  Another strong performer is Indonesia followed, to a lesser 
extent, by Chile. This is in contrast to South Korea and Malaysia where a modest deterioration is 
indicated by these data.   
Figure 26 takes the analysis for North African countries one step further by conducting 
sensitivity analysis for the 13 indicators used for the construction and estimation of the IG index 
both for 2000-02 and 2008-10. In this figure, a baseline of 100% indicates no change and each data 
point shows the re-estimated IG if a particular indicator were to be excluded from the calculations 
(given a weight of zero). Figures above 100% (baseline) indicate the indicator has a negative effect 
on the overall index and hence its elimination (as shown in these figures) will improve the index. The 
opposite is true of the figures below 100% (i.e., they have an overall positive effect on the IG index 
and their elimination lowers the IG score).  
It can be seen that the employment indicators (both employment-to-population ratio and 
female workforce as a % of total labour force) have the largest impact in all five countries. This is 
especially true of Algeria (particularly in 2000-02) as well as in Tunisia. Ironically perhaps, the 
inclusion of the inequality indicator (Gini) improves the situation in Egypt. By contrast, almost all of 
these five countries do well in respect of sanitation and education indicators whose elimination 
lowers their IG index below 100%. Last but not least, Morocco shows a more varied pattern since its 
IG index shows sensitivity to the structure of employment as well.  
These results are interesting and to a large extent reinforce our descriptive discussion of a 
wide range of indicators in Section 4 above. It should be emphasised, however, that the 
methodology used here is at best a starting point for estimation of a single inclusive growth 
estimator. Both the choice of indicators selected for our purposes and weights attached to them are 
unlikely to meet with universal agreement.  Nevertheless, the methodology developed and offered 
here is flexible enough to incorporate other variations both for choice of indicators and weights 
applied. In that respect, it is hoped that this approach will encourage methodological debate and 
prove useful in stimulating attempts to quantify inclusive growth.  
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Table 21: Estimated 'Inclusive Growth' Scores, 2000-02 and 2008-10 
Based on Normalised Ranks (max=100; min = 0)(a)  
 2000-02 2008-10  Change 
North Africa        
Algeria
(b)
 24.1 29.6  22.8% 
Egypt 34.7 38.8  11.8% 
Libya
(b)
 29.4 37.6  28.1% 
Morocco 29.2 31.6  8.3% 
Tunisia 41.3 42.4  2.8% 
          Other Middle East         
Iran
(b)
 32.2 27.9  -13.1% 
Israel 59.7 69.2  15.9% 
Jordan 39.7 42.6  7.4% 
Lebanon
(b)
 35.2 43.8  24.7% 
Saudi Arabia
(b)
 25.5 27.1  6.5% 
Syria 36.2 29.1  -19.4% 
Turkey 31.7 36.3  14.4% 
Yemen 16.7 21.6  29.6% 
          Selected LDCs         
China 47.8 56.5  18.2% 
Chile 47.2 50.2  6.3% 
Brazil 41.1 45.0  9.6% 
India 25.2 28.8  14.3% 
Indonesia 27.4 31.6  15.2% 
South Korea 62.0 54.1  -12.7% 
Malaysia 54.5 48.8  -10.6% 
Mexico 41.6 40.8  -2.0% 
Russia 53.4 42.9  -19.7% 
South Africa 30.1 20.6  -31.8% 
 
Note:  
(a)
  Based on Normalised Country Rankings for indicators specified in 
Table 20. Mean values of ranks estimated are based on geometric 
means (for details and methodology, see Appendix Tables 3.1 & 3.2). 
(b)
 Data for these countries exclude ‘Inequality’ and ‘Governance’ for 
2000-02 and ‘Inequality’ for 2008-10.  
Source:   Author’s estimates based on data from WDI (2012) and Transparency 
International (2012) as specified in Appendix Tables 3.1 & 3.2.
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Figure 26: 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on Inclusive Growth computations as in Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Figures above 100% as baseline indicate a particular indicator has a negative effect 
on the overall IG score and hence its elimination (as shown in these figures) will improve the index. The opposite is true of figures below 100% (i.e., the particular indicator has an overall 
positive effect on the IG score if its elimination as in these figures pushes IG below 100%).  
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PART 2: SELECTED MENA CASE STUDIES OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH – WAGE DISPARITIES, JOB 
CREATION IN MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISES AND ACCESS TO FINANCE  
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4. Inequality Dimension of Inclusive Growth: Wage Adjustments and Disparities during Economic 
Crises in Egypt and Jordan2 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of macroeconomic crises, labour markets are often depicted as arenas where the 
inequality and social impact of economic adjustments are most vividly witnessed. At the same time, 
they constitute the space were reforms and policy interventions can be carried out with a view to 
achieving long and short-term inclusionary targets. Hence it is apt to proceed with our exploration of 
the inequality dimension of inclusive growth policies in MENA, by studying how labour earnings 
were recently adjusted and distributed in response to crisis and reform measures in specific labour 
markets in the region. This task is facilitated by the availability of rich and comparable labour market 
panel surveys in two countries: (1) Egypt, with 1988 comprehensive labour sample survey (LSS 1988) 
followed by three rounds of the Egypt labour market panel survey (ELMPS 1998, 2006 and 2012 ), 
and (2) Jordan,  with one round of the Jordan Labour Market Panel survey (JLMPS 2010). 
Since the early 1990s, the Egyptian and Jordanian economies, along with several MENA 
economies witnessed a series of partial liberalization measures, which usually culminated in the 
signing of agreements for full economic reform and structural adjustment programme under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Economic theory, backed by 
an accumulating wealth of developing countries’ empirical experiences, indicates that such 
comprehensive liberalization programmes are bound to have a profound impact on the level and 
structure of labour earnings in the short and medium terms. There is less agreement, however, on 
the direction of the expected change in real wages and inequality, as outcomes have diverged across 
countries and even for the same country over time.  
In the case of Egypt, the availability of two comparable nation-wide labour force sample 
surveys for 1988 and 1998 mentioned above, has facilitated the analysis of changes in wage 
structure over the first decade of implementing these programmes, which have mostly taken the 
form of a fall in real wages and narrowing of wage gaps for all groups (Said 2002, World Bank 2004). 
As the pace of liberalization and privatization has continued unabated since 1998, coupled with 
important institutional changes in the labour market including the passing of a new labour law in 
2003 and the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, it would be interesting to examine, on the basis of 
more recent data, whether the above trends were reinforced or reversed in the new millennium, 
and to compare the results to another reforming economy in the MENA region - Jordan. This will 
help identify areas of commonalities amongst similarly situated economies to ascertain the degree 
to which policy implications can be generalized across other countries in the MENA region.   
Thus, this chapter investigates the distributional and structural developments of real hourly 
wages and monthly earnings in Egypt before and after the World Financial Crisis on basis of the four 
comparable labour surveys collected between 1988- 2012, and compares these to recent 
developments based on the recently available 2010 Jordan labour Market Panel Survey.  
Although the recent global crisis is recognized to have strongly impacted labour markets 
around the world, very few studies were undertaken to examine its impact on wage inequality 
outcomes in emerging and transition economies, due to data limitations. The analysis here 
contributes to this literature by focusing on the estimation of selectivity corrected gender–based 
and public-private wage differentials, using a joint model of work status allocation and wage 
determination for Egypt and Jordan. The results point to two distinct phases in Egypt: an initial one 
of wage erosion and narrowing pay differentials, and a subsequent phase of recovery of real wages 
and decompression of the wage structure. Estimates based on data after the onset of the financial 
                                                          
2
 By Mona Said. 
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crisis in both countries, point to a combination of real pay erosion again but this time coupled with 
widening gender and sector pay differentials. 
The analysis in the chapter will proceed as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide a brief 
overview of related literature on wage differentials during economic reform and crises and introduce 
the main stylized facts and structural features of real wage and inequality adjustments in the 
Egyptian and Jordanian labour market during the recent liberalization episodes. Section 4.3 describe 
as the wage determination model used in calculating wage differentials and presents the data and 
descriptive statistics of the sample underlying the estimation.  Section 4.4 discusses the wage 
estimation results, while focusing on public-private and gender wage gaps and changes in returns to 
education over the past decade. Finally, section 4.5 concludes and draws implications for the reform 
of the labour market in the wake of the financial crisis. 
 
 
4.2 Conceptual Issues and Review of Related Studies 
 
4.2.1 Gender Wage Gaps and Public sector Employment 
Since the mid 1980s, the drop in oil prices and the end of the US-Soviet conflict in the 1980s led to a 
fiscal crisis which the state attempted to solve by implementing economic reform and structural 
adjustment programmes in several MENA countries. ‘Adjustment’ can be defined as “a process of 
achieving rapid structural change in an economy, so as to secure a stable growth of national income 
over the long-run” (Colclough, 1997). The particular mix of economic reform and structural 
adjustment policies advocated by international lending institutions and aid organizations essentially 
involves a shift to outward oriented liberal economic regimes and a much reduced role for 
government as provider of goods and services, and hence as an employer. This led to concerns that 
certain groups such as women and educated workers who previously swelled the ranks of the 
government sector might become disproportionately affected.  
Thus one dimension of inequality which has come under increasing attention in both Egypt 
and Jordan lately has been that of gender–based and public-private wage differentials.  In 
comparison to other developing regions of the world, MENA appear to be within the normal range 
of wage discrimination. However, MENA is atypical because women generally have higher levels of 
education and qualifications in the MENA region; so if wage discrimination was eliminated, a 
woman’s wage would be higher than the average man’s. In the MENA region, women also have 
more difficulty finding work in the private sector, which seems to discriminate against women more 
than the public sector. As a result, several public-sector dominated economies in the region, the 
public sector was reported to engage in positive discrimination in favour of women, in an effort to 
act as a model employer (World Bank 2004, El-Hamidi and Said, 2008).  
In fact, an important finding in many empirical studies on public sector labour outcomes in 
different industrial and developing countries is that its wage structure tends to be more compressed 
than in the private sector. This is a direct consequence of the tendency of most public sectors to 
adopt coordinated models (as opposed to market-based de-centralized models,) involving public-
sector wide career and pay structures, emphasizing fairness and equality across various departments 
or units. In contrast, private sector firms are encouraged to construct differentiated or de-
centralized pay structures due to greater product heterogeneity and greater volatility and 
uncertainty in their economic environment. As a result, the wage structures in the public and private 
sectors tend to differ in two important respects. First, least skilled occupations are usually better 
paid in the public sector. This is further strengthened by public sector union power in protecting 
minimum rates of pay as well as the state’s aspiration to be a model employer by offering adequate 
pay to even the least skilled (Elliot et al., 1999). Second, the most skilled or most senior public 
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servants tend to be paid lower than comparable employees in the private sector. Besides obvious 
demand and supply factors (such as that these skills may be in relative short-supply and are highly 
demanded in private sector jobs), a ‘political’ reason for the perpetuation of this situation could be 
the higher visibility of senior government posts and public (including media) opposition to their 
higher rates of pay.  
As a corollary to this difference in wage structures between the public and private sector, 
the magnitude of gender-based wage differentials tend to be much smaller, and sometimes non-
existent, in the public sector. In addition, occupational segregation of females, which leads to their 
crowding in a few lower paying ‘feminine’ jobs, tends to be of a much smaller magnitude in the 
public sector.  
The main factor that appears to have worked for women in the public around the world is 
the uniformity of a pay structure that links remuneration to educational level and seniority, and 
leaves little room for managerial discretion, thereby reducing the potential for both statistical and 
taste discrimination.  In other words, public sector institutionalized and bureaucratic recruitment 
and compensation policies tend to produce more gender-blind labour market outcomes than 
methods that rely on employer discretion in the private sector. Moreover, as women tend to have 
less experience than men and tend to be located in lower paid industries and occupations, any trend 
towards centralization or introducing cost of living adjustments that explicitly give lower paid 
workers larger relative increases than others can improve the relative wage of women (Blau and 
Kahn, 1999).   Finally, equal opportunity and gender-discrimination policies are usually much more 
effective in centralized wage setting environments such as the public sector (Gregory and Borland, 
1999).  
 
 
4.2.2 Impact of Structural Adjustment and Trade Liberalization  
The legacy of narrow gender differentials has been reported to erode on many parts of the 
developing world as a result of introduction of competitive pressures in the context of privatization 
and trade liberalization. These policies, usually part of wider structural adjustment programmes, 
essentially aim to decrease the returns of factors of p production in the previously protected import-
substitution sectors and in non-tradable, while raising those returns in exportables and formerly 
unprotected import-competing sectors, to induce factors to move accordingly (Horton, Kanbur, and 
Mazumdar 1994:5). In the majority of cases, structural adjustment policies involve a retrenchment 
of the public sector either through cuts in public expenditures and investments or, alternatively, 
through the privatization of government enterprises. Furthermore, cutbacks in the public sector, 
which generally come with structural adjustment, are more likely to affect female workers 
disproportionately because of the concentration of women in a few sectors of economic activity 
(Haddad et al. 1995; Sparr 1994; Afshar and Dennis 1992). Moreover, the increased burden which 
women face at home due to cutbacks in social expenditure places a barrier on their ability to 
respond to the changing opportunity structures caused by structural adjustment.  
Evidence shows that liberalized trade tends to increase the availability of paid jobs for 
women, particularly in export-oriented sectors. However, certain factors, such as discrimination, 
lower skills, and gender inequalities in access to resources, may impede women’s ability to benefit 
from trade expansion ((Joekes 1995). Thus the wage gap does not necessarily disappear over time. A 
cross-country study that investigated the impact of trade on the gender wage gap suggests that 
within occupations, increasing trade in most cases is associated with narrowing gender wage gaps 
(Oostendorp 2004). An exception is found for high-skill occupations in poorer countries, where there 
is no evidence that trade has a narrowing impact. Insofar as skills tend to be relatively homogeneous 
within narrowly defined occupations, the narrowing of the gender wage gap can be seen as evidence 
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that there is less labour market discrimination as trade increases.   
 
 
4.2.3 Impact of Financial Crisis on Wage Inequality During Transition 
The global economic crisis of 2008 had a significant impact on labour markets across the world as 
millions of workers lost their jobs, while countless others experienced cuts in wages, hours worked, 
and benefits (Cazes et al. 2009).  After significant economic contraction, evidence shows that labour 
markets usually recover slower than economic growth, and unemployment generally persists at 
above pre-crisis rates. At the start of economic crisis, many firms reduce working hours of 
employees and/or decrease wage levels. However, if there is a sharp decrease in economic activity, 
massive layoffs and hiring freezes often occur. Other adjustments also take place, during the Russian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, there was a tendency for workers from all statuses to move into 
informal employment, suggesting the informal sector may serve as a buffer for workers during times 
of economic downturn (Bernabé and Stampini 2009).  In the case of South Africa, although many 
jobs have been lost since the crisis, the greatest impact on the labour market was through rising 
discouragement, or unemployed individuals who give up the job search. This stresses the 
importance of analyzing all aspects of the labour market after economic downturn, not solely 
unemployment levels (Verick 2010). 
Studies on the relationship between the economic crisis of 2008 and income inequality in 
developing countries are very limited. Lessons from past crises suggest that relative inequality 
decreases almost as often as it increases during times of economic contraction (Paci et al. 2008). For 
example, in Mexico, a report by the World Bank showed how income inequality decreased 
substantially during the 1994-1996 period of economic crisis, only to subsequently increase when 
the economy recovered (Lopez-Acevedo, 2000).   
The impact on gender gaps is also ambiguous. The Russian financial crisis of the late 1990s 
did not affect the gender wage gap significantly in the country. The differential in earnings initially 
increased as the economy recovered, only to fall back to its previous level by 2002 (Hansberry 2004). 
In a study on Thailand (Adireksombat et al. 2010), results showed that raw gender wage differentials 
declined in the early 1990s and were not significantly affected by the 1997 financial crisis in Asia. The 
study also concludes that gender inequality in the labour market improved in the years following the 
crisis.  
In general, as economies undertake transition from central planning to market oriented 
economies, gender gaps have been observed to either remain stable or ironically improve. Multi-
country studies, such as Newell and Reilly (2000), conclude that such adjustments had little impact 
on the cross-country difference in the gender wage gap.  Comparison of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics’ gender gaps revealed that sector of ownership (public vs. private sector), had little 
impact, but worse outcomes in the first case could be explained by low skilled women selecting to 
remain in employment, whereas Slovak women became unemployed (Jurajda, 2003).  This in itself 
can partially explain improvements in gender gaps during time of crisis.    
Given the shift of the current crisis both across countries and within countries, it is difficult 
to predict the distributional effects of the economic downturn with any real confidence (Habib et al. 
2010). Nonetheless, a number of studies involving simulations may provide some insight into the 
effect of the economic crisis on income inequality in developing economies. In two studies released 
in 2010 by the World Bank, the authors utilize a micro simulation approach to assess the poverty and 
distributional effects of the crisis on the economies in the Philippines and Bangladesh. The results of 
the simulations for the two countries predict that the effect of the crisis on aggregate measures of 
inequality in these two countries in 2010 is negligible (Habib et al. 2010a, Habib et al. 2010b). Similar 
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results were presented in a UNDP study on Ukraine (UNDP, 2009). In other transition economies , it 
was shown that the crisis is likely to result in a worsening of the Gini coefficient on account of a 
decrease in remittances in Tajikistan (World Bank, 2009), and the impact of the economic slowdown 
through labour markets in Latvia (Ajwad et al. 2009). 
Mainly due to the absence of post-crisis data, all the above studies combine micro-
simulation and macroeconomic projections with pre- crisis micro data from household and/or labour 
force surveys. An alternative and perhaps more informative approach, if more recent survey data is 
available, is to undertake a detailed analysis of structural and distributional changes in wages before 
and after the onset of financial crisis. This chapter follows this approach for both Egypt and Jordan. It 
is important to note, however, that the crisis came after more than two decades of transition under 
the guise of structural adjustment programmes to private sector and market led economies. These 
transitions had already impacted sector and gender based disparities quite substantially. In what 
follows we examine these adjustments, and whether were sustained or were reversed in the post 
financial crisis period. 
 
4.3 Wage Adjustments during Economic Liberalization in Egypt and Jordan 
4.3.1 Trends in Egypt during Economic Reform and Adjustment:  
Our data allows to explore longer term trends in the Egyptian labour market prior to the onset of 
both the financial crisis and revolution, and dating back to the outset of economic reform and 
structural adjustment policies in late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The period from 1988 to 1998 in Egypt 
witnessed several important changes in the labour market as the pace of liberalization has risen and 
the economy shifted faster towards a “market” private-sector led model. A public sector 
employment guarantee scheme, which was in operation since 1964 providing all graduates of 
vocational secondary and university degrees with public employment, although not yet officially 
abrogated, came to an almost complete halt. Privatization, after more than 20 years of debate, 
became a reality post-1996 and schemes for early retirement and compensation of retrenched 
workers have been introduced in several public enterprises selected to be privatized. As a result, for 
the first time since their creation, there was an absolute decline in the number of employed workers 
in public enterprises in the 1990’s. A new labour law was proposed, and eventually passed in 2003, 
that significantly decreases the job security guarantees of  public  and private sector workers in 
return for granting them a limited right to strike. 
Table 4.1 examines the changes in average the level of hourly wages across important socio-
economic groups (gender, occupations, industries, levels of education, and sectors of ownership). To 
facilitate comparability, all 1988, 1998 and 2006 wages are inflated to 2012 using the consumer price 
index, so that everything is in 2006 Egyptian pounds. The figures in the table reveal that after 
significantly declining in real terms over the 1990s period, by 2006 wages recovered to their 1988 
level or even surpassed them for almost all groups. It is interesting, however, that whereas the 
sharpest real wage falls in the 1990s were for some of the traditionally higher paid segments of the 
labour market (males, public sector managers, private sector professionals/technical workers and 
those with secondary education and above), the recovery in the new millennium was up to 2006 and 
more across the board if not favouring those higher groups, especially in the private sector.  After 
2006, the traditionally underpaid benefited from higher wage rises. Thus, based on average wages, 
there appears to have been a process of compression of the distribution of wages in the earlier 
decade which was reversed in the later period up to 2006 only and then wages started becoming 
less dispersed again. 
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[Table 4. 1 about here] 
 
 This confirms that the Egyptian labour market can be described as going through two 
distinct phases in the aftermath of economic liberalization and structural adjustment. The 1990’s has 
been a period of real wage erosion and compression if the wage structure led by the public sector. 
This was followed by a period of real wage recovery, as inflationary pressures relatively subsided, 
and a rise in measured wage inequality and wage differentials. Thus after 25 years of privatization on 
structural adjustment programmes the Egyptian labour market seems to have recovered to pre-
adjustment levels of real wages.   
Figure 4.1 below present a summary of main findings on real wages, inequality and share 
of workers below the low-earnings line.  Looking at this whole period, starting 1988, it is clear that 
real wages went through ups and down, but there has been no real wage gains overall on average 
for Egyptians by 2012 in comparison to 1988. The wage structure has become much more 
compressed, with a larger share of earners that now can be classified as working poor i.e below the 
low-earnings (derived from low-poverty) line. The details of which groups in the labour market were 
affected most by the above pattern will be discussed in sections below, and whenever possible, 
relative to the situation in Jordan. 
 
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
4.3.2 Wage Differentials before and after the Financial Crisis in Egypt and Jordan  
Now looking at shorter duration,  Figure 4.2 below calculates ratios Male/ Female and Public /Private 
median wage ratios based on median wage two years before and four years after the onset of 2008 
financial crisis  by gender and sector.  Real wages on average increase by 12% over this period, and 
the increase was more substantial in the public sector and for females rather than males. This public 
sector led process of real erosion was much more substantial for females. Thus it is instructive to 
examine what happened public-private and male-female wage differentials. Gender raw wage ratios 
remain compressed in the public sector (less than 10%), compared to the private sector (25%). 
Similarly, the public-private differential also declined for both males and females. Now men have a 
32% advantage instead of the previous 68% and women advantage declined to only 81 to 53%.  
 
[Figure 4.2 about here] 
 Gender and wage ratios in Jordan for 2007-2010  in Figure 4.3 below again shows similar 
trends to Egypt The raw gender gap slightly declined in both the public and private sector over the 
crisis period. In 2010 it was 20% in the public sector and 32% in the private sector. The decline in 
public sector real wages, also resulted in a moderate decline public-private median wage ratio for 
males from (1.24-1.20) and female (1.49-1.40) 
 
[Figure 4.3 about here] 
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4.3.3 Measures of Wage Inequality and share of Working Poor Before and After the Crisis 
Finally, we turn to an analysis of the implication of the above changes in wage differentials to the 
overall observed inequality (or dispersion) of hourly wages. Table 4.2 shows Gini coefficients for 
different socio-economic groups  in Egypt over the period prior to the crisis. It is noteworthy that the 
groups that witnessed the largest real wage increases between 2006 and 2012 are also the ones that 
had the largest increases in inequality amongst them (females, young age groups, rural -upper Egypt, 
services and lower educational groups). These are also the traditionally lowest paid and hence both 
trends imply compression between and within groups. Looking at differences across institutional 
sectors, it is also interesting to note that whereas in 1988, hourly wages were most compressed 
(equalized) in the government sector and most dispersed the private sector, by 2006, the highest 
degree of dispersion is now observed in the government sector. This pattern is even more dramatic 
if we look at the decile ratios (see Figure 4.4).The slight U turn or relative stability in decile ratios in 
aggregate hides two clearly opposing effects: increase in dispersion in the government sector, 
especially in PE’s and continued compression in the wage structure of the private sector.  
This can be taken as further evidence of the declining impact of the public sector 
employment guarantee and centralized wage bargaining in the government sector in Egypt in 
comparison to late 1980’s.   
 
[Table 4.2 about here] 
 
[Figure 4.4 about here] 
 
To identify poor earners, a low earning line is computed using the official national poverty 
lines listed in Table 4.3 below. First, the individual regional specific poverty lines are converted to 
real terms using the consumer price index (taking 2012 as the base year).  Second, the per-capita 
region-specific poverty lines are scaled up by the regional median ratio of household members to 
working-age employed household members to account for the fact that each worker’s earnings are 
used to support not only him/herself but also other non-working members of their household.  For 
the sake of comparability and to abstract from changes in dependency ratios that may have occurred 
during the 1988-2012 period, the 2012 low earning line is used to identify low earners in all four 
survey rounds. Table 4.3 shows that the low earning lines that emanated for each region as a result 
of this exercise. These are used to examine the portion of earners that can  be classified a low-
earners or the working poor. 
 
[Table 4.3 about here] 
 
Table 4.2 above also shows the distribution of the share of low earners across groups. 
Overall, over the period 2006-2012, there has been a rise in the share of low wage earners from 39% 
of all wage-earners in 2006 to 46%% in 2012. Rise of Share of Low Wage Earners and change was 
much more pronounced for: males, prime age workers 35-49, greater Cairo and lower Egypt (highest 
at 54% in urban upper Egypt),  University and post-secondary institute graduates workers Public 
enterprises and government . The share of the low-waged was already high and remained highest at 
50% in private sector. 
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In answer to the question of who currently are the low-waged in Egypt? the gender, age, 
regional and educational structure of the group of low-wage workers in 2012 remained similar to 
2006, with 76% male,  72% are in younger age groups (15-34 years), 61% reside in rural (upper and 
lower) Egypt,  40% are illiterates and 22% have a vocational high school degree 
Besides the Gini coefficient, the measures of inequality estimated include the Thile Index, 
which is a member of the general entropy (GE) Indices which have the desirable property of being 
additively decomposable into components within and between groups. The groups considered are 
level of education (8 groups), occupation (9 groups) and industry (3 groups). A problem with both 
the Gini coefficient and the Thile Index, however, is that as they take into account all observations, 
they are sensitive to errors or real changes at the tails of the distribution. It is also, therefore, useful 
to report ‘the decile ratio’ (ratio of the 90th%ile of the wage distribution to the 10th%ile) which is 
not sensitive to outliers.  
Table 4.4 presents further decomposition of the Thile index show that most of the observed 
inequality for Egypt and Jordan is ‘within’ (as opposed to ‘between’) groups. Over the period, 
however, there were some decline in inequality ‘between’ educational groups and occupations 
between 1988 and 1998 in Egypt and a dramatic increase in within group inequality afterwards. For 
Jordan, hourly wages dispersion in the sample were higher in the private than public sector. 
Inequality as measured by Decile Ratio: p90/p10. Multiple of 3 the public sector as opposed to 7.5 
for males in the private sector and 8.5 for females in private sector.  
All measures of inequality however indicated that inequality is higher in Jordan than in 
Egypt, particularly in the private sector where the Gini coefficient was as high as 0.64 as opposed to 
0.44 in Egypt. Most of the observed inequality for males and females in both countries is ‘within’ (as 
opposed to ‘between’) groups.  In Egypt, in fact all inequality by occupation and industry is 
exclusively of the within-group variety. 
 
[Table 4.4 about here] 
 
    
4.4 Data and Empirical Model 
4.4.1 Estimation Model  
The empirical analysis in this chapter proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, ordinary least squares 
(weighted by sampling weights, described below) were used to estimate separate wage equations for 
workers in the public (p), and private (r) sectors as follows: 
             Ln (wis) = Xis s + us                                         (s = p, r)    (1) 
Where Ln (wis) is log hourly wages of individual i in sector s and X is the vector of individual and 
job related characteristics seen to be of relevance for wage determination. This was estimated twice, 
once for males and once for females, yielding a system of six equations.  
These are then compared to selectivity corrected wage estimates, where selection terms  () 
were derived from a model of sectoral choice of government or public enterprise employment relative to 
private employment. The model underlying this estimation is based on Lee’s extension (1982 and 1983) 
of Heckman's selection model to the multinomial case.      
Ln (wsi) = s X+ s s +es        (s = p, r)     (2) 
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Given the parameter estimates from (1), public-private wage differentials can be evaluated at the 
mean of the sample, using the following decomposition formula: 
 
    (s = p)  (3) 
Ds refers to the wage differential between the public and the private sector.  refers to the 
mean of Ln wages. 
The formula decomposes the wage differential into two main components. The first term, which 
is ‘explained’, is the part of the differential attributable to differences in observed characteristics of 
workers (X’s). The second term, which is “unexplained,” is the part of the differential resulting from 
differences in the pay structure, or in returns to the characteristics. Note that the unexplained 
component also includes the differential in base wage (the constant term) that can be interpreted as a 
premium or pure rent from attachment to a particular sector.  Similarly the same formula can be used to 
decompose the male-female wage gap as follows:  
 
                  (4) 
Here the unexplained component (second term on the right hand side) is broadly taken to refer to 
gender-based discrimination.  
This methodology, as well as any approach based on the estimation of earnings functions, may 
lead to inaccurate measures of discrimination. It is not clear, however, whether it yields an under-
estimate or over-estimate.  On one hand, omitted variables, such as attachment to the labour force, lack 
of specific training, tastes, personality and interrupted careers will also be captured in the “unexplained” 
component. In other words, this measure does not control for a range of pre-market and extra-market 
factors that may result in payment of higher wages to males. It is therefore more accurate to describe 
this component as only an upper bound estimate on gender-based discrimination by employers.  
 
 
4.4.2 Data and Variable Specification 
The Egyptian Labour Surveys 
To estimate wage differentials employing the above model, this chapter makes use of four rich 
nationwide labour market surveys (ELMS): the 1988 Labour Force Sample Survey (LFSS88); the 1998 
Egypt labour Market Survey (ELMS98), and the 2006 and 2012  Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS06-12). Both the ELMPS 06-2012 and ELMS 98 were conducted by the Economic Research 
Forum (ERF) in cooperation with CAPMAS. Together these five surveys provide detailed information 
on the household members’ education, employment status, time allocation, job mobility, earnings 
and household enterprises. This Chapter presents results for the first time on earnings structure 
based on ELMPS 2012, which is considered the third round of a periodic longitudinal survey that 
tracks the labour market and demographic characteristics of households and individuals interviewed 
in 2006 and 1998, in addition to a refresher sample in each round to ensure that the data continues 
to be nationally representative.  
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The Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey 
The chapter further utilizes wage data from the Jordan Labour Market Panel survey for 2010, 
collected by the National Centre for Human Resource Development (NCHRD), and the Jordanian 
Department of Statistics (DOS), and containing a wealth of information on household composition 
and socioeconomic characteristics such as income, parental background, measures of access to the 
labour market, detailed education history, ownership of assets, migration histories, and activity 
status. The survey is nationally representative covering 5000 households. It was conceived as a 
periodical longitudinal survey, of which 2010 is the first round. For comparison purposes, wages 
across occupation, gender and sector groups are also calculated for 2007 and 2008 from the Jordan 
Employment Surveys and an attempt is made to generate a time series of real wages up to 2010.  
 
Variable Specification 
For the purpose of this study, several variables are extracted that affect the choice of employment 
status, levels of education, age, age squared, experience, experience squared, regional dummies, 
parental education, and hourly wages (in logs). Five regional dummies were used in Egypt and 
twelve for Jordan. The sample for wage estimation is limited to wage workers who are between the 
age of 16 and 64, amounting to 7558 in 2006 and 10,160 in 2012 in Egypt and to 4,903 wage workers 
in Jordan. 
In addition, the work-status selection model uses also other non-wage, unemployed and 
non-participating individuals within the working age sample which increases the sample of 
estimation of the sector selection equations to 15,192  females and 14,839 males for Egypt in 2009 
and 7,505 males and 7,600 females for Jordan in 2010. Additional household level and family 
background variables were also used to identify the sector selection equation from the wage 
equation. These include number of preschool children, children above 6 years, mother’s level of 
education, father’s level of education (a dummy for holding an intermediate or above degree; and a 
dummy for holding less than an intermediate degree), and father’s employment status (whether he 
is a self-employed or an employer at the time the individual entered the labour force). Parental 
background variables can also be interpreted as proxies for household socioeconomic status. . In 
addition, a measure of non-labour income (total monthly earnings of male members of the 
household) was used in the female work status equation. 
The two surveys used very detailed set of earnings structure. As a consequence, data on 
monetary earnings are fairly reliable. However, the quality of non-pecuniary benefits data is likely to 
be poor in quality. Therefore, only monetary earnings are included in the wage equation. Log real 
hourly wage is used as a dependent variable which is computed by dividing the monetary net 
earnings by the number of hours worked per year and all wages are expressed in 2006 prices. Log 
hourly wage is used (instead of hourly wage) to reduce the effects of wages outliers.  
 
4.5 Estimating Hourly Wage Differentials Using Wage Equations 
To estimate wage differentials that correct for differences in such characteristics, log hourly wage 
regressions for Egypt 2006 and 20012 and Jordan 2010 were estimated.  For each country, five 
regressions are estimated for the following: all wage workers, males in the private sector, males in 
public sector, females in the private sector, and females in the public sector. The last four 
regressions are also repeated using selectivity corrected methods.  
Means and standard deviations for all variables used in the regressions are reported in 
Tables 4.A1-A2 for Egypt and 4.A3 for Jordan.  As can be seen from these tables, the regressions 
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controlled for experience and experience squared to account for non-linearity in the wage-
experience profile. They also controlled for levels of educational attainment and region of residence. 
 
4.5.1 Determinants of Work Status Choice: Multinomial Logit Model 
To correct wage estimates for selectivity, in the first stage, four multinomial logistic regressions are 
estimated to study selection into non-participation, unemployment, non-wage work, non-
government work, and government wage work in comparison to non-participation by gender. In 
each equation, the dependent variable is a categorical variable represented by the five different 
work status states mentioned above. The identification variables (affect participation but not wages) 
are represented by household-related variables that determine participation in the labour force 
which consequently affects the choice of the employment status.  Parameter estimates are then 
used to compute the four selection variables or inverse (λ) Mill’s ratios to correct for selectivity bias, 
which are subsequently included as regressors in the selectivity corrected wage equations. Tables 4. 
A4 and 4.A5 show the parameter estimates of the sector-gender-round specific selection equations 
For Egypt and Jordan respectively.  
The results are very similar for both Egypt and Jordan. The reference category is an illiterate 
and non-participant person living in greater Cairo for Egypt and in Amman for Jordan. The results 
show that education increases a male's probability to be wage workers in the government sector but 
it decreases a male's chance of being a non-wage or as being a non- government wage earner in 
most cases. For females, education increases a female's probability to be wage worker, especially in 
the government sector, even more so than men, followed by the non-government sector. As 
expected, higher education reduces the probability of a female being a non-wage earner. One 
interpretation is that women prefer to work in the government, even more than men, because of its 
more convenient working conditions and short working hours. Simultaneously, however, education 
also increases the probability of unemployed as well for both men and women in Egypt and Jordan. 
Other patterns are found by examining the coefficients on the household level identification 
variables. As expected, presence of small children negatively affects the probability of being a wage 
worker for women and positively affects it for men. Non-labour income exerts influence only in 
preventing women from becoming non-wage workers. Additional family background variables 
available for Jordan reveal that a father holding an intermediate or above degree is a negative 
significant determinant for government sector choice. Mother's intermediate or above education 
has significant and positive effect only on women becoming non-government workers. The fathers 
employment status (whether self-employed, employer or government employee) seems to also 
positively influence the possibility that his son or daughter will follow in his path. 
 
4.5.2 Corrected Sector and Gender Wage Differentials  
From Gender and sector differentials are estimated using two methods. First, a dummy for being 
female and another for working in the public sector are included in aggregate wage equation. This 
method accounts only for differences in the intercept and assume similar returns to characteristics 
for males and females and in the public and private sectors. The second method uses the separate 
estimates across the four other equations to calculate wage decompositions that also allow for 
differences in the education, experience and regional parameters to be included in the calculations. 
Regression results for aggregate wage equation estimates for Egypt are shown in Table 4.A6 
and Table 4.A7, and for Jordan in Table 4.A8. Together they reveal that there is substantial negative 
female-male wage differential amounting to 34% of female wages in 2007 that remained negative 
but dropped to 20% in 2009.  They also reveal a 22% wage advantage for public sector employees (in 
comparison to their private counterparts) in 2007 that increased further to 25% in 2009. In Jordan, 
estimates based on aggregate wage equation are only available for one year. They indicate a 10% 
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disadvantage for women (substantially lower than Egypt), a 20% public sector advantage  
(comparable to Egypt) As mentioned above, these estimates should only be indicative as they only 
consider differences in intercept and not coefficients of the wage equation. 
Figure 4.5 and Table 4.6 below reports corrected gender and sector wage differentials for 
Egypt and Jordan respectively based on the second method outlined above. Thus corrected sector 
wage differentials are calculated as the difference between predicted log hourly wages for public 
sector employees using the public sector wage equation and their predicted log hourly wages using 
the private sector equation (expressed as a proportion of the former). Similarly, corrected Gender 
wage differentials are the difference between predicted female wages using the female equation 
and their predicted wages using the male equation.  In case of Egypt, the corrected Female-male 
differentials remain more compressed in the public sector and have further narrowed down to to 
near gender equality there. The gender gap remained very high at over 40% in the private sector. 
Corrected public-private differentials confirm that the public sector advantage does not exist for 
males and remained a around 35% for females. 
 
[Figure 4.5 about here] 
 
In case of Jordan, after correcting for productivity differences, public sector wage 
advantages still exist in Jordan in 2010 for both males and females and amount to 17% and 24% 
respectively, whereas they turned to an 8% disadvantage for males. Gender-based wage gaps are 
compressed by international standards in the private sector (14%) and less in the public sector (8%).  
In sum, the corrected wage differentials reveal that a most of the wage adjustment, led by 
the public sector took place prior to the financial crisis period in Egypt, and the wage structure 
remained relatively stable since 2006. Women in Egypt and both men and women in Jordan remain 
better paid in the public sector. The gender gap is compressed in both countries in the government, 
but is substantial in the private sector in Egypt in comparison to Jordan. 
 
4.5.3 Proportionate Returns to Secondary and University Levels of Education 
Finally it is possible to use the wage parameter estimates to calculate proportionate returns to 
education and compare them to earlier estimates over the past decade in Egypt and Jordan. These 
estimates are presented in the Table 3 below.  
Three main important observations can be made as a result of this comparison.  First, in the 
post crisis era (2010), and consistent with higher wage inequality there, returns to education are 
much higher or Jordan than Egypt, for all levels. Second, returns to schooling have dropped quite 
substantially in Egypt over this period at all levels (except the university level where they increased 
in the private sector), but increased in Jordan (except for vocational education where they dropped 
in the private sector).  Third, in relation to gender differences, after the crisis, returns to schooling 
for women are much lower than men in the public sector in Egypt and Jordan. In the private sector, 
they are higher for women at all levels in Jordan; the opposite is the case in Egypt. 
This confirms the finding that highly educated women can still reap significant benefits from 
their education in the private sector in Jordan (World Bank, 2004). This does not mean that educated 
women fare better than men in Egypt and Jordan, but only that the gender gap in wages declines 
with education in the private sector, especially when one reaches the university level.  
 
[Table 4.5 about here] 
69 
 
 
[Table 4.6 about here] 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the limited literature on inequality effects of the recent global economic 
crisis in emerging and transition economies in MENA, by utilizing recently available household survey 
data sets in Egypt and Jordan. An examination of public-private, gender and education dynamics of 
wage inequality during a period of economic liberalization and crises point to two distinct phases in 
Egypt: an initial one of wage erosion and narrowing pay differentials, and a subsequent phase of 
recovery of real wages and decompression of the wage structure up until 2006. The onset of the 
crisis, seemed to have coincided with a moderation in real wage rises, whereby the traditionally 
lower paid segments saw bigger rises, this resulted in compression of wage structure (ie reduced 
inequality), but still everyone’s wages are low enough that there is a rise of share of workers below 
the low earnings line to around 46% of the total.  
Measures of overall wage inequality show that inequality is much higher in Jordan than in 
Egypt and in the private sector than in the public sector there. The bulk of wage inequality is of the 
‘within-group’ variety in both countries, which shows that the standard human capital variables 
(education, experience, occupation) can explain relatively little of observed inequality patterns. 
Overall, after correcting for productivity differences, the public wage advantage was completely 
eroded in Egypt for males but continue to exist for females and for both males and females in 
Jordan. 
As for gender wage gaps, estimates that correct for productivity differences confirm that 
they remained compressed by international standards in Jordan. This does not indicate the absence 
of gender based discrimination in Jordan, but rather that it might take other forms such as 
occupational segregation or unequal access to benefits as pointed out in recent reports (Peebles et 
al., 2005; Assaad and Amer, 2008).  By contrast in Egypt, women actually bore the bulk of wage 
adjustments since 1998, whereby female-male wage gaps increased substantially in the private 
sector, reaching 42% in the latter which are very high by international standards. Previous studies 
have highlighted that occupational segregation accounts for a good proportion of the gender wage 
gaps in Egypt (Said, 2003). The findings of this chapter indicate that this is also might be exacerbated 
by pure-pay discrimination. 
Trends in returns to schooling underscore the inequality changes in both Egypt and Jordan 
over the crisis period. These returns are much higher and have been improving in Jordan, and are 
lower and deteriorating in Egypt. Yet in both countries, university graduates, especially women, 
benefit from higher returns in the private sector which can help reduce the gender-wage gap at 
higher education levels. Vocational education degrees are the most undervalued credentials in terms 
of labour market returns in both countries.  
These results call for continued monitoring of the Egyptian and Jordanian labour market as 
their economies further adjust to the aftermath of the financial and post-revolution economic crisis. 
As noted above historical experience following financial crisis episodes in Latin America, Asia and CIS 
countries indicate that gender wage gaps can improve or worsen as economies recover from crisis 
effects. Much of course depends on how inclusive are the recovery policies to especially badly hit 
groups, who are according to the findings of this chapter, are women in Egypt and vocational school 
graduates in both countries. 
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The most recent episodes of  popular revolutions and protests in the MENA region, that 
resulted in the ouster of the dictatorial political regime in Egypt and destabilizing the entrenched 
monarchy of Jordan, is likely to have  profound labour market structures and outcomes. Both 
countries engaged in ad-hoc raising of nominal wages, by presidential decree for public sector 
employees and increasing public sector employment opportunities particularly for young graduates 
as a first reaction to the crisis. The limits of such short-term policies have been shown in recent past, 
as in situations of limited budgetary resources they ultimately result in a severe compression in the 
wage structure. Moreover, raising the expectations amongst graduates for guaranteed public jobs, 
will ultimately results in massive queuing and higher rates in wait and structural unemployment.  
Long run solutions for graduate unemployment (vocational and otherwise) and deteriorating 
gender wage differentials ultimately lie in improved demand conditions in these countries’ private 
sector, as well as in a deep overhaul in education and skill acquisition systems to upgrade the quality 
of the labour force in the private sector.  Although higher and better quality education is likely to 
increase overall wage inequality, it can in fact protect women wage gains and reduce the gender 
wage gap for higher educated women, as has been shown to be the case in Jordan in comparison to 
Egypt in the recent past. Public policy, therefore, need to focus on enhancing measures that increase 
the equality of opportunity for modern and relevant training and education programmes, 
particularly for women, and groups diverted to lower quality vocational education in the past. 
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Table 4.1:Trends in Real Hourly Wages in Egypt,  1988-2012 
          Median real hourly wages by group 
  
 
Level 
  
Change 
 
  
  1988 1998 2006 2012 1988-98 1998-2006 2006-2012 
  (in 2012 L.E.) (in%) 
Total 4.52 3.42 4.10 4.58 -24 20 12 
  
      
  
Gender 
      
  
Male 4.64 3.46 4.10 4.50 -25 18 10 
Female 3.87 3.25 4.08 4.86 -16 26 19 
  
      
  
Age Group 
      
  
15-24 3.58 2.43 2.81 3.57 -32 16 27 
25-34 4.52 3.21 3.75 4.17 -29 17 11 
35-49 5.87 3.93 4.85 5.02 -33 23 4 
50-64 5.91 5.02 6.32 6.25 -15 26 -1 
  
      
  
Region 
      
  
Greater Cairo 5.65 4.22 5.04 5.16 -25 20 2 
Alexandria and Canal Cities 5.43 4.05 4.73 5.19 -25 17 10 
Urban Lower Egypt 4.52 3.52 4.30 4.65 -22 22 8 
Rural Lower Egypt 4.54 3.51 4.41 4.81 -23 25 9 
Urban Upper Egypt 4.02 3.12 3.69 4.06 -22 18 10 
Rural Upper Egypt 4.44 2.81 3.57 4.40 -37 27 23 
  
      
  
Educational Attainment 
      
  
Illiterate 3.98 2.81 3.30 3.77 -29 17 14 
Literate without Diploma 4.39 3.03 3.30 3.77 -31 9 14 
elementary school 4.19 3.14 3.33 3.85 -25 6 15 
Middle School 4.35 3.51 3.82 4.00 -19 9 5 
General High school 6.52 4.22 4.10 4.33 -35 -3 6 
Vocational high school 4.52 3.12 3.93 4.47 -31 26 14 
post-secondary institute 5.72 3.78 4.75 5.00 -34 26 5 
University & above  7.50 5.23 6.03 6.25 -30 15 4 
  
      
  
Sector of Activity 
      
  
Agriculture 4.52 3.16 3.51 4.04 -30 11 15 
Industry 5.36 3.51 3.93 4.44 -34 12 13 
services 4.74 3.51 4.54 4.95 -26 29 9 
  
      
  
Institutional sector 
      
  
government 4.78 3.49 4.76 5.45 -27 36 14 
public enterprise 5.89 4.57 5.62 6.11 -22 23 9 
private 4.52 3.21 3.62 4.09 -29 13 13 
Total 4.64 3.46 4.10 4.60 -25 18 12 
Source: Author Calculation the 1988 Labour Force Sample Survey, 1998 Egyptian Labour Sample Survey 
and 2006-2012 Egypt Panel Labour Market Survey and Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey 2010. 
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Real Hourly Wages and Share below Low Earnings line in Egypt,  1988-2012 
  Gini coefficient for earnings by group   Share Below low earnings line by group   
  Level Change in % Level Change in % 
  1988 1998 2006 2012 
1988-
98 
1998-
2006 
2006 - 
2012 1988 1998 2006 2012 
1988-
98 
1998-
2006 
2006 
- 12 
    
     
  
      
  
Total 0.39 0.38 0.50 0.43 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.34 0.54 0.39 0.46 36 -37 15 
Gender   
     
  
      
  
Male 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.30 0.51 0.37 0.44 41 -38 16 
Female 0.38 0.37 0.50 0.43 -0.02 0.14 -0.08 0.51 0.65 0.48 0.56 22 -36 14 
Age Group   
     
  
      
  
15-24 0.32 0.33 0.48 0.40 0.01 0.16 -0.09 0.49 0.72 0.63 0.66 32 -15 5 
25-34 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.44 0.00 0.14 -0.05 0.40 0.60 0.43 0.51 33 -39 14 
35-49 0.42 0.38 0.47 0.42 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.22 0.48 0.30 0.40 54 -59 25 
50-64 0.36 0.33 0.41 0.35 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.24 0.34 0.21 0.31 30 -60 33 
Region   
     
  
      
  
Greater Cairo 0.436 0.44 0.51 0.49 0.00 0.08 -0.03 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.36 30 -33 28 
Alexandria and Canal 
Cities 0.38 0.40 0.47 0.43 0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.27 0.40 0.30 0.35 34 -34 14 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.383 0.34 0.46 0.42 -0.05 0.13 -0.05 0.33 0.52 0.38 0.47 38 -38 20 
Rural Lower Egypt 0.347 0.36 0.50 0.44 0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.39 0.57 0.40 0.47 31 -42 15 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.335 0.32 0.50 0.37 -0.01 0.18 -0.13 0.44 0.62 0.46 0.54 30 -35 14 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.281 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.04 0.16 -0.06 0.44 0.71 0.51 0.51 38 -39 -1 
Educational 
Attainment   
     
  
      
  
illiterate 0.31 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.44 0.66 0.50 0.58 34 -31 14 
Literate without 
Diploma 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.41 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 0.30 0.60 0.44 0.59 50 -36 25 
elementary school 0.37 0.33 0.49 0.37 -0.04 0.16 -0.12 0.36 0.52 0.47 0.56 31 -9 15 
Middle School 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.39 -0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.25 0.51 0.38 0.50 50 -34 24 
General High school 0.36 0.45 0.54 0.39 0.09 0.09 -0.14 0.08 0.30 0.39 0.45 73 23 12 
Vocational high school 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.38 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 0.45 0.61 0.44 0.46 26 -39 5 
post-secondary 
institute 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.48 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.33 0.57 0.29 0.41 43 -100 30 
University & above  0.33 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.35 46 -34 31 
Sector of Activity   
     
  
      
  
Agriculture 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.54 0.69 0.66 0.52 22 -5 -26 
Industry 0.38 0.35 0.45 0.42 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.23 0.43 0.37 0.44 47 -18 17 
services 0.42 0.38 0.52 0.44 -0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.36 0.57 0.37 0.45 37 -53 18 
Institutional sector   
     
  
      
  
government 0.37 0.37 0.53 0.43 0.01 0.16 -0.10 0.39 0.60 0.35 0.43 36 -71 18 
public enterprise 0.37 0.36 0.52 0.42 -0.01 0.16 -0.09 0.20 0.34 0.21 0.28 43 -61 24 
Private 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.36 0.52 0.45 0.50 30 -16 10 
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Source: Author Calculation the 1988 LFSS, 1998 Egyptian Labour Sample Survey and 2006-2012 Egypt Panel Labour Market Surveys. 
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Table 4.3. Real Monthly Per-capita Region-Specific Poverty lines and Low Earning 
Line (in 2012 L.E.) 
    
  
Real monthly per-capita 
region-specific poverty 
lines 
Real monthly 
region-specific low 
earning lines  
Dependency 
Ratio 
Region 
  
   2011 2012 2012 
Metropolitan 304 926 3.06 
Lower Egypt 
Urban 
282 845 
3.09 
Lower Egypt Rural 279 837 3.23 
Upper Egypt 
Urban 
293 878 
3.31 
Upper Egypt Rural 281 983 3.74 
Total Egypt 286 899 3.34 
Source: Author's calculation based on ELMPS 2006-2012 and regional poverty 
lines from Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS) 
2010- 2011. 
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Table 4.4: Measures of Inequality of Hourly Wages, Egypt 2006-2012 and  Jordan 2010 
 
                      Decomposition of  Thile Index 
    
  
  
  
    
  
  (% due to within group inequality) 
    Gini Decile Ratio Thile G(1) Education Occupation Industry 
    
Egypt 
06 Egypt12 
Jordan 
10 
Egypt 
06 Egypt12 
Jordan 
10 
Egypt 
06  
Egypt 
12 
Jordan 
10 
Egypt 
12 
Jordan 
10 
Egypt 
12 
Jordan 
10 
Egypt 
12 
Jordan 
10 
Total Public 0.53 0.49 0.37 5.40 5.70 3.23 0.78 0.35 0.38 94% 95% 91% 97% 97% 100% 
  Private 0.44 0.44 0.64 4.80 6.50 7.80 0.47 0.47 1.12 96% 92% 100% 90% 100% 95% 
  Total 0.5 0.55 0.55 5.60 7.10 5.90 0.69 0.42 0.86 95% 94% 95% 93% 98% 95% 
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Table 4.5 Returns to Education in Egypt (1998-2012) and Jordan (1997-2010) 
    Egypt Jordan 
 
  
1998 2012 1997 2010 
 Male Public           
  General Secondary 8.8 8.4 2.8 1.7   
   Vocational Secondary 7.2 9.8 3.8 -0.5   
  University 8.8 12.4 4.6 8.8   
Male Private   
 
        
  General Secondary 7.3 5.3 6 4.2   
   Vocational Secondary 5.0 3.5 3.2 -2.9   
  University 7.3 6.8 10.2 16.6   
Female Public             
  General Secondary 9.7 6.3 4.6 0.8   
   Vocational Secondary 9.6 7.5 4.3 3.1   
  University 10.7 10.1 6.8 13.7   
Female Private             
  General Secondary -1.5 12.8 10.4 7.5   
   Vocational Secondary 4.9 4.4 8.6 -9.7   
  University 10.9 9.0 12.9 17.6   
Source: Author Calculation from the 1998 Egyptian Labour Sample Survey and 2006-2012 
Egypt Panel Labour Market Survey and Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey 2010.            
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Source: Author Calculation from log hourly wage regressions based on the 1988 Labour Force Sample Survey, 
1998 Egyptian Labour Sample Survey and 2006-2012 Egypt Panel Labour Market Survey and Jordan Labour 
Market Panel Survey 2010. 
 
Note:  Crude sector and gender wage differentials are simply differences in the means of log hourly wages. 
Corrected sector wage differentials are calculated as the difference between predicted log hourly wages for 
public sector employees using the public sector wage equation and their predicted log hourly wages using the 
private sector equation (expressed as a proportion of the former). Similarly, corrected Gender wage 
differentials are the difference between predicted female wages using the female equation and their predicted 
wages using the male equation.  
 
 
  
Table 4.6: Gender and Sector Wage Differentials in Egypt, 1988-2012 and Jordan, 2010 
(in log hourly wages) 
 
   Egypt Jordan 
  1988 1998 2006 2012 2010 
  crude corrected crude corrected crude corrected crude corrected crude corrected 
    
      
  
 
  
Sector Wage 
Differentials 
       
  
 
  
Male Public-private 0.20 -0.19 0.11 -0.19 0.32 -0.04 0.24 -0.06 0.26 0.17 
Female Public-private -0.56 0.59 0.50 0.08 0.72 0.33 0.54 0.35 0.40 0.24 
  
       
  
 
  
 Gender Wage 
Differentials 
(Female-Male) 
       
  
 
  
Government -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.08 
Private Sector -0.66 -0.43 -0.34 -0.31 -0.49 -0.41 -0.32 -0.41 -0.01 -0.14 
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Figure 4.1 Summary of Findings on Real Wages and Earnings Inequality : 1988-2006 
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Figure 4.2: Raw Gender and Sector Wage Ratios, Egypt 2006-2012 
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Figure 4.3: Raw Gender and Sector Wage Ratios  Jordan 2007-2010 
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Figure 4.5: Corrected Gender and Sector Wage Ratios , Egypt 2006-2012 and Jordan 2010 
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5. The Potential Contribution of Micro and Small Enterprises to Inclusive Growth: Evidence from 
Enterprise Surveys in Egypt and MENA3 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The potential contribution of micro and small enterprises, as opposed to large and public sector 
firms, is of special interest to prospects for generating jobs, hence contributing to inclusive growth. 
This is particularly relevant for MENA countries affected by the tumultuous events in the past years.   
MSEs play an important role in creating jobs, and in building a flexible, adaptable base for an 
internationally competitive economy. The performance of MSEs in terms of growth and variety of 
economic activities, employment creation, export growth and productivity is thus a matter of 
interest to policy makers.  
 
 MSEs have historically also played an important role in contributing to economic 
development of many countries around the world. There is widespread consensus in the empirical 
literature that MSEs, by virtue of being labour-intensive, provide more opportunities for low skilled 
workers and are correlated with lower income inequality. They also form an important part of the 
supply chain for large firms and are necessary for agriculture dependent nations transitioning to an 
industrial- and service oriented economy. They also can provide unique opportunities for innovation 
and sustainable initiatives due to their inherent flexibility and risk-taking ability (Loewe, 2012) 
 
 This chapter evaluates characteristics of the MSEs environment in Egypt, with a specific 
interest in the formality of the sector, and its ability to act as an employment generator. The analysis 
draws on rich very recent panel data sets:  two rounds of Micro and Small Enterprise Panel Survey 
(MSES), 2003-2011, the latest of which was collected in the fourth quarter of 2011. This descriptive 
analysis based on enterprise data also provides the complementary evidence and paves the way for 
the empirical analysis on determinants of household wealth from labour force household survey 
data on household based micro and small enterprises presented in the following Chapter. The 
specific interest in both cases, is in characteristics of MSEs that affect their ability to expand 
employment opportunities and the constraints that finance pose for entrepreneurs. Better 
understanding of these constraints will allow policy to more effectively fuel this sector. 
 
 The analysis will proceed in two main parts. First for, for comparative purposes and to put 
the Egyptian results in a wider MENA economies context, the first part will present evidence on 
enterprise characteristics in Turkey and Lebanon in comparison to each other and Egypt, from very 
similar surveys employing the same methodology and conducted during the earlier period (2001-
2004). The second part, then concentrates on the comparison overtime in Egypt, by looking at the 
second round of the MSES survey in 2011, which represents the first instance after the onset of the 
2008 global financial crisis and January 2011 revolution, that data on the performance of MSEs in 
Egypt is available, which should shed some light on the immediate effects of economic crisis on that 
sector. 
   
 The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents a brief overview of 
previous studies on MSE environment in Egypt and presents the definitions of micro and small 
enterprises as well as formality employed in the rest of the chapter. Section 5.2 motivates the 
analysis further by comparing stylized facts on MSE’s in MENA drawing on similar data in Lebanon 
and Turkey. Section 5.3 introduces the Egyptian MSES data set and compares its key results to the 
                                                          
3
 By Alia El Mahdi and Mona Said. 
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most recent enterprise census in Egypt. Section 5.4 then explores the evidence over the period 
2003-2011 in Egypt on formality, size, location, distribution across industries as well sources of 
capital and finance (whether formal or informal) as obstacles or opportunities for growth of these 
enterprises in the past. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes by drawing some policy implications for 
enabling these enterprises to fulfill inclusive growth targets that are most suited for, given their 
predominant role as employment generators in Egypt.  
 
5.2 Overview of MSEs Environment in Egypt  
MENA region’s persistently high unemployment rate has presented policy-makers with a serious 
challenge in the past few decades. Whilst exacerbating the unemployment challenge, demographic 
factors are not alone in explaining high unemployment rates. Demand side factors too have an 
important bearing on the regions’ ability or inability to address its endemic unemployment problem 
which persisted even during the buoyant growth period of the decade preceding the onset of 
economic crises. MSEs are one of the tools of inclusive growth through generating jobs as well as 
poverty reduction. Thus, their effect on employment and alleviating poverty will be explored. Also, 
the obstacles hindering MSEs in MENA region will be discussed with special focus on access to 
finance and lack of skilled labour.  
 
 
5.2.3 Potential and Constraints of MSEs in Egypt from previous studies 
El-Mahdi (2006) provides an extensive review on the literature on MSEs in Egypt. Most such studies 
were descriptive nature and utilized their own small scaled surveys in particular sectors. Hafez 
(1986) investigated 25 establishments in the manufacturing industry and Meyrs (1988) carried out a 
survey on a sample of 1149 small sized establishments in the manufacturing industry in Cairo. El-
Mahdi and El Said (1996) study was also confined to a small city, the Tenth of Ramadan City. Large 
empirical studies were carried out by CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) 
in 1985, 1988, and 1998. These latter studies were comprehensive in nature to represent the 
Egyptian market, with sample sizes reaching 5000 establishments. The 1998 survey estimated that 
small enterprises (less than 50 workers) represented more than 90% of all private sector enterprises 
in Egypt employing 63% of total employment, with the bulk being in the (1-10) workers category. 
This startling finding has been mirrored in other cases in MENA region, ad underscores the key role 
that MSEs can play in achieving growth and equity outcomes. 
 
 Moreover, with the signing of the Economic Reform and the Structural Programs (ERSAP) 
with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in early 1990’s, and the process of 
privatization the ensued, meant, among other things, increasing the role of the private sector in 
investment, production and employment, reducing the role of the government and public sector in 
these same three areas. The inability of the large companies to provide sufficient work opportunities 
to the growing labour force and return migration from the Gulf countries, deemed it necessary to 
identify new reliable sources with fast job creation potential. As a consequence, and given the 
relative slow growth in employment during the nineties, the interest in the potential role of the 
medium, small and micro enterprises grew over time. The main employer in the labour market, ever 
since the implementation of ERSAP in 1991, was the MSEs. The Social Fund for Development was set 
up in 1992 and started to take initiative to support MSEs by the mid-nineties, though the results 
were modest until the new millennium. 
 
 Thus the micro and small enterprises play an important role in the economic activity in 
MENA in general and Egypt in particular, around 63% of the total employment is employed by Small 
establishments and represent 95.8% of the total number of establishments. In addition, Micro and 
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small enterprises are also the major provider of products and services for local markets, particularly 
lower-income segments with limited purchasing power. According to CAPMAS Employment Census , 
92.5% of enterprises are micro, 7.3% small, and less than 1% (only 0.2%) is medium and large. The 
proportion of micro and small enterprises is growing. While micro and small enterprises accounted 
for 73.5% of total private sector employment in 1996, their share had jumped to more than 85% in 
2008.  On the other hand, medium and large enterprises witnessed a decline in their share of 
employment by almost half, from 26.5% to 14.7% during the same period.  
 
 Even though MSEs play a key role in employment generation, one of the main obstacles that 
the literature cites as a deterring factor for the MSEs is the lack of sufficient finance to start their 
new venture. In the case of Egypt, the issue of micro and small finance has been on top of the 
priority list of the governments since the beginning of the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991, and especially with the establishment of the Social Fund for 
Development in 1992. One of the mandates of SFD was to provide finance to MSEs, as means of 
encouraging the private initiative as the spirit of ERSAP indicated. Keeping this in mind, numerous 
numbers of businessmen Associations, Economic NGOs were either established or strengthened, as 
well as Bank's initiatives adopted with the sole purpose of providing micro and small finance to 
MSEs. So the question is: to what extent were these initiatives successful in reaching out to MSEs? 
Several surveys have been undertaken after 1991, which indicated that the start-up phase, the role 
of formal institutions in providing the initial capital is rather modest. As to phase after the 
establishment of the enterprise, the role of formal finance increases.  The critical role of financing 
will be explored further below and in the next Chapter. 
 
 Another obstacle is that micro and small enterprises are subject to a legal and regulatory 
framework which is cumbersome, bureaucratic and not sensitive to their operating realities 
(ElMahdi, 2006). Regulation comprises mainly three different elements: registration, licensing and 
the compliance with standards. An enterprise is especially affected by the regulatory framework in 
the moment when it wants to formalize (registration) or it wants to obtain a license (e.g. for a new 
product line). In addition, the compliance or non-compliance with existing standards (e.g. health or 
quality standards) is directly linked to the regulatory framework. (Loewe et al., 2012). 
 
 A third constraint is corruption since many scholars highlight that corruption negatively 
affects firms in a country. Others object that corruption may also have positive effects such as 
reducing information and transaction costs or speeding up administrative procedures19. However, 
we have to keep in mind that only wealthy entrepreneurs can afford to pay high bribes and only 
entrepreneurs with connections benefit from favouritism in state-business relations, while all others 
are disadvantaged by any form of corruption. In addition, corruption reduces the incentives of 
entrepreneurs to be competitive on markets. If they understand that bribes and connections are the 
main determinant to get an application approved or to win a government bid, they shift their 
investment in terms of time and money from research and development of new products to bribery 
and investments into connections (Loewe et al., 2012).  
 
 Finally, availability of well trained and skilled labour force is an obstacle given that empirical 
evidence shows that highly skilled managerial and technical workers are needed to provide the 
management and supervisory roles for enterprises to upgrade and play a more dynamic role 
domestically and with international interlinkages. 
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5.3 Relevant Definitions and Key Concepts 
5.3.1 Definition of MSMEs 
There is disgreement on the cut-off point between micro and small on one-hand and small and 
medium enterprises on the other hand. The variance in definitions depends on the research needs 
and objectives concerning the segment of enterprises it intends to target, investigate and analyse.  
Therefore the cut-off point between the MSE and the medium-sized enterprise could be set high or 
low, using different criteria such as employment, size of capital, type of organisation or technology 
.... etc. However, the Micro and Small Establishments Law (Law 141/2004) has defined the micro 
enterprise as the one that employs less than 10 workers and has a capital less than LE50,000, while 
the small enteprise employs 10-49 workers and has a capital that is equal to or greater than 
LE50,000 and does not exceed LE1 million. 
 
 Another point of disagreement concerns the cut-off point between medium sized and large 
enterprises. There is no general consensus over the definition of a medium sized enterprise. 
However one could surmise from the different definitions used by the different ministries in Egypt, 
that medium enterprises employ 50-99 workers ( in some cases the medium sized enterprises are 
considered to be employing between 50 and 200/ 250/500 workers).  
 
- Definition of Formality 
In defining formality ot is important to disnguish between  informal employment and the informal 
enterprises/sector. informal employment usually refers to wage-workers or non-paid family workers 
who are working either in the formal or informal sectors. The basis for difference between formal 
and informal workers is usually based either on the availability of a work contract, social security 
coverage, or the degree of permanency in work. Accordingly, a worker could be working on an 
informal basis in a formal company or even in the government if he/she is not covered by social 
insurance or bound by a contract. At the same time he would be working on a formal basis in a small 
enterprise if those conditions were existent.    
 
 As to the definition of the informal enterprise, it seems to be more complex, due to the 
variability amongst enteprises. J. Charmes tried to capture the most widely-accepted definition, 
which is based on the international definition of the informal sector adopted as a resolution of the 
15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians 1993, as comprising: 
“1) informal self-owned enterprises which may employ family workers, and employees on an 
occasional basis: for operational purposes and depending on national circumstances, this segment 
comprises either all self-owned enterprises, or only those which are not registered under specific 
forms of national legislation (factories or commercial acts, tax or social security laws, professional 
groups, regulatory or similar acts, laws or regulations established by national legislative bodies). 
2) enterprises of informal employers which may employ one or more employees on a continuous 
basis and which comply with one or both of the following criteria : 
- size of the establishment below a specified level of employment (defined on the basis of minimum 
size requirements embodied in relevant national legislation or other empirical or statistical practices : 
the choice of the upper size limit taking account of the coverage of statistical enquiries in order to 
avoid an overlap),- non-registration of the enterprise or its employees.” Charmes (1998). 
 
 Researchers chose for the sake of studying the informal enterprises, several definitions, 
which were usually either based on the number of workers ( enterprises employing less than 5 or 10 
workers…etc), the size of capital, a combinations of the two previous variables, or certain legal rules 
and regulations such as the availability of license, registration, and social security coverage. In the 
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Egyptian case, the common tendency in most of the recent studies during the last 20 years was to 
rely on the degree of compliance by the legal procedures as a determining factor of formality.  
Accordingly, if the enterprise complied by the main legal or official regulations such as the business 
license, the commercial registration, the availability tax card and keeping regular accounts it would 
be considered formal, while the inability to comply by one or more of the procedures would count 
the enterprise as an informal one. 
 
  
5.4 Comparison with MSE Sector in Lebanon and Turkey  
To motivate the analysis over time in Egypt, this section presents a comparison of the main 
characteristics of the MSE sector in Lebanon and Turkey, two other MENA countries where similar 
enterprise data was collected. The Economic Research Form’s project titled Promoting 
Competitiveness in Micro and Small Enterprises in the MENA Region’s ultimate aim is to design 
relevant policies and specific programs to help the MSE sector fulfill its enormous growth potentials. 
Both in depth country studies and cross-country comparisons will help achieve this goal.  This section 
focuses on comparing the size, formality, gender representation as well obstacles faced by MSE 
sector in the three countries.  
 
5.4.1 MSE Sector in Lebanon  
A survey of 2,948 enterprises (Hamdan 2005) provides a thorough understanding of the 
characteristics of the MSE sector in Lebanon and the challenges it faces. The 1996 census conducted 
by the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) estimated that there are 198,000 enterprises; small 
enterprises with less than five employees account for 88%, while those with less than 50 employees 
account for 96% of total enterprises in Lebanon. In total, enterprises with less than 50 employees 
account for 530,000 jobs, which is 51% of the working population.   
 
In Lebanon, three criteria must be met for an enterprise to be considered a part of the formal 
economy. The three criteria are commercial registration, social insurance scheme, official business 
license, and tax commitment, are all criteria for being part of the formal economy.  Table 5.1 below 
shows that almost half of MSEs surveyed are not commercially registered. However, as MSEs grow 
and age, they tend to legalize their status. Only 20% of surveyed enterprises participate in the 
government insurance scheme, known as the NSSF.  Furthermore, approximately 44% of surveyed 
enterprises are registered with the taxation department. As expected, the informal sector in 
Lebanon plays a significant role, and this is especially true amongst small one-worker enterprises.  
 
Though there are many new jobs generated in the informal sector, it is characterized by low 
productivity, poor working conditions, and high vulnerability to shocks. The analysis of performance 
indicates that performance is directly related to the size of the firm: as the number of employees 
increases, firms tend to record better performance levels, with a peak for MSEs with 10-49 workers. 
formalized enterprises perform significantly better than informal ones, as well as those that employ 
up-to-date technologies, have access to basic infrastructure, and when the firm’s clientele base is 
constituted of foreign customers. 
 
Male entrepreneurs do better than female ones,  as females are concentrated in low performing 
jobs and levels that enjoy low added values and profits and educational attainment is also positively 
related to performance,  with highest performance recorded in firms with entrepreneurs who have 
attained at least a university bachelor’s degree, or a  training apprenticeship experience. 
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The most prominent constraints of surveyed MSEs seem to include securing initial capital for 
business start-up, and high tax rates. One third of surveyed MSEs indicate that cumbersome 
licensing/registration procedures, custom duties and tax administration are a major concern and one 
fourth cite access to financial services is viewed as the main problem they face.  In general, the 
survey indicated that 42% of MSEs are constrained by lack of access to credit facilities. Only 8.3% of 
MSEs currently have a credit/loan (mainly larger MSEs). The main source of loans is banks (69%), but 
also friends/relatives (18%) and 6% from business associates.  
  
 Due to the family nature of micro and small enterprises in Lebanon, the initial startup capital 
for the MSE is secured through family, and not business, networks. The survey indicates that own 
savings constitute the major source of initial start-up capital of MSEs in the country, followed by 
inheritance.  
Few of the surveyed MSEs have had access to formal loans (4.2%) in their start-up phase. Of these, 
most of the loans are obtained from banks.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Degree of formality of Lebanese and Turkish MSEs, 2003-2004 
Lebanon Turkey 
Formality: Commercial registration  
Registered 41.9 Formality: 
Registration 
to public or 
professional 
organizations 
Registered  4.4 
Not registered 42.8 Not registered  95.1 
Not required  15.2 Not required  0.5 
Formality: National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF) 
Registered 20 
Formality: 
Keep 
account for 
expenditures 
and 
revenues 
Keep accounts 92.7 
Not registered 54.6 Do not keep accounts  7.3 
Not required  25.4   
  
Formality: Tax Registration  
Registered  44   
  Not registered 39   
  Not required  17       
 
 
5.4.2 MSE Sector in Turkey  
According to the European Commission’s latest report on Turkey, SMEs account for over 75% of 
employment, though they only represent 27% of value added. The field survey of 5,000 micro and 
small enterprises carried out from 2001-2004 occurred while Turkey was experiencing a serious 
economic crisis.  
The two criteria used to evaluate the degree of formality of MSEs in Turkey by Ozar (2006) 
are if the enterprise is registered to public or professional organizations, and the other is if the 
enterprise keeps account of their expenditures and revenues. Enterprises in Turkey are by law 
obliged to register to the Chamber of Trade and to their vocational association to receive licenses for 
operation. Table 5.1 above also shows that judging by registration, a much smaller percentage of 
enterprises in Turkey officially register their enterprises in comparison to Lebanon (4% as opposed to 
above 40%), but the vast majority (95%) keep accounts for expenditures and revenue.  
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Hamidi and Başlevent (2010) undertook a comparison of the results of MSE survey for 
Turkey and Egypt with emphasis on gender differences. What enterprises in both countries have in 
common is that the  majority of businesses employ less than 3 workers and trade is the dominant 
activity (the allocation of MSEs by economic sector for Egypt is 16, 73, and 11%, and for Turkey is 21, 
67 and 12% for manufacturing, trade and services, in that order, with skilled workers making up the 
largest share of the workforce). Also, like in Lebanon, Own savings are the main source of start-up 
capital, followed by inheritance. Only 10% of Turkish and 4% of Egyptian capitals come from loans 
(formal and informal). 
 
 The main differences is that there are more women entrepreneurs in Egypt than in Turkey 
(Egyptian females represent 12% of Egyptian entrepreneurs, vs. only 6% in Turkey). A result that is 
attributed, in part, to the world economic recession at the turn of the century, the time of the 
Turkish survey. Turkish entrepreneurs start working 5 years earlier than the Egyptian entrepreneur 
are two years younger than the Egyptians, they are also less educated if they are male  Egyptian and 
more educated if they are females . Another important difference is that a sizeable 28% of Turkish 
females’ MSEs are working in manufacturing activities, compared with only 2% in Egypt, attesting to 
the long history of Turkish women working in textile, clothing and leather that dates back to the 
Ottoman times. 
 
5.4.3 Comparison between the three countries: 
The unique characteristics of Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt will have policy implications on the most 
appropriate means to better fuel the MSE Sector.  There is a varying patter of economic activity 
amongst the three countries, which is indicative of the opportunities available for entrepreneurs in 
each country. In all three countries MSE sector relies heavily on trade. MSEs in Turkey are more 
involved in industry and manufacturing. This may also explain the fact that MSEs in Turkey tend to 
be larger than those in Egypt and Lebanon, with 8.4% of MSEs employing 10-49 workers. However, 
there are fewer female entrepreneurs (in relative terms) in Turkey, where they are only 6.1% of 
entrepreneurs.  In the three countries, formal loans play a small role as the primary source of 
finance. Despite Turkey’s larger SMEs and the prevalence of formal enterprises, formal loans only 
provided the initial capital for 1.5% of enterprises, though informal loans are much more common 
than the other countries.  
Thus despite the differences outlines above, the MSES surveys in the three countries at the 
turn of the century reveal important similarities: the prevalence of informality and dominance micro 
enterprises in terms of size, barriers to entry for women, whose performance is less than men and 
constrained access to finance so they rely on own savings as a major source. Nevertheless these 
enterprises, managed to employ the vast majority of population and hence it is crucial to understand 
how they managed to survive, prosper or otherwise go out of business during recent times of 
economic crisis. We turn to looking at how they fared between two surveys in Egypt. 
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Table 5.2: Comparison of Characteristics of Enterprises in Lebanon, Turkey and Egypt, 2003 
    Lebanon Turkey  Egypt  
Size of enterprise  
One-worker  45 24.3 39.3 
2-4 workers  46.8 
67.2 
55.4 
5-9 workers 5.5 3.9 
10-49 workers  2.7 8.4 1.4 
Economic Activity  
Trade  72.6 56.4 33.4 
Industry  8.8 19.3 12.3 
Construction 0.6 2.5 8.4 
Hotels and restaurants  5.1 10.7 3.2 
Other sectors  12.9 11.1 42.7 
Gender  
Female Entrepreneur  8 6.1 11.1 
Male Entrepreneur  92 93.9 88.9 
Initial capital  
Own Savings  60 74.8 79.1 
Inheritance  18 7.9 14.6 
Own remittances  5.5 1 0.1 
Other Sources  4.9 1 0.7 
Liquidation of assets  3.8 5.2 0.8 
Formal loans  4.2 1.5 3.7 
Informal loans  2.5 8.5 1 
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5.5 The Micro and Small Enterprise Data in Comparison to Other Surveys 
5.5.1 The Micro and Small Enterprises Survey Data: 2003-2011 
The Micro and Small Enterprise Panel Survey dataset was conducted by the Economic Research 
Forum in an attempt to better understand the basic needs of the sector and identify opportunities 
for policy to better shape growth. The Small and Micro Enterprises Survey (MSES) – Egypt 2003 is a 
sample survey designed to provide estimates for the key indicators related to the activities, 
manpower structure and the financial characteristics of MSEs. The primary objective of the sample 
design to provide estimates on the national level based on data randomly selected from  three major 
administrative regions (Metropolitan areas, Lower Egypt, and Upper Egypt). Eight governorates were 
selected from the three regions. The selection was based on an attempt to represent governorates 
with different economic characteristics. Due to its size and comprehensive coverage in the 
questionnaire, this survey provides an invaluable insight on the MSE sector in Egypt at the enterprise 
level. The survey holds information on the individual characteristics of the owner/manager of the 
business as well as characteristics of the enterprise. The sample size consists of 5000 private MSEs, 
large enough to provide statistically reliable estimates.  
To follow up on the 2003 survey, the primary objective of the sample design of the MSES 
2011 was to provide estimates on the national scale and three major administrative regions 
(Metropolitan areas, Lower Egypt, and Upper Egypt). Three governorates were selected from the 
three regions. The three selected governorates are Cairo (Metropolitan), Gharbia (Lower Egypt) and 
Asyut (Upper Egypt). Around 13500 MSEs were listed in 56 Primary Sampling Units in the three 
governorates. Then a stratified random sample of 3000 firms was selected from the three 
governorates proportional to the listed firms at each region. 40% of the enterprises are located in 
Cairo, 28% are in Gharbia, and 32% are in Asyut. The female owned enterprises were double-
sampled to allow for more variety, but that can be corrected in the analysis using weights. To 
compensate for an expected 10% non-response rate, the sample size was inflated to 3300, and 
ended up with the predetermined sample size 0f 3000, also a sample large enough to provide 
reliable statistical estimates. 
 
5.5.2 Overview of MSE Sector in Egypt from 2006 establishment Census data:  
According to the latest Establishment Census in 2006 (EC2006 conducted by the Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics-CAPMAS) the total number of the establishments in Egypt was 2.5 
million establishments. These establishments employed around 7.3 Million workers.  The 
establishments that employ less than 50 employees represent almost around 98-99 % of the total 
establishments in Egypt. However, they only provided 80% of all private sector employment. It is 
worth mentioning that the by definition, the EC2006 does not include any enterprises that operate 
outside fixed premises, such as itinerant salespersons.  
The main distribution of MSEs is in the following economic activities: trade activities, various 
services and manufacturing.  Within the MSEs, there is a high concentration in the employment 
bracket of 1-4 workers establishments. Thus, the structure of the enterprises in Egypt tends to be 
extremely micro in terms of number of workers. In general the estimated number of MSEs was 
around 2.444 million establishments in 2006, and they offered employment to 5.827 million workers 
with an average enterprises size 2.38 workers per unit.  
Data on employment in the Fiscal year 2006/2007 stated that the total number of workers in 
Egypt was 20.120 Million workers. Private sector workers were estimated to be around 14 million 
workers or 70% of total employment. MSEs employment was thus around 29% of all employment in 
2006/2007.  The remaining private sector employment is primarily in agricultural activities, outside-
establishments employment and in the large private sector companies respectively. 
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5.5.3 Findings from the EC2006 Census and The 2011 MSES Survey 
The MSEs’ study (2011) provided a newer estimate of the number of MSEs and the employment 
created in them.  By the end of 2011 there were around 3.04 Million establishments and those MSEs 
employed around 7.9 million workers or 33.7% of total employment in Egypt in 2011 (23.46 Mill 
workers in December 2011, CAPMAS, Press Conference Bulletin 18/02/2012), with an average MSE size 
equal to 2.63 workers. Data indicate that the employment in the MSEs increased by 2.2% between 
the last two years 2011 and 2010, and that employment in the sector grew by only 148,316 workers, 
which is an extremely small addition to the employment. This change is quite modest if compared to 
changes in other years. The impact of the revolution had its recessionary toll on the Egyptian 
economy and labour market.  However, this contribution of the MSEs is higher than any other sector 
managed to absorb in Egypt. In fact, the larger private sector companies were releasing some of 
their workforce under the stress of low demand and the government did not succeed in offering any 
additional jobs. 
When we compare the Establishment Census for 2006 data and the MSEs2011 results one could 
conclude that: first, the number of MSEs grew by 4.9% between 2006 and 2012; second, the number 
of workers in the sector grew from 5.827 million workers in 2006 to 7.9 million workers in 2011 by 
an annual growth rate of 6 %, and creating around 345 thousand job opportunities annually. The 
year 2011 witnessed a drop in employment growth rate (2.2%), which is understandable in the 
recessionary post-revolution climate.  
 
5.6 Characteristics of Enterprises and Entrepreneurs in MSES Data: 2003-2011 
Tables 5.3-5.10 and Figures 5.1-5.3 below provide a snapshot of the main characteristics of MSEs 
sector in Egypt in 2011, and in comparison to 2003. In undertaking the comparisons, we 
concentrate on the location, size, sector of economic activity, formality and market scope attributes 
of the enterprises. We then look at the distribution by entrepreneur characteristics focusing on 
his/her age, educational attainment and gender. Finally, given it importance, we devote a 
subsection to  financing issues, whether size of capital or access to sources of funding, as it is 
related to both enterprise and owner/manager characteristics. 
 
5.6.1 Enterprise characteristics: 
 
- Location 
The geographical distribution displayed in Figure 5.1 based on the survey results in 2011, indicate 
that almost 85% of the sample is located in urban areas compared to 62% in 2003. This result is 
understandable given that the study deals with MSEs that are not pursuing agricultural activities, 
and the new sample has excluded four of the governorates (Giza, Fayoum, Damietta, and Souhag) in 
the first survey, which were by nature of their population distribution more rural governorates. As to 
the distribution according geographical location, it is evident that the Metropolitan area of Cairo 
secured 38.9% of the sample, which is consistent with the relative importance of the metropolitan 
areas with regards MSEs concentration. While the MSEs in Lower and Upper Egypt contain the 
remaining enterprises.  
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- Employment size 
The share of workers in establishments employing less than 50 workers represented around 80% of 
the total workers in private sector establishments in Egypt or 5.8 million workers. 72% of those 
workers were operating in establishments that employ 1-4 workers, and 16% in establishments that 
employ 5-9 workers and the remaining 12% of workers were employed in 10-49 workers’ 
establishments.   
 
Table 5.3: The Distribution of MSEs By size of Employment and Gender of Entrepreneur, 2011 
 
Size of enterprise 
Male Female Total 
2011 2003 2011 2003 2011 2003 
1 worker 38.3 40.3 47.7 58.4 39.3 42.6 
2 workers 32.2 34.9 31.7 29.8 32.2 34.3 
3 workers 16.2 14.6 10.3 5.2 15.6 13.4 
4 workers 7.5 4.5 8.7 3.9 7.6 4.4 
5 to 9 workers 4.3 3 1 1.8 3.9 2.9 
10 to 49 workers 1.5 2.6 0.7 1 1.4 2.4 
Total Number 2701 4343 300 615 3001 4958 
Mean 2.12 2.33 1.85 1.73 2.09 2.26 
 
Table 5.3 above also shows Employment Size: From 2003 to 2011 we see the mean number of 
employees decrease from 2.26 to 2.09. However, there is also fall in the share of enterprises that 
have only 1 or 2 workers. When decomposed into male and female entrepreneurs, we see that 
females are more likely to employ only one worker than males, though females have seen a fall in 
single employee enterprise and a rise in 2, 3, 4 employees.  
 
 
- Sector of Economic activity 
The retail/ wholesale trade sector represented the main source of employment, where 46% of the 
workers were employed, followed by the manufacturing sector by 21% and the remaining 33% were 
engaged in different service activities whether social, financial or other services such as tourism, 
health, education and information and communication services as well as other activities. 
 
 
Figure 5.1The Regional Distribution of MSEs 
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If we look into the results of the MSEs2011 survey we get the following conclusions: 
The main economic activities of the MSEs are classified into three activities, namely, trade, services 
and manufacturing. The following table shows the sample distribution accordingly. 
 
Table 5.2 indicates the high prevalence of MSEs working in trade, whether whole sale or retail or 
maintenance activities, since 60% of them are engaged in such activities (compared to 64.7% in 
2003). Trade activities include: Clothes, food products, furniture, plastics, and building materials as 
well as different maintenance workshops. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Enterprises by Economic activity & Number of workers, 2011 
Size of enterprise Trade Services Industry Total 
1 worker 41.7 36.8 32.2 39.3 
2 to 4 workers 54.9 57.2 53.1 55.4 
5 to 9 workers 2.5 4.2 11.1 3.9 
10 to 49 workers 0.8 1.8 3.6 1.4 
Total Number 1806 886 307 2999 
 
Enterprises active in manufacturing do not exceed 10.3% of all MSEs, which reveals a decline in the 
share of manufacturing compared to MSEs2003 results, where they exceeded 15.7%. Those 
manufacturing activities include food processing, wood and furniture, ceramics and building 
materials, electrical and engineering industries such as air conditioners, electrical distribution 
boards, electronic appliances, lifts….   
 
The MSEs working in providing services seem to be the winners in this context, as their share rose 
from 19.5% in 2003 to 29.5% in 2011. Service activities that are most prevalent include: 
transportation and distribution, personal services such as laundry services, communication, business 
and tourism services (cafes, restaurants, hotels).  
 
- Formality/informality Status 
The years between 2004 and 2010 witnessed the adoption of some drastic official measures in the 
areas of deregulation of laws, procedures and implementation of certain simplified approaches to 
registration of enterprises. But still the empirical results reveal that the informality status has not 
been improved.  Table 5.5 summarizes the result of asking MSE owners/managers questions 
regarding the institutional obstacles that surround the start-up of a business and during its 
functioning and operations. The questions include issues related to legal procedures, workers, 
competition, financial and non-financial services, taxes and customs.  
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Table 5.5 Entrepreneurs Responses to the type of Institutional Aspects Surrounding the 
Business Operations and their Degrees of Easiness, 2011  
Criteria Easy Moderate Difficult 
Not 
applicable 
Securing Initial Capital 14.80% 12.00% 71.50% 1.70% 
Licensing & 
Registration 
Procedures 
14.80% 17.90% 50.90% 16.50% 
Labour Law 11.40% 13.50% 36.10% 38.90% 
Labour Inspection 12.70% 14.30% 39.20% 33.80% 
Labour Cost 7.90% 17.60% 48.20% 26.30% 
Meeting 
Environmental 
Requirements 
18.10% 14.00% 33.80% 34.10% 
Finding Qualified 
Workers 
9.90% 17.00% 52.20% 20.90% 
Retaining Qualified 
Workers 
9.60% 14.40% 55.00% 21.00% 
Raw Materials 
Availability 
21.30% 15.00% 16.50% 47.20% 
Raw Materials Cost 6.30% 13.70% 33.30% 46.70% 
 Capacity Utilization 47.40% 39.40% 7.50% 5.70% 
 Demand For Output 20.30% 44.30% 30.10% 5.30% 
Strong Domestic 
Competition From 
Micro E. 
14.30% 21.80% 46.90% 17.00% 
Strong Domestic 
Competition from 
Small E. 
3.80% 4.40% 43.60% 48.20% 
Strong Domestic 
Competition from 
Large E. 
3.00% 1.50% 38.20% 57.30% 
Strong Competition 
from Imports 
3.00% 2.50% 32.20% 62.30% 
Financial Services 3.30% 3.60% 29.40% 63.80% 
Other Business 
Support Services 
2.10% 3.60% 35.90% 58.40% 
Profitability 3.90% 17.90% 75.60% 2.60% 
Tax Rates 4.60% 22.20% 45.20% 28.10% 
Custom Duties 0.80% 0.60% 3.60% 95.00% 
Tax Administration 8.70% 21.80% 44.60% 24.90% 
 
 
 Responses reveal that the fear of achieving little profitability comes on top of the obstacles, 
followed by difficulties in registration procedures, as well as several aspects that are related to the 
shortage in qualified workers, their cost/wage rates, and the ability to retain them after training. 
These factors lead to MSEs' preference of working informally under the fear of low demand and 
96 
 
profitability. The combined effects of these obstacles are translated into a relatively high level of 
informality within the MSEs.  
 
 According to Egyptian laws, there are 4 procedures that make an enterprise formal: the 
license, the registration, the tax card and keeping regular accounts. If all the procedures are applied 
by the MSE it would be considered a formal enterprise, if any of the 4 procedures is lacking then it 
would be considered informal. The highest degree of compliance is in acquiring a tax card, while the 
lowest degree is in keeping regular accounts of the business transactions and presenting them to the 
tax authorities.  
 
 Figure 5.3 shows the MSEs in three main activities and their degree of compliance according 
to the number of procedures. The trade activities seem to be the least informal. In general, 
informality is rather relatively higher in rural areas, in Upper Egypt, in trade and service activities, 
and in smaller sized enterprises in terms of capital. Data indicates that 21.6 % of all MSEs are formal 
enterprises, while 18.4% of them are totally informal. The remaining MSEs have different shades of 
informality. The results also indicate that around 45% of MSEs comply with the three main 
procedures: the commercial registration, the business license, and the tax card. 
   
 The procedure that shows the highest non-compliance is "keeping regular accounts", which 
gives an accurate estimate of the volume of transactions of each enterprise. There is no evidence 
that the informality phenomena is related to the recent 25th of January revolution or its 
repercussions, it is rather more related to a culture of non-compliance with legalities. The share of 
one-year-old enterprises is quite small (7.3% or 221 MSEs), so it could not have mattered in the total 
MSEs community’s informality level. 
 
  
Figure 5.3:  The Degrees of MSEs' Compliance with the Four Formality Procedures in 2011 and 
2003 (%) 
  
 
 
- Market and scope 
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 As to the role of regional and international markets, or the role of exports in their overall 
market channels, the following table reveals that exports are of no significant importance to the 
operations of MSEs. This limited share of exports indicates the rather uncompetitive nature of the 
products whether in terms of process or quality. 
 
5.6.2 Characteristics of The Enterprise Owner/Manager 
- Gender:  
Results reveal a significant difference in the female representation in the total community of 
entrepreneurs/managers compared to MSEs2003 Survey. The female owners/managers account for 
10% of all entrepreneurs/managers, which is relatively higher than the results of the MSEs 2003 
survey, where they accounted for only 6%.  
This reversal in the contribution of females could be explained by the continuous hostile 
labour market conditions, where the role of the government as female employer disappeared 
gradually and the private sector companies do not encourage female employment. As a 
consequence, females, in their conquest to find a decent way for living opted to establish their own 
enterprises.  
Female entrepreneurs constitute 10% of all MSEs entrepreneurs in the sample. Change is 
taking place in the labour market conditions confronting females. Social barriers that hindered 
females ten years ago are now less than in 2003. As 60% of them do not need to take permission 
from the male household members to start their business compared to 38% in 2003. In case they 
need permission it mostly comes from the husband or the father. As to the most frequent difficulties 
females usually face in managing their enterprises they include hiring workers, setting up the 
business, marketing, getting financial services and harassment by others in the market. However 
most of the females (80%) feel empowered by their work as entrepreneurs.  
 
- Age: 
 
Table 5.6 indicates that there is no significant difference between male and female entrepreneurs, 
and that this pattern of distribution does not differ from the results from MSEs 2003 survey. The 
majority of entrepreneurs are concentrated in the age bracket of 40 years and above. From the 
female's perspective, this is the age where she is finished with child-care and ready to leave home 
and work. While from the male's perspective, at this age they would have managed to accumulate 
experience and savings that allow them to start their own independent business.  
 
  Table 5.6: The Distribution of MSEs By Age and Gender of Entrepreneur, 2011 
Age M F Total 
<18 y. 0.20% 0.80% 0.20% 
18 to <21y. 2.00% 4.10% 2.20% 
21 to <25 y. 7.40% 9.60% 7.60% 
25 to <30 y. 12.90% 13.00% 12.90% 
30 to <40 y. 27.20% 21.20% 26.60% 
40 years or more 50.40% 51.30% 50.50% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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- Education:  
The strongest point of departure from 2003 results is the level of entrepreneurs' education, which 
increased in 2011. Although, the average years of schooling of males are still higher than females, 
the gap in educational attainment levels between both genders has decreased substantially as 
opposed to 2003. Interestingly, female entrepreneurs' number of years of schooling in rural areas is 
higher than in urban areas, as opposed to the situation in 2003.   
 
 
 
One of the noteworthy phenomena is that all entrepreneurs are literate, as opposed to 
2003, where almost 24% were illiterate. The growing numbers of secondary school and university 
graduates who entered the labour market could explain this development, as their only hope to 
work was through establishing their own business or the family enterprises.  
Data indicate that, the respondents to the questionnaires were 70% owners of the 
enterprises and 30% managers. Almost 99% of them did not have any other economic activity beside 
their current activity as owner/manager of the MSE. When asked about the age they started first to 
work 58% of them said that they started working before the age of 18 years while another 30% said 
that they started working between the age of 18 and 25 years. Thus, most of them started working 
at an early age. Within this community of owners/managers around 12% of them were illiterate 
while 35% of them had secondary school education and 29% of them had higher institute or 
university education. Thus in general the educational attainment levels within this community are 
relatively higher than the general population where illiteracy rates exceed 27% in the total 
population. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Mean Years of Education by Gender and Area in 2003 and 2011: 
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Table 5.7: Entrepreneurs by gender and number of years of education compared to 2003 
  2011 2003 
Cat. # of years of education MALE FEMALE Total MALE FEMALE Total 
Illiterate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 21.20% 43.30% 24.00% 
1-6 years 12.50% 14.50% 12.60% 18.40% 14.90% 17.90% 
7-9 years 9.00% 11.70% 9.20% 10.50% 7.30% 10.10% 
10-12 years 42.10% 41.60% 42.10% 30.80% 26.50% 30.20% 
13-16 years 33.40% 25.70% 32.70% 18.80% 7.60% 17.40% 
17 years or more 3.00% 6.50% 3.30% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
5.6.3 Sources of Finance  
Table 5.8 shows the gender distribution of capital invested in enterprises across the two years. As 
expected there is a concentration of females in the lower capital ranges, but one of the most striking 
developments over this period is the average size of the invested capital of the female-owned MSE, 
which more than doubled between the two comparative years. The same could not be said about 
the male-owned enterprises, whose average sized declined compared to 2003. 
 
Table 5.8: Enterprises by gender of entrepreneur & Capital, 2011 
Size of enterprise 
Male Female Total 
2011 2003 2011 2003 2011 2003 
<1000 16.8 14.2 25.6 32.8 17.6 16.5 
1000 to <5000 31.9 36.6 40.4 32.8 32.7 36.2 
5000 to <20000 27.4 28.4 14.7 22.2 26.2 27.6 
20000 or more 23.9 20.8 19.3 12.2 23.4 19.7 
Total Number 2594 4342 285 616 2879 4958 
Mean 37048.1 43959.8 27653.5 12828.1 36119.3 40093.3 
 
 
 Next we turn to the issue of access to sources of funding of those enterprises. Tables 5.9 and 
5.10 show that no more than 3.7% of MSEs resorted to borrow from formal sources and 1% of the 
MSEs borrowed from informal sources to finance their initial capital to start-up the business. The 
previously accumulated own savings, (followed by inheritance money) still represent the main 
source of finance to small entrepreneurs. Table 5.9 shows the relative importance of the sources of 
loans, whether formal or informal.    No visible change has occurred in the role of formal finance. 
Banks (50%), NGOs (17.2%), and SFD (10.5%) are the main providers of these limited funds.  
 
 However, when we look closer into the limited group of MSEs that got formal loans to 
startup their business we notice that around 68% of those who received loans for initial capital were 
established in the last ten years.  This result indicates that newer MSEs had better chances in getting 
loans than older ones (more than 10 years old), since younger MSEs represent 55% of the total 
sample size. Data also reveal that the MSEs that received formal loans at their start-up was quite 
consistent with the sample distribution of MSEs according to economic activities.  Meaning that the 
trade, service and manufacturing activities received loans according to their relative shares in the 
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MSEs community. When the entrepreneurs were asked if they received any finance for their working 
capital during the last 12 months, only 261 entrepreneurs, representing 8.7% stated that they 
borrowed from several sources to finance their working capital as is shown in the following table.  
 
  
 
Table  5.9: Sources of initial capital by size of enterprises, 2011 
 
Sources of initial capital 1 worker 
2 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 49 
Total 
workers workers workers 
Inheritance 14.4 14.2 18.5 24.5 14.6 
Own savings 76.8 81.2 76.1 71.6 79.1 
Liquidation of assets 1.3 0.4 1.3 
 
0.8 
Formal loans 4.9 3 2.5 2.9 3.7 
Informal loans 1.8 0.6 0.3 
 
1 
Own remittances 
 
0.1 0.6 
 
0.1 
Others remittances 0.6 0.3 0.6 
 
0.5 
Others 0.3 0.1 
 
1 0.2 
Total Number 1169.3 1658.2 117.5 42.5 2987.5 
 
 As can be seen from Table 5.10 below , out of the 8.7% of the MSEs who resorted to 
borrowing to finance their working capital, around 30% of them received it from informal networks 
(family, friends, business associates, neighbours, contractors), while the banking sector provided 
48.8%, the domestic NGOs 12.8% and the SFD 5.8% of the loans for working capital.  In addition, 
around 64% of the loans were for a period that ranges between 6- 12 months, while the remaining 
loans had a longer time span especially 12-24 months (21%). The informal channels of finance 
provided similar longevity of loans and with no guarantees required. 
 
 
Table 5.10: Sources of credit in the last 12 months by size of enterprises, 2011 
Sources of initial capital 1 worker 
2 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 49 
Total 
workers workers workers 
Bank 44.2 56.4 62.5 66.7 50 
SFD 11.9 8.6 
 
33.3 10.5 
Domestic NGO 15.5 18.6 37.5 0 17.2 
Government Agency 
     
Family and Relatives 6.5 5.1 
  
5.7 
Friends 5.8 6.7 
  
6 
Neighbours 2.6 1.7 
  
2.1 
Business Associations 1.7 
   
0.9 
Others 11.8 2.9 
  
7.6 
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 
Total Number of MSEs 71.9 56.4 3 1.3 132.5 
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5.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications  
This chapter utilized the 2003-2011 MSE surveys in Egypt to evaluate the characteristics of that 
sector in comparison to other surveys in Egypt and similar one in MENA. As such it provided a 
situation analysis of the role, scope, challenges and opportunities related to MSEs in Egypt as 
presented by recent enterprise data.  It also examined changes over the 2003-2006 period which 
witnessed both global recession and domestic political upheavals leading to economic crisis. The 
objective was to identify the areas that offer potential for development and expansion in the MSEs 
and their ability to produce higher quality products and services, as well as create more productive 
employment opportunities. Three main conclusions and broad sets of policy recommendations can 
be drawn from the above comparative analysis. 
  
 First, the structure of MSEs is relatively small and mainly concentrated in the range of 2-4 
employees, and the majority of enterprises are concentrated in trade activities followed by services 
and finally manufacturing activities, so new policies should give more emphasis to manufacturing 
activities to increase their numbers, productivity and employability. The characteristics of MSEs is 
undergoing apparent improvement in terms of size and productivity and this could mean that the 
future of MSEs will include more advanced and modern MSEs in need of support of business 
development centres and the allocation of donor funds to support technical assistance as well as 
financial support on a more wider spectrum than the existing framework 
In general, the MSEs productivity, quality of products, competitiveness and ability to innovate is 
rather below the performance of other Developing Countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Taiwan, Vietnam in this respect. Thus any development of the MSEs should involve a 
serious stress on various technical assistance packages for the different types of economic activities, 
especially those that are more competitive and have potentials for growth and expansion.  
 
 Second, results indicate that informality still dominates the MSE sector in Egypt. Inherently, 
there is a disincentive to expand beyond a certain limit because of their micro size, most 
government regulations fail to reach them. As they grow, they become visible to taxes and other 
regulations and so far all the institutional steps, procedures and programs that were undertaken to 
improve the business climate surrounding MSEs were not sufficient enough to convince them to 
work on a formal basis. Yet, formal enterprises have better opportunities for interacting in the 
market and expanding their clients' base, with the formal private and public sectors through 
subcontracting, and thus raising their capacities to introduce better production technologies and 
raise their productivity and efficiency. Thus more conducive steps should be introduced to help 
MSEs become more formal and enjoy the privileges of widening the scope of their markets. Offering 
fiscal incentives such as tax exemptions in the first three years of starting up the business could be 
one step; presenting business bonus for innovation (registering patents or trademarks) and tax 
exemptions for all activities that involve research and development would be another step; granting 
certain fiscal incentives for exporting is also helpful.  
 Third, the main source of capital for MSEs comes from own savings of the entrepreneurs or 
inheritance.  Formal loans play a very modest role in financing MSEs, therefore the government 
should look into the procedures adopted by the banks and try to improve and facilitate them. Up 
and until now, the outreach capacity of the formal lending institutions is quite limited in its ability to 
support MSEs with its needs for funding. This result indicates that the present financial packages are 
not sufficient to meet the entrepreneur’s need, and are not capable to reach them. Strengthening 
the capacities of the existing NGOs operating in economic support to MSEs is direly needed. In 
addition, new NGOs should be encouraged to operate in this field. Any intervention in this respect 
should target the areas of weakness such as the female owned enterprises, and the micro 
enterprises (less than 5 workers) and rural-located MSEs.  
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 Overall and in addition to boosting the small enterprises through technical assistance, 
providing finance, offering better work places, and opening up windows of transactions with the 
larger enterprises and the public sector and government purchases would act as enabling factors. 
Specifically, new policies should also provide fiscal incentives to large and medium sized enterprises 
for establishing strong business links and extending the supply chain with the MSEs, by setting 
standards to their products, which could be used as intermediate inputs to larger enterprises. Fiscal 
incentives could also be granted to cover the costs of any new registered patents or trademarks. The 
chances that such policies could produce positive results are high with the apparent change in the 
educational status of entrepreneurs, which is improving over time. 
 In the next chapter, we turn more specifically to the impact of ownership of micro and small 
enterprise on the welfare of households that are engaged in them, based on household-level as 
opposed to firm level data on those enterprises. The richness of details on formal and informal 
borrowing and saving in the ELMPS 1998-2006-2012 will also allow us to explore more analytically 
the critical role of access to finance as a determinant of the success of MSEs, as identified above. 
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6 Household-Based Enterprises in Egypt: Formality, Access to Finance and Determinants of 
Wealth4 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Following the previous overview of the MSE sector based on firm-level data,  this chapter will take 
the analysis further by utilizing, this time, household-level  data from the Egyptian Labour Market 
Panel Survey data  1998- 2006 -2012  to document changes in the size and contribution MSE’s to 
employment and wealth/income generation  for households engaged in them in Egypt. The data set 
is unique in Egypt in that it collects data on enterprises characteristics at the household level, were 
they are based, and is therefore able to link such characteristics to a host of household and 
individual labour market characteristics in the panel survey. 
 
 Following a period of fast growth in numbers, with a concentration in the micro component, 
decline in female ownership and low export exposure between 1998 and 2006, the chapter will 
explore if these trends continued, were reinforced or reversed in a period that witnessed the impact 
of economic slow-down and revolution. The analysis draws on the same rich very recent panel data 
sets on household based enterprises in the ELMPS used in Chapter 4, to complement the analysis 
based on the MSES survey at enterprise level in Chapter 5. 
 
  It is important to emphasize that the two datasets provide different perspectives of the MSE 
sector in Egypt. The ELMPS was a household-based survey, while the MSES was an enterprise-based 
surveys. Each approach has its merits. Whereas, the HH approach enables the researcher to detect 
some of the home-based economic activities, it is not particularly useful in capturing the details of 
the economic units that work outside home, which represent the main bulk and the more dynamic 
part of the small and micro economic units (whether formal or informal). The enterprise approach, 
on the other hand, avoids the previous difficulty -in case the goal was to understand more about the 
small enterprise in order to improve the setting in which it functions- in providing a wholesome 
picture of the way the small/informal unit operates and deals with its surroundings. It enables the 
researcher to look closer into the way the small firm copes with the changing market conditions, 
competitors, and suppliers, with the workers and with the rules and regulations. However, its main 
drawback is in its inability to reach the entrepreneurs working at home, since almost all the studies 
using this methodology tend to get their sample from the “visible” economic units, which could be 
found without having to knock on the household doors. 
 
 To date, most studies concerned with the employment dynamics of growth of MSE s have 
been concerned with limited access to credit and finance (mainly consisting of formal and interest-
based finance) and how that constitutes a major constraint on the growth, sustainability and 
employment generation capacity of these enterprises.  The chapter will focus on the main 
impediments to the potential growth, survival and income generation of these enterprises, 
particularly access to finance (whether interest based or interest free and whether through formal 
channels or informal rotating savings mechanisms).  
 
The basic question is map the sources of finance that are available for these categories of 
business enterprises in order to identify the extent to which they rely on formal versus informal 
finance and how this reflects on their capacity to generate employment. In particular, the chapter 
                                                          
4
 By Mona Said and Ali Rashed. 
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estimates the reliance of such business enterprises on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(RoSCAs), also known in Egypt as gam'iya, as one of the sources that are compatible with Islamic 
finance rules and are common in Egypt. The rich data collected for the first time on the prevalence 
of these ROSCas will facilitate this analysis which has important policy implications for social banking 
and empowerment of MSE’s in Egypt. 
 
 This chapter will use the panel component of three waves in the ELMPS survey to study 
factors that help enterprises perish or survive. Using transition matrices we will also examine 
whether they manage to develop their enterprises and thus raise their families’ income; and if the 
small and successful business enterprises are capable of raising the household’s socio-economic 
status measured by an asset-based wealth index.  Policy implications to bolster the contribution of 
MSE’s to employment creation and poverty alleviation can be highly relevant to other MENA 
countries. 
 
 The rest of this chapter will be organized as follows: Section 6.1 presents a brief overview of 
some studies highlighting the problem of access to formal finance for micro enterprises and informal 
sources available for financing in MENA. Section 6.2 presents stylized facts on developments of 
household enterprises drawing on the latest panel in the data : 2006-2012, and emphasizing the link 
between sources to finance and employment size , gender and formality of the enterprises. Section 
6.3  then examines the dynamics and impact of the enterprises on the welfare  of households 
engaged in them by constructing a wealth index based on household assets and examining the 
movement of enterprises between various quintiles of wealth between 2006-2012 and Section 6.4 
defines a model of determinants of wealth based on enterprise, household and enterprise owner 
characteristics and estimates for the two panels of the survey. Finally section 6.5 concludes by 
summarizing results, relating them to the previous Chapter results and pointing to directions for 
future research. 
 
6.2 Overview of Previous Studies: Access to Finance for Micro and Small Enterprises in MENA 
and Egypt  
6.2.1 Restricted Finance for SMEs MENA5 
Many recent studies (e.g. World Bank 2011 , Rocha et al , 2011 and El-Gamal, 2012) have 
documented  that MENA financial sectors exhibit strengths in some areas, most notably the sizes of 
deposit bases and traditional financial depth measures, but suffer many weaknesses in other areas. 
Chief among these is the high degree of concentration of credit, which results in major financial gaps 
for micro, small, and medium enterprises that are crucial for employment creation and sustainability 
through inclusive growth. 
 As shown in previous chapter, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are generally 
dependent on internal financing by entrepreneurs and their families in Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey.  
CGAP (2006) and others have shown that external finance is an important causal channel for the 
documented correlation between financial development and economic growth (although many 
other studies suggest that the causal relationship is bidirectional). The importance of SME finance 
for Arab countries stems from the simultaneous need to reduce unemployment and promote 
manufacturing sectors that largely remained below 15% of GDP in the Middle East and North Africa 
region, which deindustrialized prematurely, This pattern of premature deindustrialization in MENA 
resulted directly in much higher rates of youth unemployment, which in turn poses great risk to the 
region’s long-term development prospects.  
 
                                                          
5
 This section is based on El-Gamal (2012)  
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Two very recent studies have utilized survey data of banks and enterprises, respectively but 
separately, to study the supply and demand sides of SME finance in MENA. We summarize the main 
results of these two studies in this section, starting with TurkAriss (2011b) on the demand side using 
enterprise level data, and then concluding with Rocha et al. (2011) on the supply side using a survey 
of banks. Using data from Orbis and Zawya, TurkAriss (2011b) started with a sample of 9,877 
businesses in 14 MENA countries, which she narrowed down to a sample of 333 SMEs and 563 large 
enterprises for which she had financial data.  
 
 Not surprisingly, she found that SMEs in the region were generally younger and relied much 
less on debt financing – roughly one quarter of their assets, compared to large enterprises which 
financed one third of their assets using debt. She hypothesized that SMEs’ greater reliance on equity 
finance is a direct result of their greater credit constraint compared to large enterprises. Moreover, 
she argued that this greater reliance on equity (including internal) finance imposed higher costs of 
capital and impaired SME competitiveness and employment, generating growth potential. TurkAriss 
(2011b) then ran two sets of regressions. The first set of random effects regressions of firms’ debt to 
assets ratio on firm size, firm age, and other variables showed that SMEs were credit constrained 
relative to large enterprises (the coefficient on the dummy variable for SME was negative and very 
significant statistically and economically). Echoing the main argument of World Bank (2011) and 
Rocha et al. (2011), she finds that the viability of credit bureaus and public registries in a given 
country enhance debt to assets ratios for firms of all sizes. To the extent that SMEs are viewed as 
riskier debtors, the lack of well developed 
Infrastructure for independent credit scoring and security of collateral is likely to impact the credit 
constraint of SMEs more heavily. 
 
 The second set of regressions conducted by TurkAriss (2011b) show that firm employment is 
positively affected by the firm’s ability to raise its debt to assets ratio regardless of firm size. Firm 
age also contributes positively to employment creation for all firms, and firm size contributes to 
employment creation for large firms. To the extent that credit constraint, shown in the first set of 
regressions, prevents SMEs from surviving longer and growing in size, the impact of this credit 
constraint on employment creation can be quite substantial. She estimates that every 1% increase in 
debt to assets ratio for SMEs would result in approximately 1% increase in employment. World Bank 
(2011) confirmed that SMEs in MENA are severely credit constrained. In this regard, they reported 
that only 20% of MENA SMEs have any loans or lines of credit, a ratio worse than all regions other 
than Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Moreover, the average share of SME loans amounted only to 8% of total loans, also very low 
by international standards.  
 
 World Bank (2011) suggests that this is in large part a byproduct of the high concentration of 
credit to few large firms with well-established connections, while 84% of working capital for SMEs 
and 76% of working capital for large enterprises in MENA are financed internally. 
Despite state bank directed lending and partial credit guarantee schemes to enhance SME lending in 
MENA, credit constraints continue to constrain their growth. Using data from a joint survey 
conducted by the Union of Arab Banks and the World Bank, Rocha et al (2011) examined the supply-
side reasons for lack of sufficient SME finance in MENA. Comparing the target to actual SME lending, 
they found that all banks fell significantly short. State banks aimed to dedicate 23% of their total 
loans to SMEs, but only 
9% of their loans were to SMEs, private banks fared slightly better but still fell short of their 
target 26% ratio, in fact extending only 11% of their loans to SMEs.  
  
 This result is particularly disappointing given that nearly two thirds of all banks had 
dedicated SME units. Banks of all types cited expected returns as the most important driver for SME 
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financing, but listed a number of obstacles that prevent them from reaching their target rates of 
SME lending. Top among these obstacles was the lack of transparency of SMEs, which is consistent 
with the classical literature that suggests that SME lending will be affected more severely by 
information asymmetries. Unfortunately for the region, banks also listed the lack of reliable credit 
information systems to ameliorate information asymmetry, and the lack of reliable collateral and 
protection of legal rights that would allow banks to ameliorate the adverse selection and moral 
hazard that result therefrom. 
  
 
6.2.2 ROSCAs and Islamic Compatible Solutions 
One of the main obstacles that the literature cites as a deterring factor for the MSEs is the lack of 
sufficient finance to start their new venture.  The importance of looking for sources of finance that 
are Islamic compatible is that many of the poor, especially in Arab countries, reject not only interest-
based microloans, but also thinly-veiled imitations through murabaha (credit sale with markup) and 
other legal stratagems. This coincides with large, and increasing incidences of poverty and financial 
exclusion in the six most countries with largest Muslim populations: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria (Obaidullah and Khan, 2008). Recent studies have also included 
survey results that show Muslims a re highly excluded from access to banking products and services, 
with exclusion rates reaching as high as 80% in India. Finally, for Muslims with access to microloans, 
surveys have suggested that up to 40% reject such loans on religious grounds (CGAP, 2008 and 
2009). 
 
 El Gamal (2012) argues that with increasing political and economic power of Islamists, 
Islamic finance is likely to play a growing role in coming years. Unfortunately, Islamic finance has 
heretofore mimicked the same patterns of conventional finance in these countries, focusing on bank 
structures and market instruments that are subject to the same limitations because of the 
underdeveloped of sufficient financial and legal infrastructures. The introduction of Islamic financial 
intermediaries in the form of mutual financial institutions would be closer to the spirit as well as the 
letter of classical Islamic jurisprudence.  Interest free rotating savings facilities within such mutual 
financial institutions can provide working capital for leasing and factoring financial facilities, which 
are already the workhorses of today’s Islamic finance, possibly in partnership with specialized 
institutions, to generate returns for the Islamic financial institutions and their shareholders. 
Repeated interactions and natural peer monitoring in mutual financial institutions serves as a strong 
form of relationship banking, well suited for MENA where credit bureaus and other solutions to 
asymmetric information problems remain significantly underdeveloped. The proposed model would 
thus embody the three main classical means of ameliorating the effects of asymmetric information 
in SME lending: relationship banking, leasing (where ownership rights may remain with the lessor, 
thus reducing the need for elaborate secured lending infrastructure) and factoring (where the 
creditworthiness of the ultimate large client can substitute for the less established creditworthiness 
of the SME). 
 
 He proposes a credit union structure, with the added leveraging of social capital by 
organizing groups of shareholders into members of smaller RoSCAs, is the greater similarity to 
relationship banking. Recent academic literature has questioned the importance of relationship 
banking in SME finance. However, the classical reasons that relationship banking can be effective in 
reducing information asymmetry and its adverse effects, remain valid, especially in Arab countries 
where external credit ratings and legal infrastructure for secured lending remain lacking. Repeat 
interactions and better financial information on credit union shareholders can ameliorate these 
problems. 
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6.2.3 Impact of Access to Finance on SME Performance in Egypt 
El-Gamal et al. (2000) show that conventional micro-finance for traditional SMEs (especially if group-
lending strategies are employed) can play a short-term role in poverty alleviation and employment 
creation. The problem, however, is that non-conventional financing methods are needed for the 
type of SMEs that enhance economic growth, export orientation and attractiveness to inflows of 
foreign investments. Similarly, this applies to micro-enterprises. According to 2006 data in Egypt, 
MSEs employ 70-80% of the labour force in the private sector non-agricultural sector. Therefore, a 
careful analysis of the sources of finance that are available for MSEs in Egypt is necessary to 
establish a thorough understanding of their requirements and the financial obstacles they face in 
employment generation  
 
A study by El-Mahdi and Osman (2007), compared between a group taking microloans (IG) 
and a control group (CG). The findings showed that self-finance represented the main source of 
capital for IG, just as for the CG; however, the reliance on this funding was greater for the latter. 
Other sources of finance included borrowing from individuals, followed by the Gameia (rotating 
informal savings association) and NGOs and SFD as the fourth and fifth sources of finance 
respectively. This demonstrated how the CG entrepreneurs seldom resorted to formal financial 
institutions. The IG on the other hand, relied on the following five sources, respectively: partners, 
Businessmen Associations (BA), self-finance, Gameia, and other formal lending institutions such as 
the SFD, Shorouk project, and the NGOs.  
 
The size of the loans received differed significantly according to the economic activity If we 
look into the three most important economic activities, one could note that manufacturing activities 
received the largest loans with an average loan size of LE 13,132 compared to LE 8,400 in trade and 
LE 5,850 in services. This result could be indicative of an emphasis on the part of the lending 
programs towards encouraging manufacturing activities. The reasons for getting loans differed 
between the two groups. From the IG entrepreneurs’ point of view, loans were primarily needed to 
help in sustaining their ongoing projects. On the other hand, the CG entrepreneurs resorted to loans 
mainly as they started up their activity and in acquiring fixed capital. As to using loans for expanding 
the economic activity, answers of both groups reflected that this target was of minor importance. As 
to the impact of loans on the number of workers/employees, there seems to be no significant 
difference between the answers of the entrepreneurs in the two groups.  
 
The majority of the entrepreneurs did not change the number of workers because they were 
able to get loans. It is however noticeable that the IG had a greater tendency to increase the labour 
as they borrowed which indicated that a far greater percentage of the IG used external finance to 
sustain or to expand their activity. When we look into the comparisons between the SFD and USAID-
financed enterprises, it could be noticed that between the years 1995 – 1999, the first group of EUs 
was able to increase its employment by 17.9%, while the second only managed to increase it by 
6.8%. However, this visible increase in employment in the SFD’s enterprises did not prove to be of 
statistical significance. One possible explanation is the small sample size of these enterprises (66 
EUs). However, it has to be remembered that among the SFDs IG, especially in the Greater Cairo 
region, more than 50% of the chosen sample proved to have closed down or gone bankrupt because 
of several reasons, of which the debt burden was a prominent factor. Therefore, the high failure rate 
remains one of the major problems the SFD must be able to confront. 
 
It is clear that the interventions through micro-finance proved to have an impact on the 
employment creation process in the IG only when the employment levels in 1999 are compared to 
the minimum employment levels in the last five years. Within the IG, the enterprises that received 
loans after they became established in the market were in a better position to create employment 
than the enterprises that received loans just as they were starting up their businesses.  The 
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comparison between the SFD and USAID-financed enterprises indicates that the former group 
proved that the absolute numbers of workers in its enterprises were significantly higher, and so was 
the size of its loans granted to the entrepreneurs. However, when the change of employment over 
time was included there was no apparent significant difference between the two groups.  
 
Besides the above formal channels, there are many informal providers such as household 
savings themselves, remittances from abroad, income from family properties, farms loans from 
friends and relatives, NGOs and religious and charitable institutions.  RoSCAs, which can be thought 
of as simultaneous savings and borrowing mechanisms, are also commonly used to finance MSE 
projects, as such enterprises face many obstacles in getting formal funding, especially for startup 
projects. In sections 6.2 and 6.3 below we utilize the ELMPS data  to map the sources of finance that 
are available for these categories of business enterprises in order to identify the extent to which 
they rely on formal versus informal finance and how this reflects on their capacity to generate 
employment.  In particular, we estimate the reliance of such business enterprises on also known in 
Egypt as gam'iya, as one of the sources that are compatible with Islamic finance rules and are 
common in Egypt.    
 
 
 
6.3 Developments in Micro and Small Enterprises Based On Household Enterprise Module of 
ELMPS: 2006-2012 
This section specifically looks at the 2012 ELMPS dataset, which is a valuable addition to the 1998 
and 2006 datasets. It offers a characterization of the MSME sector from the perspective of 
households in Egypt. The 2012 ELMPS dataset included 2,236 who own enterprises. We first 
summarize the variations in age, size, ownership, economic activity, number of employees, and 
degree of formality.  Then we delve specifically into the financial aspects as they relate to enterprise 
characteristics, particularly the amount of capital available, and and second source of financing, 
distinguishing between bank and formal sources, ROSCAs, other informal channels (own and family 
sources, NGO’s, remittances, religious organisations, etc). 
 
 Figure 6.1 shows development in the size of enterprises from 1988 till 2012, it is quite clear 
that there is a marked decrease in size, whereby enterprises with 1-4 employees 1-4  amounted to 
only  45% of the total in 1988 to are now almost 69% in 2012.That is a 20% increase in the number of 
firms from year 2006 (period of  revolution and the financial crises) alone, while all the other size 
categories declined in size.  
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Figure 6.1: The Size of Enterprises Employment (1988-2012) 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Formality Status of Enterprises (1998-2012) 
 
 Similarly, as can be seen from Figure 6.2, there has been a steady increase in the percentage 
of MSEs in the informal sector overtime; the percentage increases from 32% in 1998, to 35% in 2006, 
and to 54% in 2012. Using the same degrees of formality discussed in previous Chapter 5, Table 6.1 
below , illustrates a  consistent increase in informality and decrease in formality (following 2 or 3 
procedures). The fully formal measure dropped from 18% in 1998 and 2006 to 15% of enterprises in 
2006.    
Further, Table 6.2 illustrates that the tendency towards informalisation increases with the 
age of the establishment. In more recent establishments are more likely to be informal than formal. 
The high degree of turnover amongst these enterprises is also evident in the table that almost one 
third of the enterprises were established after 2006.  
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Table 6.1:  Distribution of Enterprises by Degree of Formality (1998-2012) 
  1998 2006 2012 
Degrees of formality count Percent count Percent count Percent 
Informal (none) 474 32 750 35 1,189 53.81 
Partially formal (one procedure) 207 13 240 11 322 14.78 
Semi Formal (2 procedures) 547 37 771 36 374 16.22 
Fully Formal (the 3 procedures) 269 18 381 18 351 15.18 
Total 1497 100 2142 100 2,236 100 
 
 
Table 6.2: Formality by Date of Establishment (2006-2012) 
  2006 2012 
  Formal Informal Formal Informal 
(before 1981) 17.7 17.1 9.1 7.6 
1981 - 1990 15.3 18.7 12.9 12.3 
1991 - 1995 
35.2 
31.3 
10.8 10.4 
1996 - 2000 14.8 15.1 
2001 - 2005 31.7 32.5 18.1 17.7 
2006 - 2012 .. .. 31.0 33.7 
DK 0 0.5 3.3 3.3 
 
 
Table 6.3 explores the gender and urban/rural location of enterprises by formality status. It 
is clear informality permeates urban areas more than rural areas and female owned establishments 
more than male-owned ones. So while the overall sample of enterprises is equally distributed 
between rural and urban areas, the 62% of informal establishments are in urban areas. This is not 
surprising as the informal sector is by-and-large an urban phenomenon, and women might phase 
even higher barriers to (or cannot afford) formalisaton than men. 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: Ownership gender by formality status and location (urban/rural) in 2012 
  Formal Informal Total 
  male female Total male Female Total male Female Total 
Total 40.96 52.62 42.37 61.04 76.31 61.96 50.57 59.71 51.42 
Rural 59.04 47.38 57.63 38.96 23.69 38.04 49.43 40.29 48.58 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 6.4 shows the distribution of MSE’s  by ownership and formality  status : Enterprises 
are  mainly owned by only one family (it is a family enterprise) rather than shared or corporate. 
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Enterprises operating in the formal sector are more likely to be shared with others, while enterprises 
in the informal sector tend to be owned by a single household.  
 
Table 6.4:  Distribution of Ownership type by formality Status in 2012 (column and row 
percentages) 
    Formal Informal Total 
HH ownership Row % 42.73 57.27 100 
 
col % 82.08 94.43 88.73 
shared with others Row % 73.42 26.58 100 
 
col % 17.92 5.57 11.27 
Total Row % 46.19 53.81 100 
  col % 100 100 100 
 
 
The table 6.5 below explores the gender and age of the entrepreneurs. Male entrepreneurs tend to 
start enterprises earlier than females in both the formal and informal sectors, specifically those 
between the ages of 20 and 39, but they give up early also.  Females owned enterprises much likely 
to survive.  
 
Table 6.5: Ownership gender and age group by formality status in 2012 (column percentages) 
  Formal Informal Total 
age group male female Total Male female Total male female Total 
(15_19) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(20_29) 7.6 2.7 7.3 12.0 0.8 10.6 9.9 1.4 9.1 
(30_39) 28.3 1.8 26.7 33.5 3.6 29.9 31.1 3.0 28.5 
(40_49) 26.7 11.6 25.8 24.2 22.4 24.0 25.4 19.2 24.8 
  21.9 39.6 23.0 16.8 31.4 18.6 19.2 33.9 20.6 
(60-64) 5.8 15.0 6.4 5.5 12.2 6.3 5.7 13.1 6.4 
(65+) 9.6 29.4 10.8 7.9 29.5 10.5 8.7 29.5 10.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 6.6 looks at the education levels of the entrepreneurs. Illiteracy is a much larger 
obstacle for women than men, in both the formal and informal sector. Men have higher 
academic achievements. Interestingly however, both men and women with university level 
education are more prevalent in the informal sector than the formal sector.  
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Table 6.6: Ownership gender and education level by formality status in 2012 (col %) 
  Formal Informal Total 
  male female Total male female Total male female Total 
Illiterate 29.7 72.8 34.9 15.0 56.8 17.5 22.7 68.1 26.9 
Reads & Writes 9.0 11.2 9.2 7.4 9.4 7.5 8.2 10.7 8.5 
Less than Intermediate 22.1 9.7 20.6 19.6 8.9 19.0 20.9 9.5 19.8 
Intermediate 27.8 5.5 25.1 26.1 9.5 25.1 27.0 6.7 25.1 
Above Intermediate 2.5 0.0 2.2 6.4 1.8 6.1 4.3 0.5 4.0 
University & Above 9.0 0.7 8.0 25.5 13.6 24.8 16.9 4.6 15.8 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 6.7: Location of Operations in 2012 
  Col % Row % 
  Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total 
own home 4.0 22.3 13.8 13.3 86.7 100 
Shop 53.0 21.7 36.1 67.8 32.3 100 
another house 0.2 1.4 0.8 8.9 91.1 100 
office/flat/building 10.9 0.9 5.5 91.3 8.7 100 
room/ number of rooms 0.4 0.3 0.3 54.7 45.3 100 
workshop/factory 9.6 4.5 6.8 64.9 35.1 100 
Kiosk 0.7 1.0 0.9 39.5 60.5 100 
street vendor 0.4 7.3 4.1 4.9 95.1 100 
mobile worker 1.9 22.6 13.0 6.6 93.4 100 
street vendor with mo 0.2 1.2 0.7 13.9 86.1 100 
Hut 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 100.0 100 
drinks fridge connect 0.1 0.7 0.4 10.6 89.4 100 
drinks fridge not con 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 100.0 100 
basket/ table 0.1 4.4 2.4 1.6 98.4 100 
truck/pick-up truck 5.3 0.3 2.6 93.1 6.9 100 
Taxi 8.4 0.1 3.9 98.9 1.1 100 
toc-toc 1.4 3.7 2.7 25.0 75.0 100 
field/ farm 0.5 1.0 0.8 31.5 68.5 100 
Other 3.5 6.4 5.1 38.5 61.5 100 
Total 100 100 100 46.2 53.8 100 
 
 
Table 6.7 shows that the majority of MSMEs from the informal sector operate from their 
home, a shop, or are mobile workers.  Whereas, in the formal sector, the majority operate from a 
shop, office building, or workshop in that order.  
 Finally, in terms of distribution across economic activities and markets of product,  and like 
in the previous chapter using enterprise data, Table 6.8 shows that household enterprises are 
concentrated in  retail trade, manufacturing, transportation, and construction  (in that order) , which 
together constitute 64.8% of the economic activity of enterprises. Table 6.9 shows that The market 
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for products produced by main and secondary buyer of production.  It is clear that HH enterprises 
products are mainly directed to the individuals or consumers as main buyer (92 %). To local large 
private sector units and wholesalers or even government are indeed very small (5%), and export 
markets are below 1%.  
 
Table 6.8:  Economic Activity of Enterprise (1-digit), based on ISIC4, ref. 1-week) 
  Percent Freq. 
G:Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 33.4 1,216,326 
C:Manufacturing 12.3 447,315 
H:Transportation and storage 9.3 337,473 
F:Construction 8.4 304,974 
A:Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.6 167,129 
P:Education 4.3 155,242 
S:other service activities 3.7 134,639 
M:Professional, scientific and technical 3.5 127,663 
I:Accomodation and food service activity 3.2 117,753 
O:Public administration and defense; co 2.7 98,057 
Q:Human health and social work activity 1.5 55,455 
J:Information and communication 1.1 40,931 
R:Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.6 21,367 
E:Water supply; sewage, waste management 0.4 14,353 
K:Financial and insurance activities 0.4 12,935 
N:Administrative and support service ac 0.3 11,079 
D:Electricity,gas,steam and air condition 0.2 8,620 
T:Activities of extraterritorial organization 0.2 7,289 
L:Real estate activities 0.1 3,008 
B:Mining and quarrying 0.1 2,119 
NA 10.0 363,557 
Total 100.0 3,283,727 
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Table 6.9: Market of Products 
  Main Buyer Secondary buyer 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1.  consumers / individuals 3,353,429 91.9 64,192 1.8 
2.  small private sector units 106,032 2.9 188,021 5.2 
3.  large private sector units 18,820 0.5 20,259 0.6 
4.  public sector units 976 0.0 6,653 0.2 
5.  government 13,345 0.4 2,158 0.1 
6.  wholesalers 62,154 1.7 32,570 0.9 
7.  retailers 37,608 1.0 112,210 3.1 
8.  investment companies 
  
3,299 0.1 
9. co-operative sector 992 0.0 619 0.0 
10.  exporters or foreigners 3,813 0.1 
  11.  contractors 41,818 1.2 54,355 1.5 
12.  Tourists 4,601 0.1 994 0.0 
13.  non- governmental or foreign organisation  
   14.  other 3,696 0.1 7,062 0.2 
NA 
  
3,154,892 86.5 
Total 3,647,284 100 3,647,284 100 
 
 
 
6.4 Access to Finance by Size and Formality of Enterprises 
We are interested to explore the extent to which financing serves as an obstacle to enterprises to 
expand their business, thus creating employment opportunities. Table 6.10 shows capital size and 
informality status. As expected, projects cannot hide (ie remain informal) as they become larger in 
terms of capital. Also enterprises in the informal sector rely upon much less capital than those in the 
formal sector, with 12% of informal enterprises not using any capital, compared to 2.6% of formal.  
Now turning to sources of financing, Table 6.11 below show that data on these aspects was 
very patchy and unreliable in 2006, with less than 4% of household enterprises reporting that they 
have undertaken any borrowing at all (64 observations), and of these 35% borrowed from Nasser 
Social and other public sector banks. Due to the new questions asked the data is much more rich is 
2012, we have detailed data on both primary and secondary source of finance.  
As can be seen from Table 6.12, an overwhelming majority of MSEs use household savings as a 
source of finance, with 85.3% using it as either a primary or secondary source. There are a variety of 
sources of finance that range from formal to informal. ROSCAs are also very common in the region, 
with 21.5% of household enterprises engaging in a savings group. 
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Table 6.10: Capital and formality status in 2012 (row and column percentages) 
  Col % Row % 
  Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total 
None 2.6 12.0 7.6 15.6 84.4 100 
le 1 – 499 3.6 26.7 16.1 10.4 89.6 100 
le 500 – 999 5.9 12.4 9.4 28.7 71.3 100 
le 1,000 - 4,999 14.0 21.9 18.2 35.4 64.6 100 
le 5,000 - 9,999 18.7 13.8 16.1 53.9 46.2 100 
le10,000 - 49,999 27.7 9.7 18.0 71.1 28.9 100 
50,000 or more 23.5 2.6 12.3 88.5 11.5 100 
do not know 4.1 0.9 2.4 79.3 20.7 100 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 46.2 53.8 100 
 
 
Table 6.11:  Sources of Finance of MSEs in 2006 
Did you Borrow money to operate business. during past 12 months(1st eco. unit)      
 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
 
   
Yes 64 3.75   3.75 
 
    
No 1,642 96.25 100       
Total 1,706 100 
  
    
 
Who did you borrow money from-1st lender (1st eco. unit) ? 
 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Nasser social bank 10 15.63 15.63 
other public sector bank 24 37.5 53.13 
private sector bank 5 7.81 60.94 
an NGO 11 17.19 78.13 
social fund for development 8 12.5 90.63 
Suppliers 3 4.69 95.31 
Purchasers 1 2 96.88 
local money lenders 1 2 98.44 
family members outside the 
HH 1 1.56 100 
Total 64 100   
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Table 6.12: First and Second Sources of Finance of MSEs in 2012 
    First Source Second Source 
  Count Percentage Count Percentage 
1. Household Savings 2,261,803 68.9 138,374 16.4 
2. Inheritance 355,622 10.8 171,953 20.4 
3. Loans from Relatives/ friends 234,063 7.1 226,071 26.8 
4. Proceeds from ROSCA (gam3eya) 155,252 4.7 141,968 16.8 
5. Remittances from abroad 5,473 0.2 16,835 2 
6. Proceeds from family farm 20,276 0.6 9,930 1.2 
7. Proceeds from non-farm family enterprise 2,473 0.1 2,081 0.3 
8. Income from family property 36,940 1.1 32,202 3.8 
9. Loans from NGO's 15,707 0.5 7,506 0.9 
10. Loans from religious institutions 2,207 0.1 
  
11.Loans from Nasser Social Bank 15,546 0.5 3,126 0.4 
12. Loans from other public sector banks 42,481 1.3 16,706 2 
13. Loans from Private banks 4,930 0.2 6,481 0.8 
14. Social Fund for Development 13,608 0.4 3,503 0.4 
15. Loans from local money lenders 5,249 0.2 6,099 0.7 
16. Others (specify) 90,015 2.7 47,509 5.6 
17. don't know 19,810 0.6 14,365 1.7 
  3,281,455 100 844,709 100 
 
 
Table 6.13 also shows that household savings continues to play an overwhelming role even 
when decomposed to formal and informal enterprises. ROSCAs are more common among the 
informal sector, but also have a strong presence in the formal sector.  
Table 6.14 shows that Women tend to rely on own savings slightly lower proportions than 
men, but definitely engage in more ROSCAs in financing there household owned businesses. Finally 
table 6.15 decomposes the sources of finance based on the size of the enterprise. NGOs, local 
money lenders, the Social Fund for Development, religious institutions do not provide funding for 
any of the enterprises with more than 10 employees, as they tend to concentrate on very small 
businesses. This is relevant to the literature on microfinance crowding out sources of finance for 
SMEs. ROSCAs see a high participation rate amongst enterprises with 100+ employees, which 
contradicts the common image of its primary use at the small scale.  
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Table 6.13: Sources of Finance 
  First Source Second Source 
  Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total 
1. Household Savings 65.59 72.1 68.9 16.0 17.0 16.4 
2. Inheritance 16.02 5.9 10.8 22.5 17.0 20.4 
3. Loans from Relatives/ friends 5.66 8.6 7.1 26.7 26.8 26.8 
4. Proceeds from ROSCA (gam3eya) 3 6.4 4.7 12.9 23.0 16.8 
5. Remittances from abroad 0.22 0.1 0.2 1.5 2.8 2.0 
6. Proceeds from family farm 1.11 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.2 
7. Proceeds from non-farm family enterprise 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.3 
8. Income from family property 1.42 0.8 1.1 5.2 1.7 3.8 
9. Loans from NGO's 0.35 0.6 0.5 0.1 2.2 0.9 
10. Loans from religious institutions 0.08 0.1 0.1 
   11.Loans from Nasser Social Bank 0.55 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.4 
12. Loans from other public sector banks 2.18 0.4 1.3 2.7 0.9 2.0 
13. Loans from Private banks 0.26 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.3 0.8 
14. Social Fund for Development 0.51 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.4 
15. Loans from local money lenders 0 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.9 0.7 
16. Others (specify) 2.3 3.2 2.7 6.6 4.1 5.6 
17. don't know 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.5 0.4 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
Table 6.14:  Sources of Finance by ownership gender 
  First Source  Second Source 
  male female Total male female Total 
1. Household Savings 69.35 64 68.93 15.23 32.9 16.38 
2. Inheritance 10.91 10.02 10.84 19.72 29.42 20.36 
3. Loans from Relatives/ friends 7.09 7.64 7.13 27.85 11.21 26.76 
4. Proceeds from ROSCA (gam3eya) 4.12 11.82 4.73 17.03 13.64 16.81 
5. Remittances from abroad 0.18 0 0.17 2.04 1.27 1.99 
6. Proceeds from family farm 0.67 0 0.62 1.26 0 1.18 
7. Proceeds from non-farm family enterprise 0.08 0 0.08 0.26 0 0.25 
8. Income from family property 1.19 0.36 1.13 4 1.14 3.81 
9. Loans from NGO's 0.46 0.74 0.48 0.75 2.85 0.89 
10. Loans from religious institutions 0.04 0.35 0.07 
   11.Loans from Nasser Social Bank 0.51 0 0.47 0.4 0 0.37 
12. Loans from other public sector banks 1.39 0.13 1.29 2.12 0 1.98 
13. Loans from Private banks 0.12 0.55 0.15 0.82 0 0.77 
14. Social Fund for Development 0.39 0.68 0.41 0.44 0 0.41 
15. Loans from local money lenders 0.17 0 0.16 0.77 0 0.72 
16. Others (specify) 2.82 1.88 2.74 5.48 7.56 5.62 
17. don't know 0.5 1.83 0.6 1.82 0 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 6.15a:  Sources of Finance of MSEs by Size of Employment 2012 
 
  
first source of finance               
  
(1- 
4) 
(5 - 
9) 
(10 - 
24) 
25 - 
49 
50 – 
99 
more than 
100 
Tot
al 
1. Household Savings 69.9 64.8 64.6 56.8 77.4 67.4 69.1 
2. Inheritance 10.3 18.8 14.7 14.0 15.0 8.9 11.1 
3. Loans from Relatives/ friends 7.5 5.8 2.9 15.5 5.9 6.5 7.3 
4. Proceeds from ROSCA (gam3eya) 4.4 1.5 4.9 3.4 1.7 8.3 4.4 
5. Remittances from abroad 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 
6. Proceeds from family farm 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 
7. Proceeds from non-farm family 
enterprise 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 
8. Income from family property 1.2 2.8 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.3 
9. Loans from NGO's 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
10. Loans from religious institutions 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
11.Loans from Nasser Social Bank 0.3 0.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
12. Loans from other public sector 
banks 1.2 0.0 4.0 2.3 0.0 3.7 1.4 
13. Loans from Private banks 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 
14. Social Fund for Development 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
15. Loans from local money lenders 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
16. Others (specify) 1.1 2.3 0.0 5.0 0.0 2.3 1.3 
17. don't know 1.9 2.5 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.4 1.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 6.15b:  Sources of Finance of MSEs by Size of employment 2012  
(Second source of finance) 
  (1- 4) (5 - 9) (10 - 24) 
25 - 
49 
50 – 
99 
more 
than 
100 Total 
1. Household Savings 14.4 18.9 20.0 14.1 7.8 17.1 14.9 
2. Inheritance 19.8 25.7 28.2 13.9 13.1 17.5 20.0 
3. Loans from Relatives/ friends 29.8 18.2 0.0 20.7 15.5 35.6 27.7 
4. Proceeds from ROSCA 
(gam3eya) 17.3 14.0 39.3 26.6 8.8 20.6 17.5 
5. Remittances from abroad 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 
6. Proceeds from family farm 1.2 0.0 12.5 9.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 
7. Proceeds from non-farm family 
enterprise 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 0.3 
8. Income from family property 4.7 0.0 0.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.9 
9. Loans from NGO's 0.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.0 
10. Loans from religious 
institutions 
       11.Loans from Nasser Social Bank 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
12. Loans from other public sector 
banks 2.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 2.7 2.2 
13. Loans from Private banks 0.4 1.1 0.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 
14. Social Fund for Development 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.5 
15. Loans from local money 
lenders 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
16. Others (specify) 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 0.0 2.9 
17. don't know 3.8 10.8 0.0 0.0 22.2 0.0 4.8 
 
 
 
6.5 Determinants of Wealth of MSES from Panel and Cross Sectional Data: 2006-2012 
This section presents a detailed description of the data and variables used in the analysis. It also 
presents a description of the methodology used in the data analysis. This analysis uses the principal 
components analysis multivariate statistical technique to create an asset based household based 
wealth index. It then proceeds to estimate its determinants for households who own enterprises 
based on a variety of enterprise and entrepreneur characteristics, employing both OLS techniques 
for 2006 and 2012 separately,  as well as using random effects pooled time series models while 
utilizing  panel data of the two surveys 1998 -2006. 
 
6.5.1 The Household Module of the 1998- 2006-2012 ELMPS Panel Data 
The data used in this study is based on the Egypt Labour Market Surveys (ELMSs). These surveys 
were conducted in three waves (1988, 1998 and 2006) by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in 
cooperation with the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). The 
questionnaire of the three waves was designed to allow for the comparison among the three waves. 
The last wave of this series of surveys was a panel of the 1998 survey. The analysis in this study is 
based on data of the two waves of 1998 and 2006 to measure the socioeconomic status of the 
households in Egypt. (see Assaad, (2006) for detailed description for these sets of surveys).  
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 The panel data was obtained by tracing the same households that were interviewed in 1998. 
About three-quarters (3695 out of 4815 original households in 1998) of the households included in 
1998 wave, were successfully interviewed in the 2006 ELMPS. Those households were re-
interviewed successfully at 2006. They are considered as a second round of a longitudinal data of the 
households interviewed in 1998. The ELMPS 2012 is therefore the third round of a periodic 
longitudinal sample survey that tracks the same individuals in 1998 and 2006, as well as a refresher 
sample of 2000 households to ensure that the data remains representative. The fibal sample of 
ELMPS 2012 consists of 12,060 households , consisting of 6752 households from 2006 sample, 3308 
new households that emerged as splits from these households as well as 2000 completely new 
refresher ones.  
 
 
6.5.2 The Construction of the Wealth Index: 
The assets index was constructed by applying the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) for most 
durable goods owned by the households, in addition to the ownership of a private car, taxi, truck, 
motorcycle and bicycle. Applying criteria6 that exclude the variables of weights less than +/-0.04 to 
enhance the results, the% of explained variance increased from 22 to 29% in 1998, and from 18 to 
24% at 2006. The following table shows the results of PCA before and after deleting some very low 
weight variables (bicycle, motorcycle, taxi and truck). In 2012, it was possible to construct a longer 
and more detailed wealth index, by incorporating other important assets that emerged such as 
mobile telephones, desktop and laptop computers. Table 6.16 shows the factor loadings (weights) of 
the various items as generated by the principal component analysis in each year. 
 
Table 6.16: Matrix principal component factor loadings (weights) for the wealth index 
short-list 1998 2006 Extended list 2012 
Fridge 0.3094 0.2682 Rooms 0.3516 
Freezer 0.1733 0.2332 Area 0.3216 
Dish Washer 0.1054 0.164 Walls 0.2818 
Color TV 0.3203 0.2959 floor_w 0.3695 
Black and White TV -0.1704 -0.2135 Roof 0.3576 
Video 0.2381 0.2595 Phone 0.4297 
Air Condition 0.1594 0.2482 Fridge 0.3799 
Microwave 0.0467 0.1628 Freezer 0.4535 
Cooker 0.2712 0.2219 Dishwash 0.2287 
Kerosene Cooker -0.2221 -0.1846 CTV 0.3791 
Elect. Fan 0.2676 0.2037 OBWTV -0.236 
Water heater 0.3143 0.3037 Video 0.2918 
Heater 0.186 0.2103 AC 0.5204 
Sewing mach. 0.1686 0.1319 Micro 0.4053 
Iron 0.3007 0.2864 Cooker 0.4986 
Radio 0.1977 0.2024 Okerocook -0.4958 
Washing mach. 0.2443 0.1905 Gasov -0.0683 
Camera 0.219 0.2226 Fan 0.2687 
                                                          
6  The Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000, used similar criteria in calculating the socioeconomic indices for 
areas, in order to enhance the results and to eliminate the less significant variables. 
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Bicycle 0.0779 0.0485 Watheat 0.6283 
Motorcycle 0.0387 0.0291 heater 0.299 
Private car 0.2097 0.2574 sewing 0.1485 
Taxi 0.0249 0.0152 Iron 0.5287 
Truck 0.0403 0.0316 Radio 0.3102 
  
 
  semiwashing -0.3931 
  
  
autowashing 0.6558 
  
  
camera 0.3135 
  
  
bicycle 0.0662 
  
  
scooter 0.0311 
  
  
Car 0.48 
  
  
deskcomputer 0.5388 
  
  
lapcomputer 0.4201 
  
  
router 0.4207 
  
  
cellphone 0.2942 
      satdish 0.4095 
 
 
6.5.3 Panel Data Analysis (Fixed and Random Effects models): 
Because of the need in family research for dealing with panel data that consist of more than two 
points of time, Johnson (1995) presented a suitable method for dealing with more than two waves 
panel data and continuous dependent variable. This method called pooled time-series analysis. The 
fixed and random effects models for pooled time series data developed by econometricians to 
analyze pooled time series cross-section data, but it has much potential for analysis of two or more 
waves of panel data in family research.. The two models (fixed and random effects) have two 
advantages, their ability to capture the variation in number and timing of waves and the ability to 
allow the unit to be included in the analysis if it were existed in at least two waves. 
 
- Fixed Effects Model: 
 
The fixed effects model is suitable to deal with panel data composed of only two waves (Johnson, 
1995). In this case, the model is easy to handle like ordinary least squares regression analysis. A 
simple model can be formulated as follows: 
 
(Yi2 – Yi1) = a + b(Xi2 – Xi1) + ei , i=1, ….,n 
Where, Yij  the dependent variable for individual i at time j  
Xij   a vector of the explanatory variables for individual i at time j,  
a   constant term,  
b   the effect of changes in X on changes in Y,  
and e is the error term. 
This model can be estimated using ordinary least squares regression. Another method can be used 
to estimate the coefficients in fixed effects model through creating a set of n-1 dummy variables to 
be added to the OLS regression analysis where n is the number of waves included in the analysis. 
This estimation method only retains the within individual variations at the model.  
 
- Random Effects model: 
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This method includes an additional assumption is that the unobserved variations between 
individuals are random variables. The model in this case can be formulated as follows: 
Yit=u+bXit+ai+eit  
Where u overall constant,  
 Xit  vector of explanatory variables for individual i at time t 
 
ai constant for time i,  
 
and eit is within time periods error term.  
The between effects model uses only the cross sectional information and asks "what is the expected 
difference in Y between two households' SES that differ by 1 in X's". While a fixed effects model uses 
only the time-series information and asks "what is the expected change in the SES (Y) if its values of  
X's  increases by 1". The random effects model combines those two questions. The random effects 
estimator is the weighted average of the within (fixed effects) estimators and the between (group) 
estimators. The treatment of individual effects can be measured by using the two options (fixed 
effects and random effects).  
 
- Hausman Test (Fixed or Random): 
 
The Hausman test examine whether the fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate for the 
data under study. Specifically, It tests Ho: E(u |xit) = 0 
If there is no correlation between regressors and effects (do not reject Ho, then fixed effects and 
random effects are both consistent, but fixed effects is inefficient.  
 
      . If there is correlation, FE is consistent and RE is 
inconsistent (Reject H0). Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, there should be no differences 
between the two estimators. The covariance of an efficient estimator with its difference from an 
inefficient estimator should be zero. Thus, under the null hypothesis we test: 
  
 
If W is significant, we should not use the random effects estimator. 
 
 
6.5.4 Sample characteristics and Transition Matrices  
Table 6.17 below shows means and standard deviations of variables used in determinants of wealth 
analysis. Comparison of 2006 and 2012 samples show an increase in wealth score, increase in 
informality, increase in services (but trade is still dominant). The sample is equally distributed 
between urban and rural areas. There was relative stability in distribution of capital, but a slight 
increase in share of 10-49 enterprises and decline in the share of 1-9 employees between 2006 and 
2012. Also age and education  of entrepreneur increased between the two rounds , Finally, we 
define four main categories: Bank and other formal finance (Nasser Social Bank, loans from public 
and private sector Banks, Social Fund for Development, Loans from local money lenders), ROSCA 
finance, Other informal ( household savings, inheritance, loans from relatives/friends, remittances 
from abroad, proceeds from farm and non-farm family enterprises, family property, loans from 
NGOS and other religious institutions), and others/unclassified. Data was only available in 2012 and 
covariance its and ˆˆ Calculate RE FE 
)(~)(ˆ)'(=W 2RE
1
RE kFEFE  

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shows that the distribution is 14% Bank finance, 20% ROSCA finance, 40% other informal and 34% 
unclassified or unknown.   
 
Table 6.17: Means and Standard Deviation of Determinants of HH Wealth Status variables , 2006- 
2012 
  2012 2006 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Household wealth score 2236 0.19 0.96 
-
2.71 4.25 1986 0.14 0.88 
-
2.73 2.58 
formal_ent 2236 0.46 0.50 0 1 1986 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Economic Activity 
    
  
     
NewEaActReg==Agriculture 2236 0.05 0.21 0 1 1986 0.08 0.28 0 1 
NewEaActReg==Industry 2236 0.21 0.41 0 1 1986 0.20 0.40 0 1 
NewEaActReg==Trade 2236 0.33 0.47 0 1 1986 0.36 0.48 0 1 
NewEaActReg==Service 2025 0.34 0.47 0 1 1986 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Location 
    
  
     
Urban 2236 0.51 0.50 0 1 1986 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Rural 2236 0.49 0.50 0 1 1986 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Tot Num of Workers 
    
  
     
Tot Number of workers (1-9) 2025 0.84 0.37 0 1 1982 0.99 0.11 0 1 
Tot Number of workers (10-49) 2025 0.08 0.27 0 1 1982 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Tot Number of workers (50 +) 2025 0.08 0.27 0 1 1982 0.00 0.03 0 1 
     
  
     
Newvaluekap=(Less than 1000) 2236 0.45 0.50 0 1 1968 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Newvaluekap=(1000 - 10,000) 2236 0.34 0.47 0 1 1968 0.34 0.48 0 1 
Newvaluekap= (10,000 - 
49,999) 2236 0.20 0.40 0 1 1968 0.23 0.42 0 1 
     
  
     
Outside estab.  2025 0.40 0.49 0 1 1821 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Inside estab. 2025 0.60 0.49 0 1 1821 0.63 0.48 0 1 
     
  
     education 2 Categ. (less 
intermediate, and intermediate 
and above) 2234 0.45 0.50 0 1 1986 0.38 0.49 0 1 
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sources_Finance==DK_Others 2236 0.13 0.34 0 1 
     
sources_Finance==ROSCA 2236 0.04 0.20 0 1 
     
sources_Finance==Other_Informal 2236 0.81 0.40 0 1 
     
sources_Finance==Formal_Loan 2236 0.02 0.14 0 1 
     
     
  
     
Age 2236 46.07 13.37 18 91 1986 45.90 13.40 19 90 
age Square 2236 2301.24 1335.67 324 8281 1986 2286.39 1315.97 361 8100 
 
 Table 6.18 shows transition matrices for the changes in wealth status across quintiles for  
the two periods understudy. The figures indicate that between 1998 and 2006 , the wealth of some 
households increased. This trend is clearly apparent in low-wealth household groups. Around 40% of 
the HHs in the lowest quintile in 1998 were able to move up to a higher wealth status. The same 
trend applies to the three following quintiles. Meanwhile, other quintiles—especially the highest 
quintile in 1998— experience a drop in their wealth status. However, when comparing the 
households’ wealth distribution in 1998 (reflected in the last column) with that of 2006 (reflected in 
the last row), one can identify a slight improvement in the HHs’ situation in 2006. The change is 
apparent especially in the last wealth quintile where the percentage of households rose from 28.6% 
in 1998 to 30.6% in 2006. 
 The second period from 2006-2012 shows a definite trend towards compression with two 
important changes: (1) the proportion who moved up from the bottom quintiles are 54% , as 
opposed to 40% in the previous period  and (2) the proportion who moved down from top quintile 
are 45% instead of 31% in previous period. If we aggregate in the last two columns (% who moved 
down and up) 151% of sample moved down and 164% moved up in 2006-2012 as opposed to 129% 
and 153% respectively in 1998-2006. Overall wealth slightly increased but with this clear 
compression, much similar to trends on wage inequality documented in Chapter 4 for all wage 
earners over the same period.   
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Table 6.18:  Changes in the Wealth Distribution of Households by Quintiles (1998-2006; 2006-2012) 
Wealth 
Quintiles1998 
Wealth Quintiles 2006 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
% 
moved 
up 
% 
moved 
down 
1 60.83 24.93 6.55 6.87 0.82 100 39.17 - 
2 24.22 35.47 19.1 13.99 7.22 100 40.31 24.22 
3 6.7 17.48 32.56 26.23 17.03 100 43.26 24.18 
4 2.95 14.06 32.61 19.99 30.39 100 30.39 49.62 
5 0.58 4.8 9.16 16.29 69.17 100 - 30.83 
 
          
column 
totals 153.13 128.85 
 
Wealth Quintiles 
2006 
Wealth Quintiles 2012   
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
% 
moved 
up 
% 
moved 
down 
1 46.1 30.2 15.6 6.0 2.1 100 53.88 - 
2 24.5 29.9 22.5 15.8 7.2 100 45.55 24.52 
3 14.5 24.5 23.6 23.1 14.2 100 37.30 39.07 
4 8.0 13.6 21.6 29.2 27.6 100 27.59 43.22 
5 2.3 6.9 12.2 23.7 54.8 100 - 45.18 
            column totals 164.32 151.99 
 
 
 
6.5.5 Estimation Results from Panel and Cross Sectional and Panel Analysis 
In order to understand the relationship between changes in households’ wealth status and changes 
in the characteristics of the enterprise, the entrepreneur and the household itself. We estimated 
two models : the first model includes the main characteristics of the MSE itself: such as the 
informality, the number of workers, the economic activity, the value of capital, the location of 
enterprise (urban/rural), being inside/outside an establishment. 
 
The second model includes the above, as well as owner characteristics in terms of age and 
education. Regarding the educational level of owner, it is re-classified into 2 categories less than 
secondary (takes value 0) and secondary and above (takes value 1). In Addition for 2012, we are able 
to include in the second model the different categories for sources of finance.  Since the dependent 
variable is continuous and the explanatory variables are binary and continuous, the fixed and 
random effects time series models were investigated in the panel for 1998-2006 (Table 6.19). Then, 
Hausman test was applied to investigate between fixed or random effects models. For comparative 
purposes, and to update analysis for 2012 data we also include the cross-sectional regressions for 
2006 and 2012 separately in Table 6.20 below. This also allows to look at the effect of different 
sources of finance as mentioned above as it would not be possible in panel (due to absence or 
patchiness of such data in 2006)  
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In our case, in  1998-2006 the Hausman test (the null hypothesis tested is that the 
coefficients estimated by random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by fixed 
effects estimator) was implemented and the result was insignificant (can not reject Ho) this implies 
that random effects model should be used.  The interpretation of coefficients is similar to the OLS 
case, except that in the panel, they measure the difference between the two waves from the mean.   
Formality has significant and positive effect on the wealth index (model 1 and 2). It increases the 
wealth by 23% for model 1 and 20% for model 2. The urban and rural as well as formality, existing in 
rural areas decreases the wealth by 40% and 38% for model 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
The wealth index significantly increases with all categories of size of employment and 
current capital of the enterprises (model 1 and 2).). The wealth index significantly increases with 
education level (model 2), it has a rate of return 47%. However, being a female owned the 
enterprise decreases the wealth by 23.4% (model 2). The increasing of the age of the owner by one 
year significantly increases the wealth of the household by 4.5%.  
 
The results of the two models is cross-sectional analysis reveal several interesting results.  
The factors that changed and thus played a crucial role in raising the households’ wealth status 
between the two comparative years include:  The change in the formality status of the enterprise 
and its relative stability in the  market played a major role in changing the household’s wealth status 
and its ability to  move to a higher wealth score.  The change in the geographical location of the 
enterprise to urban areas has proven to be of positive influence on the socioeconomic status of the 
household . The growth in the size of MSEs —especially in the employment category of more than 
10 workers or capital size that is more than LE 1,000— was associated with a more positive impact 
on the household’s wealth status.  The older age of the entrepreneur, which is usually associated 
with more work experience proved to play a significant role in improving the household’s wealth 
status as well as the education of the entrepreneur. Interestingly enough the specialization in 
industry or manufacturing results in higher wealth, specialization in trade is insignificant and finally 
agriculture has a negative impact (just like rural location) 
 
Finally the most interesting results for 2012, relate to access to finance. Recall that we 
define four sources of finance: Bank and other formal finance, ROSCA finance, Other informal, and 
others/unclassified. Of all the above sources, access to finance through ROSCAs was indeed the most 
significant and largest determinant of higher wealth status. This is followed by other informal 
sources defined above which were also superior and more significant to bank/formal finance.  
The above estimates should be thought of as providing only preliminary estimates of the 
relationship between enterprise, entrepreneur and finance on household wealth. It is likely to suffer 
from various endogeneity and selection problems and hence should be interpreted with care. Future 
drafts of this research will examine other variables such as household expenditure (extrapolated 
from household expenditure surveys on household characteristics), to avoid problems joint 
determination of wealth and determinants of enterprise success that affect the current framework. 
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Table 6.19: Random Effects estimates of Determinants of Welfare Score of Household Enterprises, 1998-
2006 
VARIABLES RE Model 1 RE Model 2 
   formal_ent 0.2313*** 0.2004*** 
 
(0.0324) (0.0310) 
NewEaActReg==Agriculture -0.4182*** -0.3196*** 
 
(0.0507) (0.0492) 
NewEaActReg==Industry 0.0381 0.1194*** 
 
(0.0407) (0.0391) 
NewEaActReg==Trade -0.0968*** -0.0020 
 
(0.0347) (0.0338) 
Urban/Rural -0.4024*** -0.3759*** 
 
(0.0306) (0.0293) 
NewTotNumWrkrEntGrp==     (10-50) 0.4227*** 0.3536*** 
 
(0.0959) (0.0914) 
NewTotNumWrkrEntGrp==     50 + 0.5841* 0.4980 
 
(0.3207) (0.3054) 
Newvaluekap==    (10,000 - 50,000) 0.3128*** 0.2797*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0330) 
Newvaluekap==     50,000 + 0.6373*** 0.5331*** 
 
(0.0361) (0.0350) 
InOutEstab==     Insude 0.4370*** 0.3250*** 
 
(0.0326) (0.0319) 
Educational Attainment (Less Secondary omitted) 
 
0.4713*** 
  
(0.0307) 
Age 
 
0.0451*** 
  
(0.0067) 
ageSqr 
 
-0.0004*** 
  
(0.0001) 
Female 
 
-0.2340*** 
  
(0.0547) 
Constant 0.0595 -1.1994*** 
 
(0.0621) (0.1681) 
Observations 2761 2761 
Hauseman Test: 
chi2(9) =                                                 9.83          5.55 
Prob>chi2                                                0.3643        0.8516 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.20: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Determinants of HH Wealth Status, 2006- 2012 
Independent Variable: Wealth index 2006 2012 
  
Model excl. sources 
of finance 
Model excl. 
sources of finance 
Model incl. sources 
of finance 
Formal Enterprise 0.1564*** 0.4660*** 0.4644*** 
 
(0.0378) (0.0374) (0.0376) 
NewEaActReg==Agriculture -0.1206* 0.0086 0.0003 
 
(0.0692) (0.0814) (0.0811) 
NewEaActReg==Industry 0.1039** 0.1892*** 0.1778*** 
 
(0.0472) (0.0457) (0.0456) 
NewEaActReg==Trade -0.0166 0.0439 0.0397 
 
(0.0409) (0.0426) (0.0424) 
Region==rural -0.3842*** -0.5180*** -0.5102*** 
 
(0.0361) (0.0343) (0.0344) 
Tot Number of workers (10-49) 0.5317*** 0.1866*** 0.1990*** 
 
(0.1480) (0.0663) (0.0661) 
Tot Number of workers (50 +) 0.3923 0.1858*** 0.1767*** 
 
(0.4916) (0.0646) (0.0646) 
value of Capital =(1000 - 10,000) 0.2834*** -0.0326 -0.0666* 
 
(0.0394) (0.0373) (0.0380) 
value of Capital= (10,000 - 49,999) 0.5262*** 0.0224 -0.0046 
 
(0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0456) 
Location=inside Establishment 0.3201*** 0.2498*** 0.2441*** 
 
(0.0386) (0.0396) (0.0395) 
Owner Secondary and Above Education 0.4757*** 0.6148*** 0.6244*** 
 
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0372) 
Owner age 0.0397*** 0.0326*** 0.0322*** 
 
(0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
Owner ageSqr -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
sources_Finance==ROSCA 
  
0.3903*** 
   
(0.1362) 
sources_Finance==Other_Informal 
  
0.1894* 
   
(0.1098) 
sources_Finance=Unclassified 
  
0.0121 
   
(0.1191) 
Constant -1.4544*** -1.1438*** -1.2918*** 
 
(0.1990) (0.2054) (0.2330) 
Observations 1806 2023 2023 
R-squared 0.379 0.413 0.419 
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6.6 Conclusion  
Like with enterprise data, results based on latest house-hold level micro and small enterprises data 
in Egypt presented in this chapter reveal that the structure of MSEs is relatively small and mainly 
concentrated in the range of 2-4 employees and this proportion has been drastically increasing over 
time, particularly as a coping mechanism in recent recessionary times. There is a large degree of 
informality among MSEs and this has also been increasing consistently since 1988 and more 
significantly since 2006. The majority of enterprises are concentrated in trade and the main source 
of capital for MSEs comes from own savings of the entrepreneurs or inheritance sources such as 
loans , as well as informal sources like family loans and ROSCAs.   
 
 More in-depth analysis of wealth status of households  based on  transition matrices for the 
changes in wealth status across quintiles for  2006-2012 shows a definite trend towards compression 
with the proportion who moved up from the bottom quintiles a the proportion who moved down 
from top quintile much higher than in 1998-2006. Overall wealth slightly increased but with this 
clear compression, much similar to trends on wage inequality documented in Chapter 4 for all wage 
earners over the same period.   
Regression analysis based on cross-sectional and panel data with MSEs indicate that they are 
more likely to prosper the larger in size (more than 10 workers and relatively high levels of capital), 
and this indicates that any policy aiming to sustain and develop MSEs should help them increase 
their capital through providing continuous and secure access to finance and technical assistance.  
The positive changes in the enterprise (size, formality and capital) or the entrepreneur’s 
characteristics ( age and education) affect the household’s wealth status positively. These positive 
changes could be triggered and enhanced by continuous training programs that target both 
entrepreneur and workers which are necessary enabling conditions. Training in areas such as 
domestic and international marketing, technical aspects of the production process, legal, financial 
and administrative procedures is required to enable the enterprise to improve their products, add 
new lines and innovate. Such developments will reflect positively on the entrepreneurs’ and also the 
workers' income and wealth status, and thus will help in poverty reduction.  
 
 The  results in this chapter  based on both descriptive and regression analysis, show that 
formal loans play a very modest role in financing MSEs, therefore the government should look into 
the procedures adopted by the banks and try to improve and facilitate them. They also single out 
one rather promising form of informal financing for household enterprises in Egypt: ROSCAs, which 
account for a significant proportion of sources of finance for both small and larger enterprises that 
exceeds both bank loans and household savings. RoSCA finance is also compatible with Islamic rules, 
especially as it promotes mutual co-operation which arguably conforms to both the spirit as well as 
the letter of Islamic prohibitions of riba (interest) and gharar (excessive risk).  
 
Field experiments conducted by El Gamal,  El-Komi , Karlan and Osman (2011) in Egyptian 
villages indicate that ROSCAs can be superior to Grameen type loans for MSEs on grounds of higher 
take-up rates and good equilibrium. However there are problems with RoSCA on its own (the fact 
that there is wither zero or low penalty attached to their normal applications), hence a bank 
guarantee is needed for coordination failure. One policy implication of this finding is to explore the 
potential for ‘formalizing’ or extension of these schemes in bank or credit-union guaranteed sets 
ups, to generate higher take-up and repayment rates, and hence bolster the contribution of MSE’s to 
employment creation and poverty alleviation. 
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Appendix Table 3.1: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Ranking for Selective Indicators (averaged for 2000-02) 
  Growth Health and Demographics 
Labour Force and 
Employment Gender 
  GDP   GDP per capita 
Health 
expenditure 
Mortality 
rate,  
Life 
Expectancy  
Tuberculosis  
Wage & 
Salaried 
Employment-
to-Population  
Female Labour 
Force 
   
Growth  
 Growth  (% GDP) under-5 (per 
1,000) 
at Birth (per 100,000 
people) 
(% of total 
employment) 
Ratios (% of 
15+) 
(% of total 
workforce) 
North Africa                  
Algeria 108 110 164 119 108 107 72 172 180 
Egypt 85 105 98 116 116 58 74 161 171 
Libya 185 187 151 90 75 80 
 
147 163 
Morocco 72 70 135 127 117 124 99 151 164 
Tunisia 93 89 90 93 73 53 64 163 166 
Other Middle East                   
Iran 41 46 127 115 111 64 
 
165 174 
Israel 123 152 46 28 11 26 25 135 57 
Jordan 51 84 14 91 80 22 44 169 179 
Lebanon 120 133 10 67 99 42 
 
162 169 
Saudi Arabia 158 174 144 71 88 46 
 
146 178 
Syria 63 112 128 80 57 70 89 154 172 
Turkey 138 143 117 102 112 83 91 150 162 
Yemen 61 120   151 154 123 
 
164 167 
Other LDCs                  
China 13 15 134 101 90 119 
 
22 72 
Chile 103 98 70 43 33 57 62 134 149 
Brazil 128 129 52 105 106 91 67 61 98 
India 70 82 132 143 151 156 
 
90 160 
Indonesia 68 68 186 126 133 150 103 59 131 
South Korea 25 20 122 20 43 103 68 76 104 
Malaysia 55 87 170 41 78 113 54 66 141 
Mexico 137 140 112 92 53 62 69 83 148 
Russia 24 16 102 75 136 131 8 105 22 
South Africa 97 121 24 135 171   
 
167 89 
                   
Countries included 200 200 188 193 202 200 115 173 183 
Missing Countries 14 14 26 21 12 14 99 41 31 
         
 
Total Countries 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
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 Appendix Table 3.1 Cont’d: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Ranking for Selective 
Indicators (averaged for 2000-02) 
 
  
Education Sanitation Inequality Governance 
Inclusive Growth Index 
(IGi)
(a)  
 
Ratio of Female to  
Population Using 
Improved Gini Index 
Corruption 
Perception 
max = 100 
 Male Secondary 
Enrolment (%) 
 Sanitation 
Facilities (%) 
(2000-04) Index min = 0 
North Africa           
Algeria 52 66 
 
  36.1 
Egypt 126 84 22 60 47.3 
Libya 39 46 
 
  39.0 
Morocco 141 117 63 45 38.5 
Tunisia 65 95 66 33 51.8 
Other Middle East         
 Iran 124 71 
 
  44.2 
Israel 98 1 54 19 79.3 
Jordan 59 39 52 39 66.5 
Lebanon 
 
39 
 
  57.5 
Saudi Arabia 
   
  31.4 
Syria 129 79 39   46.4 
Turkey 145 84 75 56 35.8 
Yemen 169 144 
 
  19.6 
Other LDCs        
 China 122 135 72 60 63.2 
Chile 76 65 102 18 59.7 
Brazil 23 107 111 47 53.0 
India 149 160 
 
70 29.3 
Indonesia 112 141 11 90 46.0 
South Korea 95 1 
 
43 77.1 
Malaysia 27 62 50 35 60.8 
Mexico 63 105 91 56 47.5 
Russia 
 
111 48 77 69.1 
South Africa 26 106 108 36 51.4 
          
 Countries included 170 189 116 94 
 Missing Countries 44 25 98   
 Total Countries 214 214 214   
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Notes:  
(a) The overall inclusive scores for each country (IGi) are computed as a geometric mean for that country of the standardised values for different indicators 
(defined below) according to the following formula: 
 
IGi  = √           
      (1) 
where:  
(i = 1,… m:  country i included in the dataset);  
 (j = 1,… n:  indicator j included in the dataset); and  
sj is a standardised score for the rankings obtained in respect of indicator j for country i. These standardised scores are obtained using the following 
formula (for each indicator for each country): 
sji = 100 . (
     
    
)i      (2) 
where rj is a country’s rank in respect of indicator j in (descending order) and mj is  the total number of countries for which data for indicator sj is 
available.  
 
Source: WDI (2012) and Transparency International (2012) for The Corruption Perception Index. 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Ranking for Selective Indicators (averaged for 2008-10) 
  Growth Health and Demographics 
Labour Force and 
Employment Gender 
  GDP   
GDP per 
capita 
Health 
expenditure 
Mortality 
rate,  
Life 
Expectancy  
Tuberculosis  
Wage & 
Salaried 
Employment-
to-Population  
Female Labour 
Force 
   
Growth  
 Growth  (% GDP) under-5 (per 
1,000) 
at Birth (per 100,000 
people) 
(% of total 
employment) 
Ratios (% of 
15+) 
(% of total 
workforce) 
North Africa                  
Algeria 99 96 157 120 100 119 
 
167 179 
Egypt 38 37 144 107 98 57 
 
153 170 
Libya 95 103 170 87 69 89 
 
140 162 
Morocco 56 42 133 126 110 121 81 149 164 
Tunisia 80 65 96 88 71 74 
 
161 165 
Other Middle East                 
 Iran 113 108 113 111 103 57 77 165 176 
Israel 85 95 61 27 9 16 22 123 49 
Jordan 53 60 44 100 89 17 38 169 177 
Lebanon 12 8 68 57 105 51 
 
156 169 
Saudi Arabia 92 119 165 58 81 55 
 
146 183 
Syria 60 64 173 80 56 60 69 166 180 
Turkey 120 123 94 86 85 77 71 155 163 
Yemen 51 77 124 156 145 98 
 
158 168 
Other LDCs                 
 China 9 1 141 82 92 116 
 
25 85 
Chile 97 78 55 52 35 58 55 119 136 
Brazil 70 50 48 89 97 93 64 52 95 
India 18 15 160 144 143 157 
 
111 167 
Indonesia 39 23 183 124 125 156 87 65 135 
South Korea 93 68 86 30 18 124 58 88 113 
Malaysia 81 79 153 41 77 117 52 85 148 
Mexico 146 149 98 85 45 53 65 86 146 
Russia 136 113 136 65 127 128 4 91 22 
South Africa 121 121 40 141 178 201 36 159 100 
                  
 Countries included 194 194 187 193 196 202 92 173 184 
Missing Countries 20 20 27 21 18 12 122 41 30 
Total Countries 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 2
1
4 
214 
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Appendix Table 3.2 Cont’d: Inclusive Growth Scores Based on Country Ranking for Selective Indicators (averaged 
for 2008-10) 
 
Education Sanitation Inequality Governance 
Inclusive Growth Index 
(IGi)
(a)  
 
Ratio of Female to  
Population Using 
Improved 
Gini Index 
Corruption 
Perception 
max = 100 
 Male Secondary 
Enrolment (%) 
 Sanitation 
Facilities (%) 
(2005-10) Index min = 0 
North Africa         
 Algeria 72 61 
 
103 34.5 
Egypt 119 61 14 108 55.2 
Libya  51 
 
134 38.6 
Morocco  113 55 85 43.5 
Tunisia 35 88 60 62 52.4 
Other Middle East         
 Iran 114 1 44 152 57.0 
Israel 69 1 
 
32 82.5 
Jordan 41 44 30 49 66.5 
Lebanon 13 
  
120 71.1 
Saudi Arabia 131 
  
64 40.2 
Syria 83 67 
 
133 46.7 
Turkey 133 79 51 58 44.2 
Yemen 158 128 41 147 33.9 
Other LDCs         
 China 40 118 64 76 74.1 
Chile 58 54 87 23 62.8 
Brazil  99 93 75 55.8 
India 134 146 21 85 51.4 
Indonesia 89 127 25 116 50.3 
South Korea 98 1 
 
39 73.2 
Malaysia 26 54 73 53 57.6 
Mexico 28 91 80 86 52.1 
Russia 113 111 59 149 56.2 
South Africa 47 98 98 54 44.4 
          
 Countries included 163 178 99 179 
 Missing Countries 51 36 115   
 Total Countries 214 214 214   
 Notes and Sources as for Appendix Table 3.1. 
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Appendix Table 4. A 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables by Sector and Gender, Egypt, 2006 
 
Male Female Total 
Variable Government Public Enterprise Private Government Public Enterprise Private 
  
 
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
               
               Real Hourly Wage 8.52 25.82 10.37 21.22 5.28 9.46 12.51 50.85 9.18 12.37 5.94 22.38 7.55 25.39 
Real Monthly Earnings 1598.20 5033.34 2106.65 4686.13 1156.05 1929.47 1235.36 3742.10 1469.91 1601.77 742.44 1264.52 1324.27 3466.41 
Log Real Hourly Wage 1.63 0.80 1.84 0.85 1.35 0.68 1.77 0.94 1.77 0.89 0.95 0.97 1.49 0.81 
Experience 22.07 11.82 22.22 12.46 23.10 37.95 16.58 9.92 16.99 12.07 19.44 16.19 17.44 36.29 
illiterate 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.21 0.37 0.48 0.78 1.76 
Literate without Diploma 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.34 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.37 1.22 
elementary school 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.32 0.49 1.49 
Middle School 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.26 0.10 0.31 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.32 1.14 
General High school 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.79 
Vocational high school 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.19 0.40 2.09 2.76 
post-secondary institute 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.41 1.44 
University 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.28 0.43 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.06 0.24 1.40 2.34 
Alexandria and Canal Cities 0.08 0.27 0.25 0.43 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.33 0.47 0.10 0.30 0.99 2.11 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.81 2.04 
Rural Lower Egypt 0.27 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.44 1.25 2.41 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.23 0.42 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37 1.14 2.33 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.23 0.42 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.23 0.42 0.77 1.82 
Greater Cairo 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.29 0.46 0.13 0.33 1.04 2.23 
               
               Sample Size 1950 491 3427 1023 68 416 7558 
Note: With the exception of real hourly wages, log real hourly wages, monthly earnings and the experience variables, all variables in the above table are 
dummies, therefore the mean refers to the percentage of the relevant variable in the sample. 
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Appendix Table 4. A2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables by Sector and Gender, Egypt, 2012 
 
Male Female Total 
Variable Government Public Enterprise Private Government Public Enterprise Private 
  
 
Mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
               
               Real Hourly Wage 7.50 10.89 8.32 7.90 5.68 13.25 6.92 7.76 12.23 31.76 4.53 6.50 6.35 11.90 
Real Monthly Earnings 1283.60 1573.70 1626.91 1380.23 1068.17 1174.54 1059.60 1066.39 1429.75 1098.20 781.72 883.59 1128.81 1269.81 
Log Real Hourly Wage 1.68 0.76 1.83 0.75 1.44 0.66 1.66 0.71 1.88 0.88 1.12 0.82 1.53 0.72 
Experience 23.65 11.38 20.81 11.54 19.72 13.89 18.74 11.19 16.67 13.08 19.42 14.23 22.87 15.82 
Experience2 688.88 571.90 565.89 566.58 582.00 771.94 476.28 458.21 445.41 554.64 579.51 735.90 773.62 968.36 
illiterate 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.50 0.50 0.24 0.43 
Literate without Diploma 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.30 
elementary school 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 
Middle School 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.29 
General High school 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.22 
Vocational high school 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 
post-secondary institute 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 
University 0.36 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.12 0.32 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 
Greater Cairo 0.10 0.30 0.18 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.39 0.49 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 
Alexandria and Canal Cities 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.46 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.48 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 
Urban Lower Egypt 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31 
Rural Lower Egypt 0.19 0.39 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.22 0.42 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 
Urban Upper Egypt 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.04 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 
Rural Upper Egypt 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.45 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 
               
               Sample Size 2306 435 5579 1321 51 416 10160 
Note: With the exception of real hourly wages, log real hourly wages, monthly earnings and the experience variables, all variables in the above table are 
dummies, therefore the mean refers to the percentage of the relevant variable in the sample. 
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Appendix Table 4. A3: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables by Sector and Gender, Jordan, 2010 
 
Male Female Total 
Variable Government Non-Government Government Non-Government 
  
 
mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. mean S.D. 
           
Log Real Hourly Wages 0.65 0.59 0.28 0.74 0.75 0.56 0.35 0.98 0.50 0.78 
Experience 12.60 7.98 14.99 10.64 10.82 8.22 9.31 8.71 14.02 10.48 
Illiterate 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17 
Reads and writes 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 
Basic 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.38 0.49 
Vocational 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.11 
Secondary 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.37 
Post Secondary 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.12 0.32 
University 0.27 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.48 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.19 0.39 
Post Graduate 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 
Amman 0.14 0.35 0.41 0.49 0.13 0.34 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.43 
Balqa 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27 
Zarqa 0.12 0.32 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 
Madaba 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 
Irbid 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Mafreq 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.26 
Jarash 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 
Ajloun 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 
Karak 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.26 
Tafileh 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.25 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.18 
Ma'an 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.19 
Aqaba 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16 
Female 
        
0.19 0.39 
Public sector 
        
0.49 0.50 
Observations 382 430 511 410 
  Note: With the exception of real hourly wages, log real hourly wages, monthly earnings and the experience variables, all variables in the above table are dummies, 
therefore the mean refers to the percentage of the relevant variable in the sample. 
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Appendix Table 4. A4: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Work Status Selection Equations, Egypt 2006-2012 
 
2006 2012 
 
Male Female Male Female 
 
Non-
wage 
Privat
e Public 
Unempl
oyed 
Non-
wage 
Privat
e Public 
Unempl
oyed 
Non-
wage Private Public 
Unempl
oyed 
Non-
wage 
Privat
e Public 
Unempl
oyed 
                 
age 0.009 
-
0.001 
0.142
*** -0.024 
-
0.045
*** 
-
0.089
*** 
0.182
*** 0.240** 
0.730*
** 
0.786*
** 
1.126*
** 
0.630**
* 
0.179
*** 
0.190
*** 
0.496*
** 
0.456**
* 
 
(0.012
) 
(0.01
3) 
(0.01
4) (0.031) 
(0.015
) 
(0.02
0) 
(0.02
0) (0.099) (0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.037) 
(0.020
) 
(0.02
7) (0.029) (0.052) 
agesq 
-
0.001
*** 
-
0.002
*** 
-
0.003
*** 
-
0.002** 0.000 0.000 
-
0.005
*** 
-
0.014**
* 
-
0.009*
** 
-
0.010*
** 
-
0.013*
** 
-
0.009**
* 
-
0.002
*** 
-
0.003
*** 
-
0.005*
** 
-
0.008**
* 
 
(0.000
) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) (0.001) 
(0.000
) 
(0.00
1) 
(0.00
1) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
(0.000
) 
(0.00
0) (0.000) (0.001) 
nlevel2 -0.157 
-
0.049 
0.530
** 0.246 
-
0.634
** 0.394 
1.600
*** -29.692 
-
0.350* 
-
0.414*
* 
0.554*
* -0.040 
-
0.339
* 
-
0.040 
1.732*
** 1.392** 
 
(0.173
) 
(0.17
8) 
(0.20
8) (0.452) 
(0.312
) 
(0.38
3) 
(0.48
6) 
(42153
79.9) (0.183) (0.182) (0.221) (0.373) 
(0.205
) 
(0.27
3) (0.456) (0.554) 
nlevel3 
-
0.693
*** 
-
0.630
*** 
0.323
* 
-
0.815** 
-
0.630
*** 0.204 
-
0.010 1.069 
-
0.614*
** 
-
0.670*
** 0.308* 
-
0.700**
* 
-
0.369
*** 
-
0.229 0.297 0.797* 
 
(0.159
) 
(0.16
0) 
(0.18
9) (0.410) 
(0.227
) 
(0.29
4) 
(0.58
7) (0.948) (0.126) (0.121) (0.168) (0.268) 
(0.142
) 
(0.18
6) (0.629) (0.452) 
nlevel4 
-
0.719
*** 
-
0.951
*** 
0.526
** -0.737 
-
1.170
*** 
-
0.209 
1.330
*** 0.370 
-
1.601*
** 
-
1.626*
** -0.164 
-
1.928**
* 
-
1.086
*** 
-
1.042
*** 
2.490*
** 0.921** 
 
(0.202
) 
(0.20
2) 
(0.23
2) (0.456) 
(0.294
) 
(0.36
2) 
(0.47
3) (1.264) (0.134) (0.122) (0.179) (0.313) 
(0.194
) 
(0.25
3) (0.346) (0.431) 
nlevel5 
-
1.333
*** 
-
2.090
*** 
-
0.052 -0.922 
-
2.131
** 0.714 
2.322
*** -29.728 
-
2.660*
** 
-
3.112*
** 
-
0.499*
* 
-
2.512**
* 
-
1.786
*** 
-
1.217
*** 
3.984*
** 
1.651**
* 
 
(0.323
) 
(0.32
9) 
(0.38
3) (0.641) 
(0.843
) 
(0.61
5) 
(0.70
9) 
(99326
81.1) (0.161) (0.142) (0.211) (0.319) 
(0.391
) 
(0.30
1) (0.326) (0.395) 
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nlevel6 
-
0.619
*** 
-
0.709
*** 
1.459
*** -0.649* 
-
1.462
*** 
0.462
** 
3.352
*** 
2.322**
* 
-
0.841*
** 
-
0.750*
** 
1.283*
** -0.010 
-
0.449
*** 
-
0.188 
4.628*
** 
3.441**
* 
 
(0.161
) 
(0.16
0) 
(0.18
1) (0.345) 
(0.169
) 
(0.20
0) 
(0.27
9) (0.756) (0.118) (0.113) (0.143) (0.216) 
(0.108
) 
(0.13
9) (0.256) (0.324) 
nlevel7 
-
0.921
*** 
-
0.938
*** 
2.042
*** -0.582 
-
2.369
*** 0.227 
3.776
*** 1.759* 
-
0.880*
** 
-
0.976*
** 
1.676*
** 0.184 
-
0.812
** 0.368 
5.336*
** 
3.736**
* 
 
(0.281
) 
(0.27
0) 
(0.28
0) (0.519) 
(0.398
) 
(0.31
9) 
(0.33
2) (0.960) (0.241) (0.227) (0.250) (0.344) 
(0.368
) 
(0.23
9) (0.288) (0.356) 
nlevel8 
-
0.925
*** 
-
1.160
*** 
2.473
*** 
-
0.786** 
-
2.703
*** 0.311 
4.212
*** 1.454* 
-
1.208*
** 
-
1.275*
** 
1.828*
** 0.248 
-
0.679
*** 
0.951
*** 
6.536*
** 
4.135**
* 
 
(0.196
) 
(0.19
2) 
(0.20
6) (0.395) 
(0.288
) 
(0.23
1) 
(0.29
7) (0.822) (0.142) (0.134) (0.158) (0.231) 
(0.212
) 
(0.14
4) (0.263) (0.330) 
_Iregion
_2 0.229 0.156 
-
0.092 0.369 -0.438 
-
0.442
** 0.210 0.709 -0.136 -0.095 0.041 0.154 -0.020 
-
0.084 
0.566*
** 0.239 
 
(0.180
) 
(0.16
7) 
(0.18
8) (0.307) 
(0.290
) 
(0.19
8) 
(0.18
8) (0.458) (0.159) (0.133) (0.167) (0.205) 
(0.286
) 
(0.14
6) (0.141) (0.188) 
_Iregion
_3 
0.733
*** 
-
0.198 
0.428
** -0.313 
0.685
** 0.051 
1.415
*** 0.704 
0.677*
** -0.099 
0.776*
** 0.007 
0.466
** 
-
0.478
*** 
1.210*
** 
1.046**
* 
 
(0.169
) 
(0.16
3) 
(0.17
7) (0.347) 
(0.274
) 
(0.23
2) 
(0.21
2) (0.547) (0.144) (0.129) (0.157) (0.205) 
(0.230
) 
(0.15
7) (0.134) (0.160) 
_Iregion
_4 
0.764
*** 
-
0.229 
0.893
*** -0.357 
1.253
*** 
-
0.794
*** 
1.255
*** 0.288 
0.550*
** -0.176 
1.057*
** 0.017 
0.810
*** 
-
0.883
*** 
1.404*
** 
0.659**
* 
 
(0.175
) 
(0.17
0) 
(0.17
9) (0.346) 
(0.235
) 
(0.23
4) 
(0.19
0) (0.538) (0.139) (0.122) (0.148) (0.193) 
(0.212
) 
(0.17
0) (0.129) (0.164) 
_Iregion
_5 
0.967
*** 0.009 
1.091
*** -0.641* 
1.090
*** 0.119 
1.590
*** -0.151 
0.801*
** 0.059 
1.211*
** 
-
0.376** 
1.098
*** 
-
0.554
*** 
1.345*
** 
1.200**
* 
 
(0.159
) 
(0.15
3) 
(0.16
5) (0.343) 
(0.234
) 
(0.21
5) 
(0.21
2) (0.642) (0.124) (0.108) (0.135) (0.185) 
(0.194
) 
(0.13
2) (0.127) (0.147) 
_Iregion 0.627 - 0.463 -0.550* 1.566 - 0.464 0.227 0.767* 0.012 1.145* -0.373* 1.232 - 1.156* 0.122 
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_6 *** 0.441
*** 
*** *** 1.361
*** 
* ** ** *** 1.571
*** 
** 
 
(0.161
) 
(0.15
6) 
(0.17
1) (0.326) 
(0.222
) 
(0.25
8) 
(0.24
0) (0.555) (0.127) (0.110) (0.141) (0.193) 
(0.195
) 
(0.18
1) (0.152) (0.177) 
siblingl6 
0.456
*** 
0.346
*** 
0.407
*** -0.015 
-
0.179
*** 
-
0.863
*** 
-
0.628
*** 
-
0.748**
* 
0.290*
** 
0.204*
** 
0.181*
** 
-
0.258**
* 
0.081
** 
-
0.551
*** 
-
0.315*
** 
-
0.308**
* 
 
(0.066
) 
(0.06
6) 
(0.06
9) (0.142) 
(0.056
) 
(0.09
1) 
(0.07
6) (0.210) (0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.085) 
(0.038
) 
(0.06
7) (0.048) (0.048) 
sibling
m6 
0.118
*** 
-
0.003 
0.152
*** 0.048 
0.282
*** 
0.163
*** 
0.115
** -0.078 0.011 
-
0.131*
** 
-
0.073*
* 
-
0.162**
* 
0.124
*** 
-
0.166
*** 
-
0.286*
** 0.012 
 
(0.039
) 
(0.03
9) 
(0.04
1) (0.083) 
(0.043
) 
(0.05
7) 
(0.05
4) (0.153) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034) (0.055) 
(0.027
) 
(0.04
4) (0.038) (0.041) 
stotwga
m 
    
0.000 
-
0.000 0.000 -0.001 
    
-
0.000
*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
     
(0.000
) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) (0.000) 
    
(0.000
) 
(0.00
0) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constan
t 
1.645
*** 
3.530
*** 
-
2.067
*** 0.654 
0.726
*** 
1.389
*** 
-
4.135
*** 
-
3.695**
* 
-
11.787
*** 
-
10.484
*** 
-
22.657
*** 
-
10.176*
** 
-
6.702
*** 
-
4.878
*** 
-
17.491
*** 
-
11.935*
** 
 
(0.237
) 
(0.23
0) 
(0.26
2) (0.460) 
(0.278
) 
(0.28
0) 
(0.36
3) (0.965) (0.346) (0.314) (0.521) (0.635) 
(0.435
) 
(0.50
4) (0.611) (0.825) 
Observa
tions 9512 9512 9512 9512 3325 3325 3325 3325 14839 14839 14839 14839 15192 15192 15192 15192 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4.A5: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Work Status Selection Equations, Jordan 2010 
 
Male female 
 
Non-Wage Private Public Unemployed 
Non-
Wage Private Public Unemployed 
 
Worker Wage Worker Wage Worker Worker Worker Wage Worker Wage Worker Worker 
age 0.704*** 0.613*** 0.659*** 0.433*** 0.339*** 0.427*** 0.571*** 0.418*** 
 
(0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.031) (0.069) (0.043) (0.053) (0.082) 
agesq -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
level2 0.866*** 0.490** 0.999*** 0.488 -0.181 -0.523 0.519 0.097 
 
(0.248) (0.204) (0.269) (0.343) (0.429) (0.333) (0.502) (1.237) 
level3 2.077*** 1.520*** 2.349*** 1.605*** -0.017 -0.433 0.563 1.558 
 
(0.235) (0.189) (0.248) (0.311) (0.387) (0.272) (0.448) (1.019) 
level4 2.653*** 2.410*** 2.326*** 2.842*** 
 
1.753* 3.978*** 
 
 
(0.544) (0.432) (0.532) (0.532) 
 
(0.974) (1.218) 
 level5 0.986*** 0.282 1.581*** 0.539* 0.215 -0.788*** 1.263*** 1.747* 
 
(0.241) (0.194) (0.251) (0.323) (0.411) (0.295) (0.448) (1.025) 
level6 1.577*** 1.377*** 2.739*** 1.216*** 0.419 0.993*** 2.992*** 4.025*** 
 
(0.286) (0.239) (0.288) (0.392) (0.430) (0.271) (0.431) (1.017) 
level7 1.807*** 1.639*** 3.220*** 2.346*** 0.981** 1.619*** 4.512*** 4.888*** 
 
(0.273) (0.224) (0.274) (0.343) (0.485) (0.279) (0.435) (1.017) 
level8 1.529*** 1.827*** 3.274*** 0.707 2.200*** 2.665*** 5.661*** 5.390*** 
 
(0.436) (0.381) (0.415) (0.825) (0.836) (0.478) (0.552) (1.128) 
_Iregion_2 -0.512*** -0.805*** 0.347*** -0.091 0.134 -0.604*** 0.406*** 0.565*** 
 
(0.104) (0.086) (0.089) (0.118) (0.231) (0.134) (0.129) (0.161) 
_Iregion_3 -0.887*** -0.646*** 0.798*** 0.447*** -0.111 -0.575*** 1.384*** 1.745*** 
 
(0.161) (0.120) (0.115) (0.146) (0.356) (0.199) (0.148) (0.175) 
siblingl6 0.312*** 0.178*** 0.276*** 0.012 -0.115 -0.727*** -0.234*** -0.517*** 
 
(0.058) (0.050) (0.051) (0.070) (0.131) (0.077) (0.063) (0.082) 
siblingm6 -0.122*** -0.174*** -0.142*** -0.039 -0.009 -0.218*** -0.109*** -0.017 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.065) (0.039) (0.037) (0.045) 
fintabove -0.042 -0.336*** -0.636*** -0.669*** -0.043 -0.058 -0.531*** -0.361** 
 
(0.146) (0.102) (0.107) (0.139) (0.337) (0.149) (0.149) (0.165) 
mintabove -0.019 -0.152 -0.581*** -0.515*** 0.457 0.499*** -0.133 -0.148 
 
(0.173) (0.109) (0.117) (0.149) (0.403) (0.162) (0.178) (0.180) 
fslforemployer 0.399*** -0.253*** 0.001 -0.228* 0.148 -0.012 0.015 0.063 
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(0.113) (0.092) (0.102) (0.129) (0.252) (0.146) (0.153) (0.173) 
fgovemployee -0.365*** -0.618*** 0.235** -0.376*** -0.158 0.177 0.403*** -0.019 
 
(0.125) (0.094) (0.097) (0.127) (0.277) (0.135) (0.136) (0.159) 
stotwgam 
    
-0.001** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -14.780*** -9.800*** -12.392*** -8.226*** 
-
10.931*** -8.607*** -14.455*** -10.748*** 
 
(0.601) (0.416) (0.489) (0.606) (1.374) (0.753) (1.013) (1.567) 
         Observations 7505 7505 7505 7505 7600 7600 7600 7600 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4. A6:  Ordinary least Squares and Selectivity Corrected Wage Equation Estimates, Egypt 2006 
 
Ordinary Least Square Estimates Selectivity Corrected Estimates 
 
Total Male Female Male Female 
  
Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public 
          exper 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.040*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.232** 0.175 0.343 0.659 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.111) (0.322) (1.057) (1.047) 
expsq -0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.000*** -0.001** 
-
0.001*** -0.003* -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.026) (0.024) 
nlevel2 0.032 0.074* 0.095 -0.427** -0.193 0.533 -0.880 -3.957 3.044 
 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.092) (0.216) (0.341) (1.100) (3.889) (13.081) (25.072) 
nlevel3 0.132*** 0.087** 0.312*** 0.042 0.533 0.440 0.937 3.296 11.816 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.085) (0.185) (0.461) (0.995) (3.796) (13.044) (34.399) 
nlevel4 0.234*** 0.199*** 0.359*** 0.248 0.429 0.541 -0.655 -3.234 2.293 
 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.100) (0.247) (0.341) (1.301) (4.480) (18.518) (24.280) 
nlevel5 0.468*** 0.219* 1.106*** 0.366 0.797* 0.365 12.780 0.315 6.512 
 
(0.098) (0.118) (0.193) (0.328) (0.461) (3.417) (9.061) (35.367) (31.833) 
nlevel6 0.396*** 0.262*** 0.697*** 0.100 0.897*** 1.946* 3.589 6.603 12.764 
 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.074) (0.126) (0.201) (1.024) (4.880) (8.138) (21.133) 
nlevel7 0.602*** 0.404*** 0.945*** 0.112 1.002*** 2.558 3.753 -16.794 12.306 
 
(0.043) (0.057) (0.087) (0.207) (0.210) (1.688) (6.016) (13.681) (23.839) 
nlevel8 0.814*** 0.823*** 1.125*** 0.662*** 1.065*** 10.138*** 4.892 -3.089 9.160 
 
(0.034) (0.041) (0.075) (0.141) (0.202) (1.455) (5.927) (8.663) (23.612) 
region_2 -0.034 0.036 -0.028 -0.138 -0.157* 0.087 -0.158 -6.165 -1.701 
 
(0.031) (0.036) (0.069) (0.114) (0.092) (0.947) (2.771) (9.564) (6.752) 
region_3 -0.138*** -0.084** 
-
0.220*** 
-
0.495*** -0.095 -0.722 -3.358 1.196 -0.904 
 
(0.030) (0.038) (0.060) (0.128) (0.085) (1.100) (2.437) (11.694) (6.768) 
region_4 -0.099*** 
-
0.136*** -0.134** -0.090 0.001 -1.607 -2.545 27.807* 2.634 
 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.053) (0.157) (0.079) (1.152) (2.686) (15.698) (6.745) 
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region_5 -0.116*** 
-
0.102*** 
-
0.310*** -0.253** 0.344*** -0.510 -1.293 -8.289 21.227*** 
 
(0.027) (0.033) (0.051) (0.119) (0.088) (1.017) (2.500) (9.787) (6.635) 
region_6 -0.139*** 
-
0.114*** 
-
0.245*** -0.070 0.017 -1.641 -1.193 -7.919 17.234* 
 
(0.030) (0.035) (0.056) (0.176) (0.128) (1.049) (2.647) (16.587) (9.581) 
female -0.035 
        
 
(0.022) 
        crgovwg -0.050** 
        
 
(0.021) 
        sel2 
     
-1.920 
   
      
(1.428) 
   sel3 
      
-2.549 
  
       
(4.351) 
  sel5 
       
9.189 
 
        
(15.323) 
 sel6 
        
-1.238 
         
(9.281) 
Constant 0.574*** 
-
0.654*** 
-
0.964*** -0.805** 
-
2.458*** 3.620** 5.573 -8.567 -12.137 
 
(0.039) (0.092) (0.254) (0.339) (0.425) (1.532) (12.177) (21.142) (37.723) 
          Observations 7505 3956 1993 505 1050 1638 1535 156 878 
R-squared 0.207 0.175 0.222 0.272 0.222 0.068 0.012 0.103 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4. A7:  Ordinary least Squares and  Selectivity Corrected Wage Equation Estimates, Egypt 2012 
 
Ordinary Least Square Estimates Selectivity Corrected Estimates 
 
Total Male Female Male Female 
  
Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public 
exper 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.009 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
expsq 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
-
0.000*** -0.001* -0.000 
-
0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
nlevel2 0.026 0.018 0.230** -0.049 0.314 0.013 0.106 -0.017 0.331 
 
(0.039) (0.044) (0.092) (0.246) (0.284) (0.044) (0.099) (0.234) (0.293) 
nlevel3 0.073** 0.004 0.178** 0.251 2.325*** 0.018 0.098 0.259 2.335*** 
 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.079) (0.159) (0.398) (0.032) (0.085) (0.162) (0.399) 
nlevel4 0.110*** 0.012 0.459*** -0.110 0.780*** 0.032 0.283*** -0.115 0.790*** 
 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.088) (0.218) (0.213) (0.040) (0.103) (0.228) (0.234) 
nlevel5 0.302*** 0.170*** 0.712*** 0.274 0.969*** 0.213*** 0.415*** 0.203 0.958*** 
 
(0.046) (0.058) (0.104) (0.242) (0.193) (0.063) (0.137) (0.256) (0.241) 
nlevel6 0.278*** 0.116*** 0.753*** 0.022 1.006*** 0.141*** 0.475*** 0.110 0.994*** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.063) (0.122) (0.153) (0.027) (0.104) (0.122) (0.228) 
nlevel7 0.403*** 0.235*** 0.888*** 0.060 1.137*** 0.308*** 0.522*** 0.182 1.114*** 
 
(0.038) (0.057) (0.082) (0.206) (0.166) (0.055) (0.136) (0.187) (0.256) 
nlevel8 0.671*** 0.442*** 1.209*** 0.634*** 1.373*** 0.496*** 0.757*** 0.773*** 1.329*** 
 
(0.027) (0.035) (0.065) (0.124) (0.154) (0.037) (0.148) (0.126) (0.289) 
region_2 -0.014 -0.083** 0.031 -0.202* 0.025 -0.009 0.020 -0.188* 0.015 
 
(0.028) (0.038) (0.068) (0.118) (0.069) (0.036) (0.068) (0.111) (0.073) 
region_3 
-
0.172*** 
-
0.179*** -0.128** -0.273** 
-
0.228*** 
-
0.179*** 
-
0.216*** -0.375** 
-
0.229*** 
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.060) (0.131) (0.063) (0.036) (0.066) (0.146) (0.076) 
region_4 
-
0.148*** 
-
0.119*** 
-
0.177*** -0.268* 
-
0.190*** 
-
0.121*** 
-
0.305*** -0.405** -0.196** 
 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.055) (0.146) (0.060) (0.036) (0.068) (0.186) (0.080) 
region_5 
-
0.217*** 
-
0.193*** 
-
0.245*** 
-
0.393*** 
-
0.166*** 
-
0.196*** 
-
0.367*** 
-
0.509*** -0.172** 
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(0.023) (0.030) (0.051) (0.107) (0.060) (0.030) (0.064) (0.133) (0.074) 
region_6 
-
0.074*** -0.019 
-
0.208*** -0.223 -0.157** -0.027 
-
0.329*** -0.378* -0.164* 
 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.054) (0.169) (0.076) (0.031) (0.066) (0.225) (0.088) 
female 
-
0.145*** 
        
 
(0.019) 
        crgovwg -0.001 
        
 
(0.017) 
        sel2 
     
-0.024 
   
      
(0.041) 
   
sel3 
      
-
0.327*** 
  
       
(0.095) 
  sel5 
       
0.149 
 
        
(0.197) 
 sel6 
        
-0.022 
         
(0.096) 
Constant 0.940*** 1.162*** 0.361*** 0.796*** 0.074 1.152*** 1.552*** 0.536 0.129 
 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.094) (0.147) (0.172) (0.048) (0.358) (0.353) (0.478) 
Observations 10054 5538 2305 409 1317 5929 2295 460 1314 
R-squared 0.146 0.068 0.241 0.184 0.218 0.084 0.242 0.216 0.210 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 4. A8:  Ordinary least Squares and  Selectivity Corrected Wage Equation Estimates, Jordan 2010 
 
Ordinary Least Square Estimates Selectivity Corrected Estimates 
 
Total Male Female Male Female 
  
Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public 
          Experience 0.026*** 0.005 0.027 0.028** 0.005 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.028** 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) 
Experience Squared 
-
0.000*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reads and writes 0.070 0.108 -0.137 -0.144 0.103 0.151 0.175 -0.144 0.103 
 
(0.072) (0.237) (0.390) (0.289) (0.239) (0.110) (0.119) (0.289) (0.239) 
Basic Education 0.230*** 0.310 0.196 -0.190 0.216 0.269*** 0.354*** -0.190 0.216 
 
(0.065) (0.207) (0.359) (0.228) (0.212) (0.101) (0.113) (0.228) (0.212) 
Vocational 0.153 0.334 0.000 -0.537 0.321 0.128 0.333* -0.537 0.321 
 
(0.112) (0.269) (0.000) (0.653) (0.554) (0.157) (0.200) (0.653) (0.554) 
Secondary 0.331*** 0.300 0.222 0.022 0.239 0.432*** 0.406*** 0.022 0.239 
 
(0.068) (0.227) (0.370) (0.239) (0.211) (0.108) (0.116) (0.239) (0.211) 
Post Secondary 0.518*** 0.288 0.462 0.241 0.511** 0.613*** 0.545*** 0.241 0.511** 
 
(0.070) (0.245) (0.377) (0.230) (0.211) (0.116) (0.122) (0.230) (0.211) 
University 0.844*** 0.951*** 0.618 0.705*** 0.802*** 1.061*** 0.760*** 0.705*** 0.802*** 
 
(0.068) (0.235) (0.376) (0.233) (0.229) (0.112) (0.120) (0.233) (0.229) 
Post Graduate 1.088*** 0.929*** 0.896* 1.136*** 0.916*** 1.298*** 1.053*** 1.136*** 0.916*** 
 
(0.083) (0.288) (0.456) (0.311) (0.253) (0.155) (0.135) (0.311) (0.253) 
Balqa -0.090** -0.052 -0.004 
-
0.401*** -0.023 -0.053 0.027 
-
0.401*** -0.023 
 
(0.042) (0.174) (0.165) (0.148) (0.093) (0.074) (0.060) (0.148) (0.093) 
Zarqa 
-
0.117*** -0.006 -0.016 
-
0.374*** 0.131 -0.113** -0.013 
-
0.374*** 0.131 
 
(0.035) (0.110) (0.136) (0.138) (0.102) (0.052) (0.056) (0.138) (0.102) 
Madaba -0.028 0.255 0.013 -0.100 -0.011 0.095 -0.028 -0.100 -0.011 
 
(0.057) (0.355) (0.180) (0.246) -0.119 (0.119) (0.068) (0.246) (0.119) 
Irbid 
-
0.112*** -0.198 -0.152 
-
0.509*** 0.103 -0.099 0.052 
-
0.509*** 0.103 
 
(0.033) (0.121) (0.136) (0.133) (0.087) (0.062) (0.053) (0.133) (0.087) 
Mafreq -0.082* -0.255 0.169 - -0.152 -0.140 0.106* - -0.152 
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0.723*** 0.723*** 
 
(0.044) (0.227) (0.150) (0.242) (0.099) (0.097) (0.059) (0.242) (0.099) 
Jarash -0.054 -0.497** 0.140 -0.052 -0.081 0.036 0.047 -0.052 -0.081 
 
(0.049) (0.199) (0.180) (0.300) (0.117) (0.098) (0.064) (0.300) (0.117) 
Ajloun 0.150** 0.462 0.333* -0.357 0.090 0.208 0.279*** -0.357 0.090 
 
(0.058) (0.288) (0.173) (0.311) (0.123) (0.135) (0.070) (0.311) (0.123) 
Karak 0.082* 0.142 0.035 0.208 0.139 0.218** 0.123* 0.208 0.139 
 
(0.044) (0.215) (0.156) (0.235) (0.096) (0.100) (0.064) (0.235) (0.096) 
Tafileh 0.013 0.504 0.338* -0.827* 0.064 0.564*** -0.059 -0.827* 0.064 
 
(0.062) (0.363) (0.190) (0.438) (0.115) (0.153) (0.079) (0.438) (0.115) 
Ma'an -0.003 0.119 -0.063 -0.411 0.092 0.219* 0.005 -0.411 0.092 
 
(0.058) (0.203) (0.213) (0.437) (0.130) (0.120) (0.075) (0.437) (0.130) 
Aqaba 0.130** 0.223 -0.236 0.011 0.159 0.435*** 0.058 0.011 0.159 
 
(0.066) (0.271) (0.215) (0.316) (0.169) (0.128) (0.083) (0.316) (0.169) 
Selection term  male Private 
    
-
0.213*** 
   
      
(0.067) 
   Selection term male public 
     
0.013 
  
       
(0.059) 
  Selection term  female Private 
      
-0.049 
 
        
(0.109) 
 Selection term female Public 
       
0.015 
         
(0.080) 
Constant 
-
0.191*** 
-
0.343*** -0.046 0.013 0.019 -0.105 -0.070 0.098 -0.022 
 
(0.070) (0.108) (0.118) (0.229) (0.214) (0.129) (0.172) (0.313) (0.313) 
Observations 4877 2071 1897 402 507 2047 1892 398 506 
R-squared 0.174 0.158 0.142 0.293 0.214 0.158 0.141 0.299 0.215 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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